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Summary
This dissertation investigates the impact of different context factors such as domain,
identity, and measurement on political ideology and its psychological underpinnings.
Taking on an ecological perspective along the lines of Brunswik (1955, 1956), a special
focus is given to representative sampling of experimental stimuli.
The first project The Domain-Specificity of Need for Cognitive Closure tested the ide-
ology symmetry hypothesis with regard to domain-specificity of need for cognitive closure.
Three studies examined the influence of the political domain addressed on the relation
between need for cognitive closure and political ideology. Across three operationalizations
(discomfort with ambiguity, closed-mindedness, dogmatism), conservatives demonstrated
more need for cognitive closure than liberals regarding a conservative domain (religion),
and vice versa, liberals exhibited more need for cognitive closure regarding a liberal
domain (environment, climate change). Differences in discomfort with ambiguity (Study
2) and dogmatism (Study 3) between conservatives and liberals were attenuated when
personal relevance was accounted for.
The second project Putting ’Identity’ Back in Political Identification examined the
degree of entanglement between political attitudes (easy vs. hard policy issues) and the
level of identity (personal vs. political identity) dependent on one’s political orientation.
In two studies, individuals endorsed counter-attitudinal issues stronger when their personal
identity was salient, and pro-attitudinal issues more strongly when their political identity
was salient. This was only found for hard issues and for individuals whose ‘own’ party
(i.e., the party associated with their own political orientation) was not in government.
The third project Now More Than Ever! Can Exposure to Fake News Lead to
Polarization? investigated the effect of exposure to in- or out-group fake news on
political polarization. Exposure to in- and out-group fake news were associated with high
affective polarization (Study 1) while higher levels in attitude polarization were found
after exposure to out-group fake news (Study 2). Informing participants about the fake
XI
news nature of the post attenuated affective polarization for those perceiving the sender
to be an out-group member only (Study 2).
The fourth and final project Measuring Political Ideology - A Systematic Review aimed
at providing a systematic review of political ideology measurement with a special focus
on replicability and validity. Using a forward and backward snowballing search strategy,
we identified 394 articles of which 207 met all inclusion criteria. Overall, we cataloged
more than 60 unique ideological measures, of which only a third had been developed
and validated beforehand. About 50% of all identified ideological instruments lacked a
single mention of validation evidence. Indeed, the majority of the scales were on-the-fly
measures or a combination of items used in previous studies. Furthermore, the data
suggests that replicability might be restricted due to incomplete reporting of the items
used, and substantial variance in scoring and scale type. In summary, these circumstances
could hinder the ability to build on each other’s work and thus likely pose a serious threat
to the comparability and generalizability of findings.
Taken together, the four lines of research highlight the necessity of representative
sampling and context sensitivity when assessing the psychological foundations of political
attitudes. Implications of these four lines of research for the interpretation of existing
and the conduction of future research are discussed.
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Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht den Einfluss verschiedener Kontextfaktoren wie
Domäne, Identität und Messung auf politische Ideologie und ihre psychologischen Grund-
lagen. Unter Berücksichtigung einer ökologischen Perspektive in Anlehnung an Brunswik
(1955, 1956) wird ein besonderer Fokus auf repräsentatives Sampling experimenteller
Stimuli gelegt.
Das erste Projekt The Domain-Specificity of Need for Cognitive Closure testete die
Ideologie-Symmetrie-Hypothese im Hinblick auf die Domänenspezifität des Bedürfnisses
nach kognitiver Geschlossenheit. Drei Studien untersuchten den Einfluss der jeweiligen
politischen Domäne auf den Zusammenhang zwischen dem Bedürfnis nach kognitiver
Geschlossenheit und politischer Ideologie. Über drei Operationalisierungen hinweg
(Ambiguitätsintoleranz, Engstirnigkeit, Dogmatismus) zeigten Konservative ein höheres
Bedürfnis nach kognitiver Geschlossenheit als Liberale in Bezug auf eine konservative
Domäne (Religion), und umgekehrt zeigten Liberale ein höheres Bedürfnis nach kognitiver
Geschlossenheit in Bezug auf eine liberale Domäne (Umwelt, Klimawandel). Unterschiede
in Ambiguitätsintoleranz (Studie 2) und Dogmatismus (Studie 3) zwischen Konservativen
und Liberalen wurden abgeschwächt, wenn die persönliche Relevanz der jeweiligen Domäne
berücksichtigt wurde.
Das zweite Projekt Putting ’Identity’ Back in Political Identification untersuchte den
Grad des Zusammenhangs zwischen politischen Einstellungen (einfache vs. schwierige
politische Themen) und dem Grad der Identität (persönliche vs. politische Identität) in
Abhängigkeit von der eigenen politischen Orientierung. In zwei Studien befürworteten
Individuen einstellungs-diskonforme Aussagen stärker, wenn ihre persönliche Identität
salient war, und einstellungs-konforme Aussagen stärker, wenn ihre politische Identität
salient war. Dies wurde nur für schwierige politische Themen und für Personen gefunden,
deren ”eigene” Partei (d.h. die Partei, die mit ihrer eigenen politischen Orientierung
assoziiert war) nicht an der Regierung war.
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Das dritte Projekt Now More Than Ever! Can Exposure to Fake News Lead to
Polarization? untersuchte den Effekt einer Exposition gegenüber Eigen- oder Fremd-
Gruppen Fake News auf politische Polarisierung. Die Exposition gegenüber Eigen-
oder Fremd-Gruppen Fake News war mit einer hohen affektiven Polarisierung assoziiert
(Studie 1), während höhere Werte in der Einstellungspolarisierung nach Exposition
gegenüber Fremd-Gruppen Fake-News gefunden wurden (Studie 2). Die Aufklärung
der Proband*innen darüber, dass es sich um Fake News handelte, milderte die affektive
Polarisierung nur bei denjenigen ab, die den Absender als ein Fremd-Gruppenmitglied
wahrnahmen (Studie 2).
Das vierte und letzte Projekt Measuring Political Ideology - A Systematic Review zielte
darauf ab, einen systematischen Überblick über die Messung politischer Ideologie mit
besonderem Fokus auf Replizierbarkeit und Validität zu geben. Unter Verwendung einer
vorwärts und rückwärts gerichteten Schneeballsuchstrategie identifizierten wir 394 Artikel,
von denen 207 alle Einschlusskriterien erfüllten. Insgesamt katalogisierten wir mehr als
60 einzelne ideologische Maße, von denen nur ein Drittel zuvor validiert worden war. Bei
etwa 50% aller identifizierten ideologischen Instrumente fehlten Validierungsnachweise.
Die meisten Skalen waren ”on-the-fly”-Maße oder eine Kombination von Items, die in
früheren Studien verwendet wurden. Darüber hinaus deuten die Daten darauf hin, dass
die Replizierbarkeit, aufgrund unvollständiger Angaben zu den verwendeten Items und
einer erheblichen Varianz in Scorebildung und Skalentyp, eingeschränkt sein könnte.
Zusammenfassend könnten diese Umstände die Fähigkeit, auf den Arbeiten der anderen
aufzubauen, einschränken und somit potentiell eine Bedrohung für die Vergleichbarkeit
und Generalisierbarkeit der Ergebnisse darstellen.
Zusammengenommen unterstreichen die vier Forschungslinien die Notwendigkeit der
Berücksichtigung von sowohl repräsentativem Sampling als auch Kontextsensitivität
bei der Beurteilung psychologischer Grundlagen von politischen Einstellungen. Die
Implikationen dieser vier Forschungslinien für die Interpretation bestehender und die
Durchführung zukünftiger Forschung werden diskutiert.
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1. Introduction
“To know an object is to lead to it
through a context which the world
provides.”
William James, 1975, p. 35
When Aristotle referred to a any human being as a zoon politikon he described
them as being ”by nature a political animal” (Aristotle, trans. 2009, book 1, II).1
We are naturally sociable, drawn to social communities and as a function thereof, we
may naturally develop attitudes towards political matters (Piepenbrink, 2001). Modern
theories of political socialization still emphasize on the role of social context in the sense
that political attitudes develop within ecological systems (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). They
are shaped within micro- (family, peers, educational institutions) and macro-systems
(political events, socio-structural features, political systems, political climate), as well as
by the media (Eckstein, 2019). Understanding political attitudes as dynamic constructs
that develop within the complex interplay of various contextual factors, they may well,
once developed, also be affected by those same factors (Jennings, 1990). For instance,
historical events such as the Holocaust (Carmil & Breznitz, 1991), the Vietnam war
(Erikson & Stoker, 2011), the September 11 terrorist attacks (Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen,
2004), the German reunification (Friedrich & Förster, 1997), the arrival of migrants in
Europe (Zick, Pettigrew, & Wagner, 2008), or the COVID-19 pandemic (Reeskens et al.,
2020) were found to have had an impact on individuals’ political attitudes. But also less
incisive context factors such as media reporting (Lecheler & De Vreese, 2012; G. Lee &
Cappella, 2001), movies (Adkins & Castle, 2014), or the weather (Egan & Mullin, 2012)
can affect political attitudes.
1He goes on to explain that “he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is
either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the ’Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one’ whom Homer
denounces—the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at
draughts.”
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Accommodating said context-sensitivity, it is the aim of this dissertation to assess the
relationship of one’s political ideology to certain psychological underpinnings by, as the
opening quote states, leading to it “through a context which the world provides” (James,
1975, p. 35). Taking on an ecological perspective along the lines of Brunswik (1955,
1956), a special focus is given to representative sampling. Assuming that an individual’s
perception and behavior is always organized in reference to and not independent from
their environment (Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004, p. 959), Brunswik suggests that
research designs should be representative, in that experimental stimuli may be sampled
from within the individual’s environment that one wishes to generalize to. That is,
as Kessler, Proch, Hechler, and Nägler (2015, p. 31) put it, research should “follow
Brunswik’s idea of varying the environmental stimuli in order to disentangle psychological
processes from content. This would be possible only by varying the content of stimuli
either systematically or according to the typical distribution in a certain environment”.
Taking on an ecological perspective and considering contextual factors as a source of
variance, the four lines of research presented in this dissertation aim at extending our
knowledge on how psychological needs and motives relate to political ideology. The first
project assesses whether cognitive closure could be a function of the political domain in
question rather than one’s political ideology alone. The second project investigates the
role of identity on political attitudes, while the third tests the effect of real-life fake news
social media posts on political polarization. The final project takes on a meta-perspective
by conceptualizing measurement itself as a source of variance within a non-exhaustive
systematic literature review. An overview of relevant theories on the structure and
formation of political ideology precedes these four lines of research and intends to provide
the conceptual and theoretical background against which the present empirical work was
conducted.
2
2. Conceptual and Theoretical
Background
“Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue
from a number of different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints
of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation
does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and
hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of
empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses
and joining a majority, but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually
I am not.” Arendt, 1961, p. 241
It is what Kant (1790, p. 224 ff.) called enlarged mentality (erweiterte Denkungsart )
that Hannah Arendt refers to in her essay on Truth and Politics when she describes the
process of political opinion formation. The capacity to think in representative, general
terms rather than relying on one’s subjective evaluations only. According to Arendt
(1961, p. 242) opinion formation requires “disinterestedness, the liberation from one’s
own private interests ... and depends upon the degree of its impartiality”. However,
I suggest that the idea of impartial public opinion formation may be a desired rather
than an actual state. Scholars in psychology and political science have proposed multiple
theories about the origin of political opinions. Structuring these different accounts is
not a trivial task, especially given the multitude of terms that can be found in the
literature: political opinions, political attitudes, political orientation, or political ideology.
While conceptually, they can mean different things, this matter is rarely discussed. The
following section will provide definitions of these key concepts and discuss structure and
measurement of political ideology. A summary of the most prominent theories about the
formation of political opinions will be presented in the last section.
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2.1. Definitions
Understanding what drives an individual’s behavior can be seen as the core research
interest of social sciences at large. One concept that has been claimed to explain how
individuals navigate complex societal contexts is their respective ideology. Its popularity,
however, lead to a plethora of definitions, an issue that Gerring dubbed “semantic
promiscuity” (1997, p. 957). By providing an overarching taxonomy to classify prevalent
definitions of ideology at the time, he identified coherence to be the common denominator:
“Ideology, at the very least, refers to a set of idea-elements that are bound together, that
belong to one another in a non-random fashion” (Gerring, 1997, p. 980). According to
this framework, ideology can be about power, the world at-large and politics of which
he deems the latter to be the most common referent. Zooming in on political ideology,
Feldman (2013) states that this concept can be understood at multiple levels. They can
be formalized, prescriptive conceptions of political thought (e.g., Marxism, Liberalism,
Conservatism), or less formalized discursive conceptions that structure political debates,
parties, and platforms. Or they can be descriptive in that they “describe the ways
in which people organize their political attitudes and beliefs” (Feldman, 2013, p. 591).
Most definitions of ideology in psychology and political science revolve around this
descriptive understanding of it being a mental framework or schema that consists of an
interrelated network of beliefs and attitudes held by the individual (e.g., Denzau & North,
2000; Erikson & Tedin, 2015) often emphasizing that this framework is shared among
an identifiable group (e.g., Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Knight, 2006). A concise
definition of political orientation is more difficult to provide. Assuming that an ideology
can be conceptualized as a spectrum or dimension (e.g., Zaller, 1992, p. 26, see section
2.2), political orientation has been described as one’s location on this spectrum (Piurko,
Schwartz, & Davidov, 2011, p. 540). That is, the individual manifestation of a specific
ideology, also referred to as ideological orientation (Feldman, 2013; Jost, Federico, &
Napier, 2009).
Political attitudes are, as the term suggests, attitudes towards political issues. An
attitude according to Allport (1935, p. 810) is “a mental and neural state of readiness,
organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the indi-
vidual’s response to all objects and situations with which it is related”. In line with
Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p. 1) who define an attitude as “a psychological tendency that
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is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor”,
most definitions agree that the evaluative component is key to the concept of attitudes
(Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010). Thus, the evaluation of a certain political entity or situation,
that is, policy issues, reflects an individual’s political attitude on the matter. Carmines
and Stimson (1980) argued that political issues can be categorized as either easy or
hard. An easy issue is assumed to have become “so ingrained over a long period that
it structures voters’ ’gut responses’ to candidates and political parties” (p. 78), it is
symbolic rather than technical, deals with policy ends rather than means, and “is likely to
be an unresolved conflict long in the public eye” (p. 80). Hence, hard issues are technical
issues that deal with policy means and that may be relatively new to the political agenda
(Cizmar, 2011, p. 25). Social and cultural issues have been labeled easy given their
“highly symbolic, affectively charged, ends-focused” nature, while “more means-focused
issues of economics and scope of government” (Ellis & Stimson, 2012, p. 118) are assumed
to be hard (see also, Bailey, Sigelman, & Wilcox, 2003; Johnston & Wronski, 2015).
Contrasting attitudes with opinions, McNemar (1946, p. 289) states that “(n)o one has
ever seen an attitude; an attitude, however real to its possessor, is an abstraction the
existence of which is inferred either from nonverbal overt behavior, or from verbal or
symbolic behavior” while an opinion “is frequently defined as the verbal expression of
an attitude. This could mean that one can never hold an opinion unless it is expressed
...” (p. 289). Hence, a political opinion can be seen as the manifest representation of an
underlying latent political attitude.
It is the aim of this thesis to investigate the interplay between one’s political ideology,
that is, their interrelated and shared network of beliefs and attitudes, and various
contextual factors. For this purpose, we will refer to an individual’s self-placement on a
certain ideological spectrum as ideological orientation, and to their stated agreement or
disagreement with certain policy issues as political attitudes.
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2.2. Structure of Political Ideology
2.2.1. Dimensionality and Measurement
“We began to recognize each other: those who were loyal to religion and the
king took up positions to the right of the chair so as to avoid the shouts,
oaths, and indecencies that enjoyed free rein in the opposing camp.” Hodgson,
2018, p. 32
The origin of a left-right-spectrum to classify political ideologies dates back to the
French National Constituent Assembly of 1789 where those in favor of the status quo
were seated on the right, and the opponents, those in favor of limiting the powers of
monarchy, were seated on the left. While the meaning associated with left and right has
developed and broadened over the years (Hodgson, 2018), it is still commonly used to
describe the political spectrum in many Western countries (Bobbio, 1996). A functional
equivalent of the left-right-spectrum that is predominantly used in the United States, is
the liberal-conservative spectrum where left equates to liberal and right to conservative
(Fuchs & Klingemann, 1990). Both model ideology as onedimensional with left/liberal on
one end of the spectrum and right/conservative on the other. This corresponds to stances
on whether individuals advocate social change and reject inequality (left/liberal), or
resist social change and accept inequality (right/conservative, Fuchs & Klingemann, 1990;
Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009).2 In contrast, a substantial number of findings suggest
that ideology may be best represented in multidimensional models (Feldman, 2013).
Kerlinger (1967, 1972, 1984) was one of the first to provide factor-analytical evidence
for a multidimensional structure where Liberalism and Conservatism are modeled as
two orthogonal dimensions. In contrast to a unidimensional model where Liberalism is
essentially the opposite of Conservatism, “it is posited that liberals and conservatives
view the political world not from different sides of the same coin, but rather, if you
will, from the perspective of entirely different currencies” (Conover & Feldman, 1981,
p. 624). While Kerlinger’s orthogonality assumption was not found to hold (Sidanius &
Duffy, 1988), a bi-dimensional structure with moderately negatively correlated factors
was replicated multiple times (Choma, Busseri, & Sadava, 2009; Choma, Hafer, Dywan,
2However, see also Proch, Elad-Strenger, and Kessler (2019) where resistance/acceptance of social
change is understood as dependent on the degree to which conservatives and liberals approve of the
respective status quo.
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Segalowitz, & Busseri, 2012). Another popular strand of literature defined ideology within
a bi-dimensional space of economic and social preferences (Ashton et al., 2005; Carmines,
Ensley, & Wagner, 2012a; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Knight, 1999; Treier & Hillygus,
2009), economic and social conservatism (Everett, 2013; Henningham, 1996, 1997),
economic and social liberalism (Surridge, 2016), or cultural and market conservatism
(Brooks, 2011; Crowson, 2009; De Witte, 1990; Zumbrunnen & Gangl, 2008). Other
multidimensional conceptions differentiated between expansion of personal freedom and
government intervention in economic affairs (Maddox & Lilie, 1984), capitalism and
democracy (Chong, McClosky, & Zaller, 1983), liberty and equity (Rokeach, 1973), or
equality and order (Janda, Berry, Goldman, & Hula, 2004).
Often similar to but not identical with the distinction between one- and multidi-
mensional models is the difference betwen symbolic and operational ideology (Free &
Cantril, 1967; Stimson, 2004). Symbolic ideology refers to “general, abstract ideological
labels, images, and categories” (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, p. 312) in the sense of an
ideological self-identification, that is, the degree to which one sees themselves for instance
as either liberal or conservative. Commonly, this is implemented with a single item asking
the individual to indicate their political position along the respective dimension of, for
instance, conservatism or liberalism. In contrast, operational ideology reflects “the sum
of one’s preferences regarding the proper scope of government at the level of particular
social problems and values” (Ellis & Stimson, 2012, p. 16–17). Rather than an ideological
label (Conover & Feldman, 1981), operational ideology is defined by an individual’s policy
mood (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 2007) and their policy preferences, that is
their responses to either proposed or actual policy actions (Ellis & Stimson, 2012, p. 17).
Accordingly, operational ideology is measured by one’s level of agreement with multiple
statements on policy issues that may be attributed to an underlying latent ideology. Usu-
ally, symbolic ideology refers to a onedimensional ideological self-placement scale, while
operational ideology refers to a multidimensional attitude scale (Ellis & Stimson, 2012).
However, there are also examples in the literature where multidimensional constructs
are measured symbolically, that is, participants indicate whether their views on certain
policies (e.g., social or economic policies) are rather liberal or conservative (e.g., Klar,
2014; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002). Similarly, some measure
onedimensional constructs (e.g., Conservatism) operationally by assessing agreement or
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disagreement with certain policies and aggregating the answers to a composite score of
the respective construct (e.g., Sidanius, 1985; Wilson & Patterson, 1968, see Table 2.1
for an overview).
Table 2.1.
Political Ideology Measurement Examples
Onedimensional Multidimensional
Symbolic
left-right self-placement economic policy self-placement
liberal-conservative self-placement social policy self-placement
Operational
Wilson & Patterson (1968) Kerlinger (1984)
Sidanius (1985) Everett (2013)
In his seminal work, Converse (1964) found that most Americans’ operational ideology,
that is their issue preferences, were not consistent with their self-reported symbolic
ideology and that their preferences as measured by the American National Election Study
were not stable between points in time (i.e., between 1956, 1958, and 1960, respectively).
More specifically, the majority of those who indicated to be symbolically conservative
were found to hold operationally liberal attitudes, suggesting that “the political thinking
of much of the public cannot be adequately described as ideological in the sense of
deductive reasoning from politics and the social world” (Kinder, 1983, p. 416). This
operational-symbolic disconnect and the temporal instability were repeatedly found in the
following years and lead to the so called nonattitudes thesis stating that the public simply
held no attitudes on most issues (Converse, 1970, 2000; Lewis-Beck, Norpoth, Jacoby, &
Weisberg, 2008; Zaller, 1992). The reception of this work was quite controversial and
apparently Converse was asked to write an essay on the topic, titled ’How Dumb Are
the Voters Really?’ (Converse, 2000). While many authors disagreed with the claim
of nonattitudes and an operational-symbolic disconnect (Achen, 1975; Nie, Verba, &
Petrocik, 1976), the bottom line that most seemed to agree with was that “although
ideological identification and issue attitudes are often related, they are conceptually
and empirically distinct” (Popp & Rudolph, 2011, p. 809). Furthermore, it has to be
noted that the disconnect was substantially less severe for those who were well informed
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about or engaged in politics (Bennett, 2006; Converse, 1964; Federico & Schneider, 2007;
Layman & Carsey, 2002; Sidanius & Duffy, 1988; Zaller, 1992).
2.2.2. Conservatism and Liberalism
A morphological view of ideology posits that ideologies share each “many core, adjacent
and peripheral concepts, but arrange and order them in different ways” (Alexander, 2015,
p. 982). That is,
“Ideologies may be likened to rooms that contain various units of furniture in
proximity to each other ... If we find liberty, rationality, and individualism at
its center, while equality - though in evidence - decorates the wall, we are
looking at an exemplar of liberalism. If order, authority, and tradition catch
our eye upon opening the door, while equality is shoved under the bed or, at
best, one of its weaker specimens is displayed only when the guests arrive, we
are looking at a version of conservatism.” Freeden, 1996, p. 86–87
The latest version of The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies (Freeden, Sargent,
& Stears, 2013) alone lists twenty different ideologies that the authors deem an adequate
representation of modern ideological study. Turning to empirical research in social
sciences, it seems the majority of work revolves around the ideological concepts of
conservatism and liberalism. The reasons for this circumstance are manifold and in
their entirety beyond the scope of this thesis. One rather pragmatic reason being that
the traditional left-right continuum outlined above has come to be synonymous with
a conservative-liberal continuum over time (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). Another
theory explaining their relative primacy over other concepts is rooted in the assumption
that liberalism and conservatism, unlike other ideologies, address “every subject, every
self, every citizen, as if universal” (Alexander, 2015, p. 983). The following attempt of a
definition cannot do justice to the broad range of theories on conservative and liberal
ideology. Rather it provides an overview of relevant concepts and ideas associated with
or attached to liberalism and conservatism along three continua often conceptualized as
core components of both ideologies: resistance vs. acceptance of change, acceptance of
inequality vs. equality of opportunity, and free market vs. government regulation.
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Conservatism Adapting a morphological view of conservatism, Jost, Glaser, Kruglan-
ski, and Sulloway (2003b, p. 342–343) claim two core concepts, resistance to change and
acceptance of inequality, and a list of peripheral aspects, such as “desire for order and
stability, preference for gradual rather than revolutionary change (if any), adherence
to preexisting social norms, idealization of authority figures, punishment of deviants,
and endorsement of social and economic inequality”. Kerlinger (1984, p. 16–17) defines
conservatism by its “emphasis on the status quo and social stability, religion and morality,
liberty and freedom, the natural inequality of men, the uncertainty of progress, and
the weakness of human reason”. Conservatism is often characterized by a preference of
individualism over government regulation, holding an “excessively optimistic belief in the
ability of political action to transform society into a rationally grounded order in which
power will survive only as a benign instrument for facilitating desirable ends” (O’Sullivan,
2013, p. 293). Or as Kerlinger (1984, p. 16–17) put it, conservatism is characterized
by “distrust of popular democracy and majority rule and by support of individualism
and individual initiative, the sanctity of private property, and the central importance of
business and industry in the society”. Believing in free markets rather than governmental
intervention to reduce inequalities, conservatives believe that “expanding market freedom
and providing the ability to choose one’s own economic path are comparably more
important, and ultimately more prosperous for all citizens” (Ellis & Stimson, 2012, p. 5).
Liberalism A core component of liberalism is equality of opportunity that is to be
ensured by governmental intervention (Ellis & Stimson, 2012). Liberalism foresees a
“political order focused on impartiality, relative inclusiveness and a distribution of goods
and services that works for the benefit of all and especially the least well off” (Freeden
& Stears, 2013, p. 342). Kerlinger (1984, p. 15) also notes the emphasis of liberalism
on “constitutional participatory government and democracy, ... egalitarianism and the
rights of minorities ... and positive government action to remedy social deficiencies and
to improve human welfare”. Another core element is acceptance or promotion of social
progress and change (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Jost et al., 2003b; Kerlinger, 1984).
Other than conservatives who have a preference of free over regulated markets, “[l]iberals
believe that a market economy, whatever its virtues in the efficient creation of prosperity,
is a beast that needs the firm hand of government to tame it” (Ellis & Stimson, 2012,
p. 4). A preference of government intervention in business and trade rests on the notion
10
Chapter 2. Conceptual and Theoretical Background
that negative externalities caused by corporate interests should not be passed on to
society.
2.3. Psychological Theories on Political Attitude
Formation
Theories on how individuals form political attitudes abound the scientific literature. It
is beyond the scope of this thesis to give an accurate historical review of political theory on
this matter. Research in political science has predominantly focused on top-down processes
“whereby political elites in the media and elsewhere construct and publicly disseminate
ideological ’bundles’ ” (Jost, Kay, & Thorisdottir, 2009, p. 5). Psychologists, on the other
hand, have often focused on bottom-up approaches, modeling certain predispositions
as the underlying cause of political attitude formation. The theories outlined in the
following sections rely on different assumptions about the nature of these predispositions.
The first account emphasizes values as the foundation of attitudes (value account) while
the second conceptualizes needs and motives as such (cognitive-motivational account).
The third points out the role of identity underlying attitude formation (identity account ).
2.3.1. The Value Account
Values have been argued to be the “ultimate underpinnings of attitudes” (Feldman,
2003b, p. 479). While values are assumed to be equally evaluative in nature, they
are considered fewer and more central than attitudes (Rokeach, 1973). Bem (1970,
p. 16) defines a value as “a primitive preference for or a positive attitude toward certain
end-states of existence (like equality, salvation, self-fulfillment, or freedom) or certain
broad modes of conduct (like courage, honesty, friendship, or chastity)”. Given the
overall positive valence of values, most value theories agree that values are organized in
hierarchical systems structured by importance or “relative endorsement of values with
respect to each other” (Feldman, 2013, p. 603). While generally assumed to transcend
specific actions or situations, this respective relevance of some values over others in a given
situation can lead to competing values (Schwartz, 1992, 1996). Accordingly, attitudes
are guided “by tradeoffs among competing values that are implicated simultaneously in a
behavior or attitude” (Schwartz, 1996, p. 2). These value systems can be domain-general
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as outlined above, or domain-specific, “where each value dimension lends structure to
public opinions within a particular domain” (Zaller, 1992, p. 26). Domain-general value
systems can be about basic values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 1996), or moral values (Haidt
& Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Graham, 2007), and have been found to be closely interrelated
(Graham et al., 2011, 2013). Whereas political values, which are organized in a domain-
specific value system (Converse, 1964; Feldman, 1988; McCann, 1997; Schwartz, Caprara,
& Vecchione, 2010), can be seen as “characteristic adaptations of basic values to specific
political contexts” (Caprara & Vecchione, 2013, p. 37).
Basic Values Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) proposed that three universal require-
ments preceded basic values : “biologically based needs of the organism, social interactional
requirements for interpersonal coordination, and social institutional demands for group
welfare and survival” (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, p. 551). In his value theory, Schwartz
(1992) identified ten of such basic values which he assumed to be organized in four
higher-order dimensions: Openness to Change (self-direction, stimulation, hedonism),
Conservation (conformity, tradition, security), Self-Transcendence (universalism, benev-
olence), and Self-Enhancement (power, achievement). These basic values have been
found to predict certain political attitudes (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005;
Duriez, Luyten, Snauwaert, & Hutsebaut, 2002; Schwartz, 2012) and political ideology
more generally (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, &
Barbaranelli, 2006; Piurko et al., 2011).
Moral Values Moral foundations as introduced by Haidt and Joseph (2004, 2007) have
often been conceptualized as moral values (Feldman, 2003b). The authors themselves
describe them as “interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psycho-
logical mechanisms that function to suppress selfishness and make social life possible”
(Haidt, 2008, p. 70) and are “organized in advance of experience” (Graham, Haidt, &
Nosek, 2009, p. 1031). They identified five foundations on which humans are assumed
to rely when making moral judgments. Two individualizing foundations (harm/care,
fairness/reciprocity) that focus on the individual, and three binding foundations (in-
group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) that focus on the role of groups and
institutions (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009). Moral foundations
were found to predict a variety of political attitudes (Kertzer, Powers, Rathbun, & Iyer,
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2014; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Milesi, 2016) as well as ideological
orientation; liberals endorsed the individualizing more than the binding foundations while
conservatives endorsed all foundations equally (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham,
2007). In a series of experimental studies, Day, Fiske, Downing, and Trail (2014) reported
an interactive effect of ideological orientation and moral foundations on political attitudes.
Conservatives’ attitudes on pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal issues were stronger
when those issues were framed according to the binding moral foundations (as compared
to a control with no framing). For liberals, attitudes on pro-attitudinal issues were
stronger when framed according to any moral foundation as compared to a control.
Political Values An individual’s system of core political values consists of “overarching
normative principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship and ... society”
(McCann, 1997, p. 565). As such, political values “may act as more proximal determinants
of political choice than less overtly political values” (Caprara & Vecchione, 2013, p. 36)
and have been found to be expressions of underlying basic values (Schwartz et al.,
2010). Given the substantial variance regarding the number and content of political
values identified in the literature, Caprara and Vecchione (2013, p. 36) and Schwartz
et al. (2010, p. 424) report each an integrated, almost identical list of political values:
Traditional morality (traditional religious and family values versus newer, permissive
lifestyles), equality (egalitarian distribution of opportunities and resources), free enterprise
(the noninterference of government in the economic system), civil liberties (freedom
for everyone to act and think as they consider most appropriate), blind patriotism
(unquestioning attachment to, and intolerance of criticism of, one’s country), economic
security (guarantee of job and income), and law and order (enforcement and obedience
to law, protection against threats to the social order). Political values have been found
to predict a number of political attitudes (Feldman, 1988; Goren, 2001; McCann, 1997;
Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985; Pollock, Lilie, & Vittes, 1993; Zaller, 1992).
2.3.2. The Cognitive-Motivational Account
In a different approach, political attitude formation has been modeled along the lines
of motivated social cognition, emphasizing the interplay between cognitive properties and
psychological needs and motives (Kruglanski, 1996). Psychological needs and motives have
often been used interchangeably but can both be understood as “internal states or forces
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experienced as wishes and desires that lead to the achievement of specific goals” (Caprara
& Vecchione, 2013, p. 33–34). Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003a, p. 341)
argue in favor of a matching process wherein individuals adopt certain political attitudes
or ideologies assuming that those would satisfy their psychological needs and motives. In
a total of three meta-analyses, Jost and colleagues evaluated how epistemic and existential
motives were associated with ideology and ideological motives of group-based dominance,
system justification, and rationalization of self-interest (Jost et al., 2003b; Jost, Sterling,
& Stern, 2017; Jost, Stern, Rule, & Sterling, 2017). Epistemic motives “govern the ways
in which people seek to acquire beliefs that are certain and that help to navigate social
and physical worlds that are threateningly ambiguous, complex, novel, and chaotic”,
more specifically, they “affect the style and manner by which individuals seek to overcome
uncertainty and the fear of the unknown” (Jost et al., 2003b, p. 351). They identified a
list of psychological variables representing epistemic motives related to political ideology:
dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, integrative complexity, uncertainty avoidance, need
for order, structure, and closure, openness to new experience, cognitive and perceptual
rigidity, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, and self-deception. Existential motives
to reduce anxiety and threat, and establish a sense of safety and security were modeled
by psychological variables on loss prevention, self-esteem, mortality salience, subjective
perceptions of threat, exposure to objectively threatening circumstances, and death
anxiety. In later publications, they proposed relational motives, that is the “process of
social influence and the motivation to achieve and maintain ’shared reality’ with others”
(Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008, p. 172), to underpin political ideology and attitudes
in addition to epistemic and existential motives. They review evidence on the desire to
share reality, perceptions of in-group consensus, collective self-efficacy, homogeneity of
social networks, and the tendency to trust the government more when one’s own party is
in power (Hennes, Nam, Stern, & Jost, 2012; Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008; Jost,
2017). To the extent that a certain political ideology satisfies any of these motives, this
ideology should be preferred by individuals high in the respective motivation. Jost and
colleagues (Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999; Jost et al., 2003b) stated that this would be
the case for a conservative rather than a liberal ideology and assumed higher levels of a)
epistemic motives associated with certainty and closure, b) existential motives for safety,
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and c) relational motives for affiliation, on the political right rather than the political
left.
2.3.3. The Identity Account
A third perspective on political attitude formation evolved along the lines of social
identity theory (SIT, Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory
(SCT, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). While, objectively, anyone is
a member of a variety of groups (e.g., mammals, Europeans, brown-haired, Millenials),
not all of those may be psychological groups, that is, groups that are “psychologically
significant for the members, to which they relate themselves subjectively for social
comparison and the acquisition of norms and values ... , that they privately accept
membership in, and which influences their attitudes and behavior” (Turner et al., 1987,
p. 1–2). In short: objective group membership is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
for group identification in the sense of a “subjective, and internalized sense of belonging”
(Huddy, 2013, p. 738). A group membership that one identifies with, to which one attaches
value and emotional significance, and which is incorporated into their self-concept, has
been referred to as one’s social identity in SIT (Huddy, 2013; Tajfel, 1981). In contrast,
an individual’s personal identity comprises their self-concept on “attitudes, memories,
behaviours, and emotions that define them as idiosyncratic individuals, distinct from
other individuals” (Hornsey, 2008, p. 206).
In SCT, a cognitive elaboration of SIT, Turner et al. (1987) define social and personal
identity in terms of self-categorizations, that is “cognitive groupings of self and some
class of stimuli as identical and different from some other class” (Turner, Oakes, Haslam,
& McGarty, 1994, p. 454). Here, one’s social identity refers to a self-categorization
that represents someone in terms of within-category similarities and between-category
differences while one’s personal identity is a self-categorization that defines “the individual
as a unique person in terms of his or her individual differences from other (in-group)
persons” (Turner et al., 1994, p. 454). However, neither the structural content of the
categories nor the degree of inclusiveness alone define the difference between personal
and social identity. Rather, it is “the level of comparison and self-categorization that is
actually taking place, and the subjective sense of self that results” in a specific instant
(Turner et al., 1994, p. 455). That is, for instance, being Christian can be a distinguishing
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attribute if one’s group of friends is non-religious, and a shared attribute when attending
a church service.
Social identities resulting from self-categorizations with political relevance are political
identities (Huddy, 2013). Some identities are inherently political, for instance, identifying
as a member of a political party. Others, based on self-categories such as gender, religion,
sexual orientation, or ethnicity, can potentially gain political relevance and become
political identities. Based on cluster analyses, Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Ethier (1995)
examined the structure of political identities (e.g., conservative, Democrat, feminist) and
found them to be social and collective rather than personal and individualistic. Similarly,
symbolic ideology in the sense of ideological identification or party identification has been
suggested to be equivalent to one’s social or political identity (Conover & Feldman, 1984;
Devine, 2015; Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2004; Huddy, 2001; Kelly, 1989).3 In line
with Turner et al. (1994, p. 461) who argued information processing to be an “emergent
group process” rather than “purely individual, private, asocial, and nonnormative”,
Huddy (2013, p. 739) states that political identities may underlie political cohesion, that
is, “shared political attitudes, beliefs, and behavior among group members”. Correlational
data from both, psychology and political science provides evidence for the claim that
one’s political identity in terms of social groups based on politically relevant criteria such
as socio-economic status, gender or ethnicity (Conover & Feldman, 1984), party affiliation
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1980; Carsey & Layman, 2006; Converse, 1964;
Green et al., 2004) or symbolic ideology (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2006; Baldassarri &
Gelman, 2008; Zaller, 1992) is associated with their political opinions.
According to SCT, social identities vary in salience across situations. Drawing on
Bruner (1957), Oakes (1987, p. 118) defines a salient group membership as “functioning
psychologically to increase the influence of one’s membership in that group on perception
and behaviour, and/or the influence of another person’s identity as a group member
on one’s impression of and hence behaviour towards that person”. Salience understood
this way depends on the interaction between accessibility and fit. Social categories “may
be fleetingly accessible if they are primed in the situation, or they may be chronically
accessible if frequently activated or if people are motivated to use them” (Hornsey, 2008,
p. 208). Fit can be comparative or normative. Comparative fit is determined by the
3In this context a social identity determined by symbolic ideology has also been referred to as
ideological identity (Popp & Rudolph, 2011) or ideological social identity (Devine, 2015).
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meta-contrast ratio, that is, the relation of inter- to intra-category differences. The larger
the ratio, the more likely will this categorization become salient (Turner et al., 1987,
1994). Normative fit or cue validity (Rosch, 1978, p. 30) is
a probabilistic concept; the validity of a given cue x as a predictor of a given
category y (the conditional probability of y|x) increases as the frequency
with which cue x is associated with category y increases and decreases as
the frequency with which cue x is associated with categories other than y
increases.
More specifically, “as the degree to which observed similarities and differences between
people (or their actions) are perceived as correlated with a division into social categories”
(Oakes, 1987, p. 130). As Conover and Feldman (1981, p. 642) noted, “ideological
identifications should act as cues or reference points in the evaluation” and thus prime a
certain political identity. Turner et al. (1987) propose a functional antagonism where as
one identity increases in salience, other identities become less salient. However, whether
or not identities are functionally antagonistic, is highly disputed (e.g., Abrams & Hogg,
2004). The fundamental mechanism in which identity turns “group normative attitudes
into individually held attitudes” is that of social categorization and prototype-based
depersonalization (Hogg & Smith, 2007, p. 120). Salience of a specific social category and
associated identity may lead to depersonalization (Onorato & Turner, 2002) by which
Turner et al. (1987, p. 50) mean “the process of ’self-stereotyping’ whereby people come
to perceive themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than
as unique personalities”. Depersonalization results in perception of self and others that
is tinted by category prototypes. Prototypes contain a meaningfully correlated set of
attributes about what defines the group and what differentiates them from others. It is
also prescriptive with regard to appropriate behavior and attitudes, that is “how people
ought to behave as category members, what attitudes they ought to hold” (Hogg & Smith,
2007, p. 94). Prototypes are instrumental in that they optimize the meta-contrast-ratio,
that is the ratio of average intergroup differences over average intragroup differences
(Turner et al., 1987, p.47). Attitudes based on ingroup prototypes thus tend to converge
to the ingroup normative attitudes and may be “more extreme than the majority of
ingroup members’ attitudes” (Hogg & Smith, 2007, p. 94). In this sense, multiple studies
have found shifts towards a perceived ingroup norm regarding non-political (Abrams,
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Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Terry & Hogg, 1996) and political attitudes
(Cohen, 2003; Conover & Feldman, 1984; Malka & Lelkes, 2010; McGarty, Turner, Hogg,
David, & Wetherell, 1992; Popp & Rudolph, 2011; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen,
2003).
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3. Overview of the Present Studies
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to evaluate the stability of political atti-
tudes and their psychological underpinnings in the face of situational and methodological
variance. Four research questions guided the present work of which each will be addressed
in a separate chapter: 1) Does the propensity for cognitive closure depend on the political
domain in question rather than one’s political ideology alone?, 2) Are there differences in
identity-based attitude shifts with regard to the nature of the policy issue addressed?, 3)
Can exposure to fake news in the media have an effect on an individual’s polarization in
affect and attitudes?, and 4) How much variability has there been in social sciences with
regard to empirical measurement of political ideology?
The first project is joint work with Thomas Kessler4 and focused on a potential
domain-specificity of cognitive closure (see Chapter 4). The aim of this chapter was
to evaluate the competing hypotheses of ideology asymmetry and ideological symmetry
(e.g., Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014; Conway et al., 2016;
Jost et al., 2003b; Tetlock, 1984) with regard to epistemic motivation. In three studies,
we explored whether psychological constructs associated with high levels of epistemic
motivation were sensitive to variations of the political domain in question. A systematic
variation of domain within each study aimed at assessing the degree to which epistemic
motivation was associated with ideological orientation. In Study 1 we explored differences
in discomfort with ambiguity between liberals and conservatives for conservative (religion)
and liberal domains (environment). In an attempt to replicate results observed in Study
1, we reassessed domain-specificity on discomfort with ambiguity and introduced closed-
mindedness as a second empirical indicator for epistemic motivation in Study 2. Study 3
built on the previous studies by expanding the scope of domain to five topics (religion,
climate change, abortion, same-sex marriage, and gun ownership) and dogmatism as the
dependent variable.
4Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany
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The second project was conducted as part of a research stay with Stephen W. Wright5.
Building on theoretical notions from social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner,
1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), we proposed that identity-based
attitude shifts would depend on the nature of the policy issue addressed (see Chapter
5). According to self-categorization theorists, a salient social identity likely provokes
prototype-based depersonalization processes whereby attitudes converge to a perceived
ingroup norm (Hogg & Smith, 2007; Turner et al., 1987). We introduced the distinction
between easy and hard issues mostly made by political scientists (Carmines & Stimson,
1980) to investigate whether a shift in identity would be associated with a shift in
attitudes for both kinds of issues. Most studies that reported attitude shifts had focused
on one hard issue and used source cues as identity salience manipulation (Cohen, 2003;
Malka & Lelkes, 2010; Popp & Rudolph, 2011). We built on this work by introducing
a set of both, easy and hard issues, and manipulated salience by a simple writing task
that did not contain cues with regard to ingroup norms. This design was tested with a
Canadian sample in Study 1 and with a sample from the United States in Study 2.
In the third project, Thomas Kessler and I assessed whether exposure to fake news
of either in- or out-group members affected polarization in both, affect and attitudes
(see Chapter 6). While intentional dissemination of deceptive information is not a novel
phenomenon (Posetti & Matthews, 2018), the introduction of the internet and social
media have lowered the barriers for misinformation to spread more quickly and efficiently
than ever (Greifeneder, Jaffé, Newman, & Schwarz, 2021). Along with the phenomenon
of filter bubbles where users are placed in like-minded clusters based on their online
activity (Pariser, 2011, p. 10), there is a trend towards increasing political polarization
in elites (Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013; Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz, 2006),
as well as the mass public (Carmines, Ensley, & Wagner, 2012b; Prior, 2013) in many
countries (Boxell, Gentzkow, & Shapiro, 2020; Pontusson & Rueda, 2008; Yang et al.,
2016). This chapter empirically tests the hypothesis put forward by theorists and in
simulations (Azzimonti & Fernandes, 2018; Ribeiro, Calais, Almeida, & Meira, 2017;
Tucker et al., 2018) that exposure to online fake news can exacerbate polarization in
affect and attitudes of the electorate. Two studies presented participants with real-life
fake news and orthogonally crossed correction (disclosure vs. no disclosure) and group
5Simon Fraser University Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
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membership of the sender (in-group vs. out-group vs. ambiguous). In doing so, the
impact of exposure to online fake news on affective (Study 1) and attitude polarization
(Study 2) was compared as a function of whether or not participants knew the social
media post was factually incorrect and their identification with the perceived sender.
The final paper in this dissertation is a non-exhaustive literature review that I
conducted with Flavio Azevedo6 (see Chapter 7). Measuring an individual’s political
ideology has been at the heart of a substantial body of research in social sciences
throughout the last century. As the scientific discourse, especially in social psychology,
was heavily affected by the so-called Replication Crisis in the past years, the importance
of reproducible science has become increasingly apparent (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012).
Furthermore, as politico-psychological phenomena are mostly latent, in that the constructs
of interest are not directly observable, its measurement requires appropriate psychometric
development and validation. The lack thereof may affect the verity of reported findings
as well as their replicability. With the recent surge in interest in politico-psychological
research, instruments intending to gauge one’s location on the ideological space abound
in the marketplace. Yet, while producing multiple instruments for the same construct
may be convenient, it is unlikely that they are all equally valid indicators of ideological
content. In a non-exhaustive literature review, we have surveyed nearly 400 scientific
articles that include a measure of ideology and report the implications of our findings for
the comparability, applicability, and validity of ideological instruments.
6Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany
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4. The Domain-Specificity of Need for
Cognitive Closure
4.1. Introduction
For more than half a century, psychological underpinnings of political ideology have
been a topic of interest for researchers and the public alike. Identifying what differentiates
the politically liberal or leftist from the politically conservative or rightist has continuously
been informing work from multiple disciplines, most prominently in political science and
psychology. Research throughout the last decades has mostly been in line with the so called
ideology asymmetry hypothesis7 claiming systematic differences in psychological make-up
between conservatives and liberals. In an extensive meta-analysis, Jost et al. (2003b)
reviewed multiple psychological motives that may underlie these differences, concluding
at one point that “[b]y far the most convincing research on left-right differences pertains
to epistemic motives” (p. 352). In his theory of lay epistemics, Kruglanski originally
defined epistemic motivation as “motivation toward knowledge as object” (1990, p. 335)
emerging from an “individual’s cost-benefit analysis of given epistemic end states” (p.
336). It can thus be understood as a factor underlying and shaping deliberation and
information processing (Abele & Gendolla, 2002). Kruglanski and Webster emphasize
need for cognitive closure as one epistemically relevant motivation and define it as “an
individual’s desire for a firm answer to a question and an aversion to ambiguity” (1996,
p. 467). When faced for instance with a complex decision, an individual high in need for
cognitive closure would be pressed to come to a conclusion quickly, whereas an individual
low in need for cognitive closure would not be bothered by having to tolerate the epistemic
uncertainty and hence, allow themselves more time to come to a conclusion.
7Also called rigidity of the right (Tetlock, 1984) or authoritarian personality hypothesis (Sidanius,
1985).
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Epistemic motives in general and need for cognitive closure in specific, are assumed to
vary as a function of both, the situation and the person (Kruglanski, 1990; Kruglanski &
Webster, 1996; D. M. Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Intrapersonal, that is situational,
differences may occur whenever external (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kruglanski &
Webster, 1996; D. M. Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996) or internal (Sorrentino,
Bobocel, Gitta, Olson, & Hewitt, 1988; D. M. Webster & Kruglanski, 1997) circumstances
make information processing seemingly costly. In both cases, need for closure “fosters
the tendency to seize on information that affords closure and to freeze on closure once it
has been attained” (Jost et al., 2003b, p. 348). The most common operationalization of
interpersonal differences in epistemic motivation has been the need for cognitive closure.
D. M. Webster and Kruglanski (1994) modeled this construct as a latent variable with
five manifest dimensions: preference for order and structure, discomfort with ambiguity,
decisiveness, predictability, and close-mindedness. Similarly, Jost et al. (2003b) list the
need for order, structure, and closure, discomfort with ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance,
dogmatism, cognitive complexity, and closed-mindedness as empirical constructs under-
lying epistemic motivation. Linking the latter to political ideology, Kruglanski (2013,
p. 27) argues that - ceteris paribus - conservative contents should generally be preferred
by individuals high in need for closure given their tendency to prefer the status quo over
change (but see also, Proch et al., 2019). Conservative ideologies emphasize on tradition
and promise “epistemic stability, clarity, order, and uniformity” (Jost et al., 2003b, p. 348)
while liberal ideologies promote “the potentiality for change, openness, and the belief in
progress (and hence, inevitably, change)” (Kruglanski, 2013, p. 28). In fact, literature
supporting the ideological asymmetry hypothesis repeatedly reported higher levels of
discomfort with ambiguity or uncertainty (Fibert & Ressler, 1998; Jost et al., 2007;
Kossowska & Hiel, 2003), cognitive rigidity (Kemmelmeier, 2007; Rock & Janoff-Bulman,
2010), dogmatism (Choma et al., 2012; Kerlinger & Rokeach, 1966; Rokeach, 1960), or
need for cognitive closure (Chirumbolo, 2002; De Zavala, Cislak, & Wesolowska, 2010;
D. M. Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) in conservatives rather than liberals.
There is, however, a substantial body of literature challenging the assumption of
fundamental differences between conservatives and liberals in psychological make-up, thus
arguing in favor of an ideology symmetry hypothesis8. The rationale being that while beliefs
8Also called extremism (Sidanius, 1985) or ideologue hypothesis (Tetlock, 1984).
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and values may vary along the political spectrum (Feldman, 2013; Graham et al., 2013),
the motivation to defend them does not, resulting in “bias and intolerance toward different
topics and targets” for liberals and conservatives, respectively (Ditto et al., 2019, p. 276).
Accordingly, Conway et al. (2016) found self-identified liberals to be more dogmatic and
cognitively complex regarding liberal domains than self-identified conservatives and vice
versa. This domain- or context-specificity9 was also found for authoritarianism (Conway,
Houck, Gornick, & Repke, 2018), intolerance towards outgroups (Brandt et al., 2014;
Crawford & Pilanski, 2014), obedience to authority (Frimer, Gaucher, & Schaefer, 2014),
selective exposure to opposing information (Frimer, Skitka, & Motyl, 2017), attributional
processes (Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010), the formation of attitudes towards new
stimuli (Fiagbenu, Proch, & Kessler, 2019, 2020; Ruisch, Shook, & Fazio, 2020), and
disgust sensitivity (Elad-Strenger, Proch, & Kessler, 2020). According to Kruglanski
(2013), need for closure “refers to a content-free tendency to seize and freeze on any
relevant notions that happen to be accessible” and that “a person with a high need for
closure may well be a rigid (or conservative!) liberal, if liberal notions were accessible in
her or his environment” (p. 50-51). Hence, content-free (henceforth, domain-general, see
Conway et al., 2016) need for closure becomes (domain-)“specific with regard to contents
that are explicitly related to closure” (Jost et al., 2003b, p. 348).
The following three studies examined whether and how a variation of the domain
addressed would affect the link between epistemic motivation and ideological orientation.
It focused on discomfort with ambiguity, closed-mindedness, and dogmatism as opera-
tionalizations of need for cognitive closure. Study 1 intended to explore differences in
discomfort with ambiguity between liberals and conservatives for conservative (religion)
and liberal domains (environment), respectively. Expanding on and partly replicating
these results, Study 2 investigated domain-specificity in discomfort with ambiguity and
closed-mindedness. Furthermore, the influence of personal relevance of domain was
considered in Study 2 and 3. Study 3 aimed at testing whether the pattern would hold
for dogmatism as dependent variable and more than two domains.
9Similar to (Conway et al., 2016, p. 2), we define domain-specific as indicating “the particular content
that comprises the thought-about subject”.
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4.2. Study 1
This study focused on intolerance of ambiguity as one of the oldest constructs making
up the overarching concept of need for cognitive closure. It is one of the constructs
that has persistently been conceptualized as a correlate of political conservatism and
right-wing authoritarianism since its emergence in the 1950s (Furnham & Ribchester,
1995; Jost et al., 2003b). First mentioned by Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) intolerance of
ambiguity describes an individual’s tendency to “perceive ambiguous situations as sources
of threat” (Budner, 1962, p. 29). According to Bhushan and Amal (1986) such ambiguous
situations can result in individual reactions on different levels. They may lead to rigid
black and white perceptions (cognitive level), or emotions such as “uneasiness, discomfort,
dislike, anger and anxiety” (affective level, Grenier, Barrette, & Ladouceur, 2005, p. 594).
Similarly, D. M. Webster and Kruglanski (1994) modeled discomfort occasioned by
ambiguity as one aspect underlying need for cognitive closure. They assumed that an
absence of closure was inherent to ambiguous situations and that individuals with a
high need for closure would perceive such situations as aversive. While they consider
discomfort with ambiguity to be closely related to intolerance of ambiguity on a conceptual
level, they noted that previous scales on intolerance of ambiguity included items that
“seem to address issues other than intolerance of ambiguity” (D. M. Webster & Kruglanski,
1994, p. 1054). Hence, they included discomfort with ambiguity as a subscale of the
Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NFCS) capturing the affective reactions of exposure to
ambiguous situations. The discomfort with ambiguity scale as designed by D. M. Webster
and Kruglanski (1994) is considered neutral regarding situational content. Accordingly, we
expected to replicate previous findings linking higher levels of discomfort with ambiguity
with a more politically conservative attitude (Jost et al., 2007; Kossowska & Hiel, 2003).
Our first hypothesis states higher levels of domain-general discomfort with ambiguity for
conservatives compared to liberals.
When assessing the degree to which discomfort elicited by ambiguous situations is
linked to ideological orientation, we argue that the type of situation, that is, the topic ad-
dressed, needs to be taken into account. Certain topics or issues can be seen as inherent to
a conservative or liberal ideology, respectively (Feldman, 2003b). Consequently, a certain
ideological orientation usually coincides with a firm stance on a topic inherent to one’s
own ideology. Taking this into account, we assumed that ambiguity regarding ideology-
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inherent topics might result in a more aversive reaction. More specifically, the purpose of
this study was to test whether variance in discomfort with ambiguity between situations
where the domain addressed was either liberal or conservative could be accounted for
by ideological orientation. Replicating and expanding the work of Conway et al. (2016),
we hypothesized that the relation between ideological orientation and discomfort with
ambiguity may be domain-specific rather than domain-general. Identical to their study,
we chose the topics of religion and environment. Both, theoretical (Hamilton, 2020;
Miller, 1994) and empirical work (Lewis & Maltby, 2000) on ideological orientation found
religion to be a topic that is inherent to political conservatism. Environmental topics on
the other hand are and have been addressed more often by liberals than conservatives in
the US and Western European countries (McCright, Dunlap, & Marquart-Pyatt, 2016).
In a recent analysis of Twitter messages about what constitutes a good society, Sterling,
Jost, and Hardin (2019) found religion and environmental topics (e.g., climate change,
climate future, clean energy) to be among the dominant topics for conservatives and
liberals, respectively. Thus, the second hypothesis assumes conservatives to experience
more discomfort in ambiguous religious situations than liberals and vice versa in am-
biguous environmental situations. Regarding differences within a political group, the
third hypothesis states that conservatives would experience less discomfort in ambiguous
environmental compared to ambiguous religious situations. And vice versa we predicted




A minimum sample size of 158 participants required to detect effects at the .05 level
with a medium effect size (Cohen’s f = .25) and a power of .80 was determined by an a
priori power analysis in G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). 544 U.S.
citizens (6.3% males) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in June 2018 and
were paid a small fee for their participation. Only one participant had to be excluded
from the analysis due to failed attention checks and non-meaningful answering patterns10.
10More specifically, the participant indicated the same number on every Likert scale administered.
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The final sample comprised N = 543 (control: n = 148; religion: n = 189; environment:
n = 206) individuals with a mean age of M = 37.03 (SD = 12.59) of whom 39.15%
were female. The majority of participants (47.88%) indicated to be very liberal, liberal
or somewhat liberal whereas 31.86% indicated to be very conservative, conservative or
somewhat conservative (see Table A.4 in the appendix for sample sizes per condition and
ideological orientation). The survey was completed with an average time of M = 9.91
(SD = 5.74) minutes.
Instruments and Procedure
In a between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to one of three
priming conditions (control: n = 148; religion: n = 189; environment: n = 206).
Subjects completed measures of discomfort with ambiguity, and indicated their ideological
orientation.
Priming Manipulation In each of the conditions participants were asked to write a
minimum of 300 words on either their daily routine on a weekday (control), their attitude
towards the significance of religion in our society (religion), or the significance of climate
change in our society (environment) while highlighting the aspects most important to
them. Answers were checked for validity with regard to contents by the authors.
Discomfort with Ambiguity As found in previous studies, most of the scales that
have been used to measure discomfort with ambiguity were either low in internal consis-
tency (Budner, 1962; Bors, Gruman, & Shukla, 2010) or contained non-neutral, mostly
conservatively biased wording (D. M. Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). One exception is the
Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NFCS) (D. M. Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) that has
been found to have a high internal consistency (Kelemen, Péter Szabó, Mészáros, Forgas,
& László, 2014; Kossowska & Hiel, 2003), neutral, non-biased wording (Bolesta, 2017),
and which had been used to link political conservatism to discomfort with ambiguity
before (Kossowska & Hiel, 2003; Okimoto & Gromet, 2016). To measure discomfort
with ambiguity, the nine item discomfort with ambiguity subscale of the NFCS was
used. Corresponding to their assigned condition, participants were either given the
original scale (control) or a domain-specific scale (religion or environment). To introduce
domain-specificity, the terms ‘religion’ or ‘environment’ were added to the item, always
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maintaining the original item structure. The item “In most social conflicts, I can easily
see which side is right and which is wrong” for instance was rephrased as either “In
most conflicts on religious topics, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong”
(religion) or ”In most conflicts on environmental topics, I can easily see which side is
right and which is wrong” (environment). McDonald’s omega suggested high internal
consistency for each of the scale composites (original scale: ωt = .85, religion: ωt = .85,
environment: ωt = .82, see Table A.1 for all items).
11 High levels indicate high levels of
discomfort with ambiguity.
Ideological Orientation Ideological orientation was assessed with a standard 7-point
Likert ideological self-placement scale (1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative) that has
commonly been used in previous studies on the matter (Conway et al., 2016; Jost et
al., 2003b). Participants were categorized as either conservatives (n = 173; those who
scored above 4 on the ideological self-placement scale) or liberals (n = 260; those who
scored below 4 on the ideological self-placement scale), thereby ignoring participants who
indicated to be middle of the road (i.e., indicated a score of 4) when it comes to their
ideological orientation (see Table A.4 in the appendix for sample sizes per condition and
ideological orientation).
4.2.2. Results
A two-way ANOVA testing the effects of ideological orientation (conservative, liberal)
and domain (control, religion, environment) on discomfort with ambiguity was conducted.
We found a large main effect of domain, F (2, 427) = 71.08, p < .001, η2 = .24, a small
main effect of ideological orientation, F (1, 427) = 5.26, p = .02, η2 = .01, and the expected
interaction, F (2, 417) = 12.90, p < .001, η2 = .06 (see Figure 4.1).
11Cronbach’s alpha has been found to underestimate reliability if items in a scale are not tau-equivalent
(Deng & Chan, 2017), and thus statisticians have recommended the use of McDonald’s omega rather
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Figure 4.1.. Study 1: Two-Way Interaction of Ideological Orientation and Domain on
Discomfort with Ambiguity.
Bonferroni-corrected comparisons of the means (see Table 4.1) showed that within the
control condition, conservatives (M = 4.98, SD = .73) and liberals (M = 4.72, SD = .98)
displayed similar levels of discomfort with ambiguity, t(427) = 1.30, p = .20, d = .30.
Compared to conservatives (M = 4.15, SD = 1.22), liberals experienced more dis-
comfort with ambiguity in the environment condition, M = 4.59, SD = .93, t(427) =
−2.45, p = .02, d = −.41. Vice versa, conservatives (M = 3.85, SD = 1.33) experi-
enced more discomfort with ambiguity in the religion condition than liberals, M =
3.01, SD = 1.23, t(427) = 4.76, p < .001, d = .66. Within liberals, we found higher levels
of discomfort with ambiguity in the environment compared to the religion condition,
(t(427) = 10.14, p < .001, d = 1.46. The same difference was found for conservatives but
did not reach statistical significance, t(427) = 1.49, p = .41, d = .23.
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Table 4.1.
Study 1: Mean Levels of Discomfort With Ambiguity Per Domain and Ideological Orien-
tation.
Overall Control Religion Environment
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Overall 4.14 1.28 4.76 1.02 3.38 1.32 4.39 1.05
Conservative 4.30 1.23 4.98 .73 3.85 1.33 4.15 1.22
Liberal 4.05 1.32 4.72 .98 3.01 1.23 4.59 .93
4.2.3. Discussion
The aim of Study 1 was to determine whether the relation between discomfort with
ambiguity and ideological orientation was domain-specific rather than domain-general.
Contrary to expectations, we did not replicate previous findings of higher domain-general
discomfort with ambiguity in conservatives (e.g.., Jost et al., 2007; Kossowska & Hiel,
2003). As stated in our second hypothesis, we found conservatives to experience more
discomfort in ambiguous religious situations than liberals, and liberals to experience
more discomfort in ambiguous environmental situations than conservatives. Our third
hypothesis assumed conservatives to express more discomfort with ambiguity in the
religion compared to the environment condition, and vice versa for liberals. Levels were
higher in the environment condition for both ideological groups, yet, the difference was
statistically significant for liberals only. In summary, the present results suggest that an
individual’s discomfort with ambiguity largely depends on the domain addressed, thus,
lending first support to the overarching hypothesis of domain-specificity.
While a first main effect of ideological orientation indicated higher levels of discomfort
with ambiguity for conservatives, this difference was no longer significant when domain
was accounted for. However, compared to the domain-specific conditions, discomfort
with ambiguity was most pronounced in the control condition for conservatives and
liberals alike. One reading of these results could be that even if items in the control
condition were phrased domain-unspecific, that is allegedly neutral, they wouldn’t make
sense in a semantic vacuum. Items such as I don’t like situations that are uncertain
might make an individual think of a situation where they experienced uncertainty even
if they were not explicitly asked to do so. Naturally, an experimenter cannot control
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for these associations. Hence, it may well be that ambiguous situations where the
domain was not further specified were perceived as generally more ambiguous than
domain-specific situations. Literature associated with the ideology asymmetry hypothesis
suggests political conservatism to be related with higher levels of uncertainty avoidance
(Wilson, 1973). Thus, uncertainty regarding the specific contents of a situation may
confound results for conservatives. Given, however, that we found similarly high levels of
discomfort for liberals, they might either also be affected by the uncertainty elicited or
by yet another mechanism that we have not yet considered in our design.
For within-domain comparisons between ideological groups, we assumed higher levels
of discomfort in ambiguous religious situations for conservatives when compared to
liberals, and vice versa higher levels of discomfort in ambiguous environmental situations
for liberals when compared to conservatives. While no significant differences between
ideological groups were found in the control condition, differences were significant and as
expected in both domain-specific conditions. When religion was primed and included in
the scale, conservatives expressed significantly higher levels of discomfort than liberals.
Similarly, liberals expressed significantly higher levels of discomfort than conservatives
in the environment condition. Thus, it seems that the direction of association between
ideological orientation and discomfort with ambiguity is heavily domain-specific.
We had further hypothesized that between-domain comparisons within ideological
groups would reveal ideology-dependent differences in discomfort with ambiguity between
the two domain-specific conditions, respectively. More specifically, conservatives were
expected to have higher levels in the religion than in the environment condition. For
liberals we expected higher levels in the environment than in the religion condition. Our
results were partly in line with these expectations. We found that liberals did indeed
experience more discomfort with ambiguity in the environment than in the religion
condition. However, a statistically non-significant trend towards higher levels in the
environment condition was also found for conservatives. In the absence of further variables
that could explain this pattern, we suggest that either liberals’ discomfort in ambiguous
situations depends more strongly on the domain addressed than it does for conservatives.
Or the statistical model may still be lacking additional explanatory variables that would
need to be accounted for in subsequent studies. Another reason could be the semantic
scope of the domains. While both, religion and environment are somewhat value-laden
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and encompass a rather vast semantic realm, environment is not solely associated with
topics regarding for instance climate change or environmental protection, but also with
the environment in terms of one’s surroundings more generally. Going further, it may be
imperative to choose a more specific and unambiguous wording to test domain-specificity.
Therefore, we suggest a further variation of stimuli other than religion and environment
in order to map alleged differences more systematically.
4.3. Study 2
Study 1 showed that domain-specificity in discomfort with ambiguity may be assumed
for both, liberals and conservatives. Conservatives showed similar levels of discomfort
with ambiguity in both domain-specific conditions that were overall lower than those in
the domain-general condition. When compared to self-identified liberals, they experienced
significantly more discomfort with ambiguity in the religion and significantly less in the
environment condition. For liberals, we found discomfort with ambiguity to be most
pronounced in the environment compared to the religion condition. Given these results, it
was the aim of Study 2 to test whether this pattern would replicate, whether it would hold
for other measures of need for cognitive closure and to introduce a potential explanatory
variable. Hence, hypotheses were the same as in Study 1: A first hypothesis assumes
higher levels of domain-general discomfort with ambiguity and closed-mindedness for
conservatives compared to liberals. A second hypothesis states conservatives to experience
more discomfort with ambiguity and closed-mindedness in religious domains than liberals,
and vice versa in environmental domains. The third hypothesis expected higher levels of
discomfort with ambiguity and closed-mindedness in the domain of religion compared to
environment for conservatives, and vice versa for liberals.
In evaluating whether need for cognitive closure may be situation-dependent, that is,
domain-specific, we expected religious issues to be more inherent to a conservative ideology
and environmental issues to be more inherent to a liberal ideology. Thereby, we implicitly
assumed that different domains or issues may be of more or less relevance, dependent on
one’s ideological orientation, and that this relevance would increase need for cognitive
closure. The degree to which an issue is of personal relevance to an individual has been
referred to as value-relevant involvement (B. T. Johnson & Eagly, 1989), issue involvement
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1979), or personal relevance (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). For
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the remainder of this study we will use the term personal relevance to describe “the extent
to which the attitudinal issue under consideration is of personal importance” (Petty
& Cacioppo, 1979, p. 1915). Personal relevance has been found to produce resistance
to persuasion (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996), better memory for (Holbrook, Berent,
Krosnick, Visser, & Boninger, 2005) and selective processing of consistent information
(W. Hart et al., 2009). This rigid persistence on preexisting attitudes due to high personal
relevance is somewhat similar to what Kruglanski and Webster (1996) describe as seizing
and freezing when “people under a heightened need for closure [...] base their judgments
predominantly on early or preexisting cues rather than on later information” (p. 265).
Thus, Study 2 tests for a potential effect of personal relevance on the interaction of
domain and ideological orientation. Introducing it as a covariate, a fourth hypothesis
assumes no differences in discomfort with ambiguity and closed-mindedness between
conservatives and liberals in either domain, when personal relevance is accounted for.
Similarly, the fifth hypothesis expected no differences in discomfort with ambiguity or
closed-mindedness between domains, when personal relevance is accounted for.
4.3.1. Method
Participants
A minimum sample size of 158 participants required to detect effects at the .05 level
with a medium effect size (Cohen’s f = .25) and a power of .80 was determined by an
a priori power analysis in G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009). We recruited and paid 180
U.S. citizens for their participation on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Only one participant
had to be excluded from the analysis due to failed attention checks and non-meaningful
answering patterns.12 The final sample comprised N = 179 (control: n = 64; religion:
n = 51; climate change: n = 63) individuals with a mean age of M = 38.02 (SD = 11.01)
of whom 56.4% were female. The majority of participants (52.51%) indicated to be very
liberal, liberal or somewhat liberal whereas 27.93% indicated to be very conservative,
conservative or somewhat conservative (see Table A.5 in the appendix for sample sizes
per condition and ideological orientation). The survey was completed with an average
time of M = 12.61 (SD = 6.05) minutes.
12More specifically, the participant indicated the same number on every Likert scale administered.
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Instruments and Procedure
We replicated the procedure and methods used in Study 1, added closed-mindedness
as a dependent variable, changed the domain of environment to climate change, and
included an item to assess the personal relevance of the topic addressed.
Discomfort with Ambiguity and Closed-Mindedness Participants were assigned
one of three versions of the eight item closed-mindedness and the nine item discomfort
with ambiguity subscale of the NFCS (Roets & Van Hiel, 2007) with either the original
or a domain-specific wording. Domains were somewhat similar to Study 1, however, we
replaced environment with climate change in order to tackle a more content-specific
domain. The wording between domain-specific conditions was identical and only differed
to the extent that either religion or climate change was inserted (see Table A.2 for both
scales). Internal consistency was acceptable for both, the discomfort with ambiguity
(original scale: ωt = .80, religion: ωt = .79, climate change: ωt = .76), and the
closed-mindedness subscale (original scale: ωt = .77, religion: ωt = .69, climate change:
ωt = .76).
Personal Relevance of Topic Participants indicated how important the domain was
to them personally on a 7-point scale (1 = not important at all, 7 = extremely important).
Mean personal relevance of religion was marginally higher for conservatives than for
liberals (conservatives: M = 3.51, SD = 2.52; liberals M = 2.43, SD = 2.40, t(138) =
1.69, p = .09, d = .55), while mean personal relevance of climate change was higher
for liberals compared to conservatives (conservatives: M = 3.58, SD = 2.23; liberals:
M = 6.15, SD = 1.21, t(138) = −4.58, p < .001, d = −1.31).
4.3.2. Results
A two-way MANOVA testing the effects of ideological orientation (conservative, lib-
eral) and domain (control, religion, climate change) on discomfort with ambiguity and
closed-mindedness was conducted. The multivariate result was significant for domain,
Pillai’s trace = .39, F (2, 138) = 16.61, p < .001, and the interaction of domain and
ideological orientation, Pillai’s trace = .08, F (2, 138) = 2.90, p = .02. When accounting
for personal relevance, multivariate results were significant for domain, Pillai’s trace =
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.40, F (2, 137) = 17.20, p < .001, the interaction of domain and ideological orientation,
Pillai’s trace = .07, F (2, 137) = 2.46, p = .05, and personal relevance, Pillai’s trace = .08,









C L C L C L
Ideology 














Domain Control Religion Climate Change
Figure 4.2.. Study 2: Two-Way Interaction of Ideological Orientation and Domain on
Discomfort with Ambiguity.
Discomfort With Ambiguity
Univariate analyses revealed a large main effect of domain, F (2, 138) = 36.05, p <
.001, η2 = .33, and a significant interaction of domain and ideological orientation,
F (2, 138) = 4.29, p = .02, η2 = .04 (see Figure 4.2). Bonferroni-corrected comparisons of
the means (see Table 4.2) suggested no significant differences between conservatives (M =
5.17, SD = .80) and liberals (M = 5.00, SD = .92) in the control condition, t(138) =
.58, p = .56, d = .19. Differences in domain-specific discomfort with ambiguity were as
expected, with higher levels for conservatives in the religion condition (conservatives:
M = 3.76, SD = 1.14; liberals: M = 3.18, SD = .91, t(138) = 1.90, p = .06, d = .56),
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and significantly higher levels for liberals in the climate change condition (conservatives:
M = 3.90, SD = 1.10; liberals: M = 4.47, SD = .80, t(138) = −2.15, p = .03, d = −.59).
Within liberals, we found higher levels of discomfort with ambiguity in the climate change
compared to the religion condition, t(138) = −5.24, p < .001, d = −1.51. No differences
between conditions were found for conservatives.
Univariate analyses accounting for personal relevance revealed a large main effect
of domain, F (2, 137) = 37.08, p < .001, η2 = .33, and a significant interaction effect,
F (2, 137) = 9.67, p = .002, η2 = .02. Bonferroni-corrected comparisons of the means
indicated higher levels of discomfort with ambiguity for liberals in the climate change
compared to the religion condition, t(137) = −3.39, p = .003, d = −.49. All other
comparisons were no longer significant.
Table 4.2.
Study 2: Mean Levels of Discomfort With Ambiguity and Closed-Mindedness Per Domain
and Ideological Orientation.
Overall Control Religion Climate Change
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Discomfort with Ambiguity
Overall 4.25 1.15 5.00 .91 3.39 1.01 4.19 .95
Conservative 4.24 1.19 5.17 .80 3.76 1.14 3.90 1.10
Liberal 4.32 1.14 5.00 .92 3.18 .91 4.47 .80
Closed-Mindedness
Overall 3.65 .96 3.58 .86 3.54 .95 3.81 1.04
Conservative 3.56 .95 3.43 .84 3.78 1.13 3.48 .90
Liberal 3.78 .97 3.68 .88 3.42 .81 4.17 1.06
Closed-Mindedness
Univariate analyses revealed a significant interaction of domain and ideological ori-
entation, F (2, 138) = 3.34, p = .04, η2 = .04 (see Figure 4.3). Bonferroni-corrected
comparisons of the means (see Table 4.2) suggested no significant differences between
conservatives (M = 3.43, SD = .84) and liberals (M = 3.86, SD = .88) in the control con-
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dition, t(138) = −.87, p = .39, d = −.29. While no differences between conservatives and
liberals were found in the religion condition, t(138) = 1.18, p = .24, d = .37, liberals had
significantly higher levels of closed-mindedness in the climate change condition than con-
servatives (conservatives: M = 3.48, SD = .90; liberals: M = 4.17, SD = 1.06, t(138) =
−2.57, p = .01, d = −.70). Within liberals, we found higher levels of closed-mindedness in
the climate change compared to the religion condition, t(138) = −3.00, p = .01, d = −.791.
No differences between conditions were found for conservatives. Post hoc power analyses
revealed that given the small effect size (Cohen’s d = .37) a sample size of n = 74 and
n = 128 per group would be necessary for the difference to be significant at the 5% level
(one-tailed) with an 80% chance. Thus, we cannot rule out that there might be a small
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Figure 4.3.. Study 2: Two-Way Interaction of Ideological Orientation and Domain on
Closed-Mindedness.
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Univariate analyses accounting for personal relevance revealed a significant interaction
effect, F (2, 137) = 4.36, p = .02, η2 = .06. Bonferroni-corrected comparisons of the
means indicated higher levels in the climate change condition for liberals compared to
conservatives, t(137) = −2.95, p = .004, d = −.49, and higher levels of closed-mindedness
within liberals in the climate change compared to the religion condition, t(137) =
−3.36, p = .003, d = −.48. All other comparisons were no longer significant.
4.3.3. Discussion
It was the aim of Study 2 to replicate and expand findings from Study 1. Against
our first hypothesis, but similar to Study 1, no differences between conservatives and
liberals in the control condition were found for either dependent variable. Results were
mostly in line with our second hypothesis; liberals experienced more discomfort with
ambiguity and closed-mindedness in the climate change condition than conservatives. On
the other hand, conservatives indicated higher levels of discomfort with ambiguity but
not closed-mindedness in the religion condition when compared to liberals. Replicating
results from Study 1, liberals’ discomfort with ambiguity and closed-mindedness levels
were higher for the domain of climate change compared to religion. Those differences were
again not found for conservatives. When accounting for personal relevance, differences in
discomfort with ambiguity between conservatives and liberals were no longer significant.
However, differences between domains were still significant for liberals. No changes
in closed-mindedness were observed. Hence, results lend partial support to the fourth
hypothesis but no support to the fifth hypothesis. In summary, results from Study 1
were consistently replicated for discomfort with ambiguity but not for closed-mindedness.
Study 2 substantiates the overarching hypothesis of domain-specificity for discomfort
with ambiguity. Results from Study 1 were consistently replicated, again showing no
difference in domain-general discomfort with ambiguity and the expected differences
between conservatives and liberals. When accounting for personal relevance, those
differences were no longer significant while liberals still experienced higher discomfort
in the climate change compared to the religion condition. Thus, personal relevance
might explain the variance between ideologies per domain - but not the variance within
liberals between domains. With regard to closed-mindedness, results indicate a significant
difference between ideologies for climate change only that was still statistically significant
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when personal relevance was accounted for. Similarly, liberals’ higher levels in the
climate change relative to the religion condition were also unaffected when personal
relevance was added as a covariate. Hence, this does not seem to explain the observed
differences. Closed-mindedness was mostly similar for either scale (domain-general and
domain-specific), irrespective of participants’ ideological orientation. The highest value
that also drove the significant differences mentioned before, was that in the climate
change condition for liberals. Taking a closer look at the items in both need for cognitive
closure scales (NFCS, Roets & Van Hiel, 2007) might offer an explanation as to why
differences in the religion domain were observed with regard to discomfort with ambiguity
only. The latter address more affective aspects of need for cognitive closure while the
other tackles cognitive aspects (D. M. Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Both, religion and
climate change, can be a matter of conviction or even belief and hence, have an affective
component. Adding the impact of personal relevance, it makes sense that conservatives to
whom religion is personally relevant would score high on items like “When I am confused
about something related to religion, I feel very upset” while liberals, to whom religion was
relatively less relevant, would score lower. The same rationale could explain differences
in discomfort with ambiguity with regard to climate change. However, given that climate
change is the object of research to thousands of research institutes worldwide as well
as subject of political debates and policies, it makes sense that liberals, who see this
issue as more pressing than conservatives (McCright et al., 2016), would rather disagree
with (reversed) items such as “When considering most conflicts on climate change, I can
usually see how both sides would be right”. That is, given the policy relevance, conflicts
on climate change would potentially be perceived as conflicts between pro- and opponents
while religious conflicts are not necessarily discussed in public and between parties. As
personal relevance did not affect the difference between conservatives and liberals in this
domain, future studies should consider further explanatory variables, such as for instance
the degree to which one identifies with a certain political ideology.
4.4. Study 3
In Study 1 and 2 we showed that the relation between ideological orientation and
discomfort with ambiguity was domain-specific rather than domain-general. This pattern
was only partly found for closed-mindedness in Study 2. Effects of personal relevance
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were only observed for discomfort with ambiguity and not for closed-mindedness. To
investigate further the role of domain in the interaction between ideological orientation
and need for cognitive closure, we adopted the procedure of Study 1 and 2 and modeled
dogmatism as the dependent variable. In addition, three more political domains were
included.
The two most prominent conceptualizations of dogmatism have been shaped by
Rokeach (1960) and Altemeyer (1996). The latter defined dogmatism as a “relatively
unchangeable, unjustified certainty” and “conviction beyond the reach of evidence to
the contrary” (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 201) while Rokeach (1960) defined dogmatic beliefs
as “closed belief systems” (p. 67). Given the rigidity and resistance to change these
definitions imply, adopting dogmatic beliefs has been understood as a way to satisfy
epistemic needs and motives (Kruglanski, 2013) and has thus been conceptualized as a
fundamental construct underlying epistemic motivation (Jost et al., 2003b; Jost, 2017).
In their meta-analysis on ideological asymmetries in epistemic motivation, Jost (2017)
found the largest effect sizes for dogmatism (unweighted r = .51) and out of the 50
examined studies “no study in which leftists scored higher” (p. 171). We expected to
replicate these findings in a domain-general condition, thus, hypothesizing higher levels
for conservatives when compared to liberals.
Conway et al. (2016) have found liberals and conservatives to be equally dogmatic -
for different domains, respectively. This result is similar to our findings from Study 1
and 2 regarding discomfort with ambiguity and closed-mindedness. Study 3 aimed at
replicating this domain-specificity of dogmatism for more than two political domains. We
thus added the topics of abortion, same-sex marriage, and gun ownership. According to
research in political science (Niemi, Weisberg, & Kimball, 2001, p. 221) and recent polls
(Pew Research Center, 2019a, 2019b), U.S. Americans are heavily divided on whether or
not abortion and same-sex marriage should be legal in the United States. Gun ownership,
on the other hand, seems to be a topic that conservatives and liberals have discussed
in a similar way in online Twitter discourse (Sterling et al., 2019). The association of
dogmatism and ideological orientation in these conditions was examined in an exploratory
matter. That is, we had no expectations with regard to whether conservatives or liberals
would have higher levels of dogmatism in the respective condition. However, given the
results on domain-specificity obtained in Study 1 and 2, we assumed that the relation
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between ideological orientation and dogmatism might be just as susceptible to differences
in domain and the respective personal relevance assigned. Directed hypotheses were
identical to Study 2.
4.4.1. Method
Participants
A minimum sample size of 211 participants required to detect effects at the .05 level
with a medium effect size (Cohen’s f = .25) and a power of .80 was determined by an a
priori power analysis in G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009). 580 U.S. citizens were recruited
and paid on Amazons Mechanical Turk. All assignments were examined regarding failed
attention checks, text production that was unrelated to the topic or visible arbitrary
answering patterns. For six participants out of 580 at least one of these criteria was true
and they were therefore excluded from further analysis. The final sample (N = 574) was
on average 36.78 years old (SD = 11.12) and consisted of 55.1% males. 51.9% of subjects
indicated to be very liberal, liberal or somewhat liberal, whereas 26.7% stated to be very
conservative, conservative, or somewhat conservative (see Table A.6 in the appendix for
sample sizes per condition and ideological orientation). The survey was completed with
an average time of M = 14.87 (SD = 8.10) minutes.
Instruments and Procedure
The design and procedure was in most parts identical to Study 1 and 2. Dogmatism
was modeled as dependent variable and in addition to the three previous conditions,
three more were added: abortion, gun ownership and same-sex marriage.
Personal Relevance of Topic Participants indicated how important the domain was
to them personally on a 7-point scale (1 = not important at all, 7 = extremely important).
Mean personal relevance of religion was higher for conservatives compared to liberals
(conservatives: M = 4.58, SD = 2.44; liberals M = 1.54, SD = 2.12, t(440) = 5.75, p <
.001, d = 1.52), while mean personal relevance of climate change (conservatives: M =
3.13, SD = 2.46; liberals: M = 5.64, SD = 1.58, t(440) = −5.42, p < .001, d = −1.26)
and same-sex marriage was higher for liberals than for conservatives (conservatives:
M = 3.03, SD = 2.76; liberals: M = 4.11, SD = 2.11, t(440) = −2.19, p = .03, d =
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−.54). Abortion and gun ownership were equally relevant to conservatives and liberals,
respectively.
Dogmatism Considering recent criticism that the Rokeach (1960) dogmatism scale was
not content-free and thus, an ideological rather than a cognitive style measure (Van Hiel,
Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010), we decided to implement the Altemeyer (1996) dogmatism
scale. Depending on the topic, participants were assigned one of six versions of the scale.
In the control condition, participants saw the original item (e.g., Anyone who is honestly
and truly seeking the truth will end up believing what I believe) whereas the topic was
added to the item in any other condition (e.g., Anyone who is honestly and truly seeking
the truth about [religion/climate change/abortion/gun ownership/same-sex marriage] will
end up believing what I believe). Otherwise the wording was identical between conditions.
McDonald’s omega suggested high internal consistency for each of the scale composites
(original scale: ωt = .94, religion: ωt = .94, climate change: ωt = .92, abortion: ωt = .95,
gun ownership: ωt = .95, same-sex marriage: ωt = .93, see Table A.3 for all items).
4.4.2. Results
A two-way ANOVA testing the effects of ideological orientation (conservative, lib-
eral) and domain (control, religion, climate change, abortion, gun ownership, same-sex
marriage) on dogmatism was conducted. We found a medium main effect of domain,
F (5, 440) = 23.80, p < .001, η2 = .19, a small main effect of ideological orientation,
F (1, 440) = 10.21, p = .002, η2 = .02, and the expected interaction, F (5, 440) = 8.76, p <
.001, η2 = .07 (see Figure 4.4).
Bonferroni-corrected comparisons of the means (see Table 4.3) suggested higher domain-
general dogmatism in conservatives than in liberals (conservatives: M = 3.94, SD =
1.07; liberals: M = 2.73, SD = .85, t(440) = 4.70, p < .001, d = 1.25). Differ-
ences in domain-specific dogmatism were also as expected, with higher levels for con-
servatives in the religion condition (conservatives: M = 4.36, SD = 1.23; liberals:
M = 3.29, SD = 1.04, t(440) = 3.75, p < .001, d = .93), and higher levels for lib-
erals in the climate change condition (conservatives: M = 3.70, SD = .97; liber-
als: M = 4.46, SD = .97, t(440) = −3.06, p = .003, d = −.79). Moreover, con-
servatives displayed more dogmatism regarding abortion than liberals (conservatives:
M = 4.81, SD = 1.46; liberals: M = 4.21, SD = .89, t(440) = 2.27, p = .03, d = .49)
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but not regarding gun ownership or same-sex marriage. Within liberals, we found
higher levels of dogmatism in the climate change compared to the religion condition,
t(365) = −5.37, p < .001, d = −1.16, while the opposite was not found for conservatives.
For liberals, dogmatism in the religion condition was significantly lower than in any other
condition. For conservatives, on the other hand, dogmatism was significantly lower in
the climate change condition compared to all other conditions except religion (see Table
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Figure 4.4.. Study 3: Two-Way Interaction of Ideological Orientation and Domain on
Dogmatism.
When controlling for personal relevance, we still found a significant main effect of do-
main, F (5, 439) = 26.50, p < .001, η2 = .19, ideological orientation, F (1, 439) = 11.38, p <
.001, η2 = .02, the expected interaction, F (5, 439) = 4.28, p < .001, η2 = .03, as well as
a a significant main effect of personal relevance, F (1, 439) = 78.38, p < .001, η2 = .12.
Differences between conservatives and liberals were still significant for abortion, t(364) =
2.36, p = .02, d = .57, but no longer for the domains of religion and climate change.
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Differences within liberals and conservatives between the latter two conditions were also
no longer significant.
Table 4.3.
Study 3: Mean Levels of Dogmatism Per Domain and Ideological Orientation.
Overall Control Religion Climate Abortion Gun Same-Sex
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Overall 4.03 1.24 3.15 1.08 3.53 1.21 4.13 1.01 4.33 1.18 4.25 1.20 4.74 1.08
Con. 4.31 1.22 3.94 1.07 4.36 1.23 3.70 .97 4.81 1.46 4.51 .98 4.66 1.29
Lib. 3.97 1.25 2.73 .85 3.29 1.04 4.46 .97 4.21 .89 4.27 1.28 4.93 1.03
Note. Climate = Climate Change; Gun = Gun Ownership; Same-Sex = Same-Sex Marriage;
Con = Conservative; Lib = Liberal
4.4.3. Discussion
Study 3 examined whether and to what respect the association between ideological
orientation and dogmatism could be domain-specific. In line with our first hypothesis,
domain-general dogmatism was higher in conservatives than in liberals. Similar to Study
1 and 2, and in line with our second hypothesis, we found higher levels of domain-specific
dogmatism in conservatives in the religion condition, and higher levels in liberals when
the domain in question was climate change. Moreover, dogmatism with regard to abortion
was also higher in conservatives than in liberals. Within liberals, religious dogmatism
was significantly lower than dogmatism with regard to climate change or any other
of the tested domains. As in Study 1 and 2, differences in dogmatism between the
religion and climate change condition were not significant for conservatives, thereby
partly disconfirming our third hypothesis. In general, conservatives’ dogmatism with
regard to climate change was lowest relative to all other domains (except religion). As
hypothesized in the fourth and fifth hypothesis, once personal relevance was accounted for,
differences between ideologies within domain, and differences within ideologies between
domains, were no longer significant.
The interaction of ideological orientation and domain on dogmatism both, supports
and contradicts the ideology asymmetry hypothesis. Other than in Study 1 and 2,
ideological asymmetries in dogmatism were found for the control group. Furthermore,
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conservatives were more dogmatic than liberals with regard to religion and abortion.
However, liberals were more dogmatic than conservatives regarding climate change and in
two out of five domains (gun ownership, same-sex marriage) we found no differences. Also,
dogmatism levels were overall lower in the control than in the domain-specific conditions,
irrespective of ideological orientation. Regarding discomfort with ambiguity we had
previously argued that levels in the domain-general condition might be confounded with
higher ambiguity of the item itself relative to items where a political domain was specified.
That is, an unspecific, general situation is by definition more ambiguous because the
range of possible real-life equivalents that a participant may imagine to derive their level
of discomfort is much broader. Using the same logic, it makes sense that dogmatism
levels were higher in the domain-general condition. Reporting how unchangeably certain
and convinced, that is, dogmatic, one is about something is much easier when they know
what this something is. Both, the need for cognitive closure scale (D. M. Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994) and the dogmatism scale (Altemeyer, 1996) are assumed to measure
latent dispositions rather than political attitudes. While our results do not contest this
assumption, those dispositions may be expressed to a varying degree within one person,
depending on the specific contents of the situation that is evaluated.
The differences in dogmatism between liberals and conservatives seem to have been
driven by personal relevance for two domains (religion, climate change). That is, if the
domains of religion or climate change are specifically important to an individual, they are
more likely to agree with items such as “The things I believe in regarding religion/climate
change are so completely true, I could never doubt them”. Thus, given that personal
relevance of religion itself was higher for conservatives and vice versa, personal relevance
of climate change was higher for liberals, it makes sense that the difference would be
no longer significant. Moreover, given similar personal relevance ratings of abortion
for both, conservatives and liberals, differences between ideologies were still significant
when personal relevance was accounted for. Hence, other than dogmatism with regard to
religion and climate change, dogmatism regarding the domain of abortion might not be
determined by an individual’s personal relevance.
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4.5. General Discussion
The goal of the current series of studies was to examine potential differences in how an
individual’s epistemic motivation or need for cognitive closure relates to their ideological
orientation dependent on a variation of issues. The prevailing claim in psychological
and political research that conservatives would have a higher need for cognitive closure
than liberals was almost exclusively tested with the standard, domain-general scales.
The current work is among the first to include a variation of the situation, that is the
political domain within which an individual would experience a need for cognitive closure.
Furthermore, it is the first to test this assumption of domain-specificity with regard to
more than one operationalization of need for cognitive closure: discomfort with ambiguity,
closed-mindedness, and dogmatism. Three studies demonstrated that an individual’s
epistemic motivation or need for cognitive closure might not solely be explained by their
ideological orientation but that the situation, that is, the domain addressed, as well as
the personal relevance assigned to a domain, can have an influence. Results supported
the assumption of a domain-dependent ideology symmetry hypothesis.
In Study 1 and 2 we found higher levels of discomfort with ambiguity in conservatives
(vs. liberals) for the domain of religion, and higher levels in liberals (vs. conservatives)
for the domain of environment/climate change. The ideological groups did not differ in
the control condition. Within ideological groups, discomfort with ambiguity was higher
in the control than in both domain-specific conditions. Comparing the latter two resulted
in a significant difference for liberals only, with higher levels in the environment/climate-
change compared to the religion condition. Regarding closed-mindedness (Study 2) we
only found differences with regard to climate change between ideological groups and
within liberals (when compared to religion). The challenge these results pose to existing
findings is twofold; not only did we not replicate higher levels of discomfort with ambiguity
in conservatives using the domain-general scale, we also found liberals to experience
more of such when the situation in question was about environmental issues. Jost et
al. (2003b) put forward the claim that ideological belief systems are adopted because
they satisfy pre-existing needs and motives. To the extent that high need for cognitive
closure produces a preference for the status quo, this preference may be met by status-quo
promoting ideologies such as conservatism (Kruglanski, 2013, p. 27). However, we suggest
that a status quo can refer to more than society as a whole. Individuals come with
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differential pre-existing attitudes and social identities all of which one may be motivated
to maintain as they also satisfy psychological needs and motives (Turner et al., 1987).
Similar to dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), experiencing uncertainty regarding an
attitude or belief than one is committed to, might lead to discomfort or, more generally,
the need for cognitive closure to avoid further dissonance.
Results from Study 3 substantiate this assumption. We replicated patterns from
Study 1 and 2 for the domains of religion, climate change, and abortion but not for
same-sex marriage and gun ownership. Zooming in on the degree to which conservatives
and liberals assigned personal relevance to each topic, we found a clear propensity of
liberals to assign high relevance to climate change and low relevance to religion. Relative
to liberals, conservatives assigned higher relevance to religion and lower relevance to
climate change. Thus, need for cognitive closure might be domain-specific if a certain
domain is of personal relevance. This relevance, in turn, may likely be affected by one’s
ideological orientation. Given that both, religion and climate change, can be seen as
a matter of belief, certainty about these matters may also be an affirmation of their
existence. This does not apply to the other topics; there would be no apparent reason
to doubt the existence of abortion, same-sex marriage or gun ownership. Regarding the
latter, the status quo would thus be an attitude rather than a belief. Future studies
could for instance prime the respective attitude (e.g., pro or contra abortion) and then
test for differences in need for cognitive closure.
One finding that was not replicated in Study 3 were similar levels of the dependent
variable in the domain-general control condition. This was true for discomfort with
ambiguity (Study 1 and 2) and closed-mindedness (Study 2) but not for dogmatism
(Study 3). To the knowledge of the authors, there is no empirical work with similar
outcomes. Turning to the scale items themselves, one could say that the discomfort with
ambiguity subscale comprises affective verbs and adjectives (uncomfortable, confused,
dislike, annoying) while the closed-mindedness subscale mentions problems, opinions,
or conflict. Both of which could potentially be applied to many situations. I don’t
like situations that are uncertain for instance could refer to the state of the world,
society, interpersonal conflict, or job security - to name just a few. The dogmatism
scale however, mentions beliefs or convictions in almost every item, thus restricting the
scope of potential status quos to uphold to beliefs. Reconsidering the notion that a
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conservative ideology comprises an appreciation of tradition and potentially religion, one
could say that rigidly holding on to (not further specified) beliefs might be more likely
for conservatives. However, one could also argue that beliefs about equality or change are
deeply engrained in liberal ideologies, thus disproving the explanation outlined before.
4.5.1. Limitations and Future Research
In the present studies we conceptualized domain, that is, topic, as a between-subjects
experimental condition on one identical dependent variable, respectively. However, this
comes with two caveats, one methodological, one theoretical. Methodologically speaking,
we assumed measurement invariance across all scales within a study. This was done
to be able to compare scores across condition. Yet, this untested assumption should
be considered in future studies. On a theoretical level, one might say that need for
cognitive closure as dispositional variable needs to be measured in a domain-general way
to capture “relevant notions that happen to be accessible” (Kruglanski, 2013, p. 50-51).
That is, if the item is unspecific about the kind of situation, it could be indicative to see
which situations are readily accessible. Future research should hence investigate further
the relation between domain-general and domain-specific need for cognitive closure by
considering a state-trait distinction and their interaction.
Regarding the measurement of political ideology, one must acknowledge that capturing
this with a self-report measure is only one way to do so. If political ideology is modeled
as uni-dimensional (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008), then comparing the ends of the
scales, that is, liberals to conservatives, almost comes naturally. There is, however,
statistical evidence that suggests a bi-dimensional model with correlated factors over a
uni-dimensional one (Choma et al., 2009; Choma, Ashton, & Hafer, 2010; Choma et al.,
2012; Kerlinger, 1984). If we assume liberalism and conservatism to be two functionally
independent factors then measuring political ideology with a single self-placement scale
might only explain a small share of the variance. While this has been the predominant
way to measure ideology in the literature, mostly due to its parsimony, it would be
worthwhile to consider operational ideology scales as predictors of need for cognitive
closure.
Given the fact that we found similar, yet not identical patterns between different
conceptualizations of need for cognitive closure, more constructs should be considered.
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Similarly, more political domains should be included and their relevance could be ac-
counted for. Future studies should thus broaden the range of domains and dependent
variables in order to better disentangle the effect relevance and domain may have.
4.5.2. Conclusion
Understanding how epistemic motivation shapes information processing and formation
of judgments can help to explain when and to what extent we may close our minds.
Rather than “singling out political conservatives for special study” (Jost et al., 2003b,
p. 339) the presented studies focused on disentangling dispositional from situational
need for cognitive closure in political domains. Our findings demonstrate that there is
considerable variance in need for closure across situations, both, within and between
ideological groups. While several explanations were offered to explain our results, one
conclusion that we want to draw independent of the specific outcomes is the following:
differentiating between constructs or even scales when conducting meta-research is not
optional but imperative if the goal is to measure one allegedly overarching psychological
concept (i.e., epistemic motivation). Similarly, the complexity of behavior and cognition
in political contexts needs to be accommodated. Modeling different domains can be a
first way to approximate real-life situations in which behavior and cognition actually
happen and where they may have an impact.
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5. Putting ’Identity’ Back in Political
Identification
5.1. Introduction
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, social psychology found itself in a so-called crisis
of confidence (Elms, 1975) where social psychologists worried that their field “was, among
other things, reductionist and immature in its theories; positivist and unsophisticated in
its methods; and blind to the role of language, history, and culture” (Hogg & Williams,
2000, p. 83). Critics noted that social psychology was overlooking the ’big picture’ when
it came to group processes, reducing them to “an aggregate of individual or interpersonal
behaviors” (p. 84). It was during this crisis of confidence that two theories emerged “as
an antidote to the overly individualistic and reductionist tendencies” (Hornsey, 2008,
p. 205), namely social identity theory (SIT, Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and
self-categorization theory (SCT, Turner et al., 1987). Both theories, later jointly known
as the social identity approach, provide an extensive framework on cognitive, motivational
and socio-historical aspects that give rise to group and intergroup phenomena (see also
chapter 2.3.3 of this thesis). A key element of the social identity approach is that human
beings are, and are able to act as both, individuals and social groups. Individuals self-
categorize themselves differently in varying situations and can hence take on at least three
levels of identity that vary in abstractness. The most abstract, superordinate category is
one’s human identity, comprising the features they share with other humans (ingroup)
and that differentiate them from other species (outgroup). The next lower, intermediate
category is one’s social identity, their respective social group affiliations, the emotions
and evaluation associated therewith, that is defined by features they share with ingroup
members and that differentiate them from outgroup members. On the subordinate level,
an individual’s personal identity is shaped by their knowledge about their own distinct
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character traits, skills, opinions and the emotions and evaluations associated (Tajfel,
1981; Turner et al., 1987). Self-categorization theorists argue that while personal and
social identity operate simultaneously, their salience and perceptual effects are inversely
related. They posit a functional antagonism between them whereby “the salience of
one level produces the intra-class similarities and inter-class differences which reduce or
inhibit the perception of the intra-class differences and inter-class similarities upon which
lower and higher levels respectively are based” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 49). In short: “as
one level becomes more salient the other levels become less so” (Hornsey, 2008, p. 208).
However, this mechanism has been criticized as being rigid and over-simplified (Abrams
& Hogg, 2004; Hornsey, 2008). Changing levels of identity from personal to social,
that is perceiving oneself in a more inclusive category, can result in depersonalization
of perception and behavior (Turner et al., 1987, p. 51). “When a category becomes
salient, people come to see themselves and other category members less as individuals
and more as interchangeable exemplars of the group prototype” (Hornsey, 2008, p. 208).
The present work aims at evaluating how such changes in category salience may impact
political attitudes.
Ensuing the social identity approach, a lot of research focused on assessing the
consequences of self-categorizations on individuals’ behavior, perception, and attitudes
(see Hogg & Smith, 2007; Hornsey, 2008, for a review). Using panel data from the
American National Election Survey, Conover and Feldman (1984) found differences in
the levels of agreement with certain political issues between political groups. Those
differences were most pronounced when the issue in question was obviously salient for a
group’s interest. For instance, women approved significantly more of the Equal Rights
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and individuals identifying as poor or
black agreed significantly stronger that the government should provide welfare services.
Given the nature of the data, that is, social categories were constructed on the basis
of sociodemographic variables (e.g., gender, ethnicity), the author assumed that the
categories chosen for analysis were chronically accessible and hence affected participants’
answers. Moreover, inducing salience of a certain social identity can cause individuals’
attitudes to shift towards a perceived ingroup norm in both, non-political (Abrams et
al., 1990; Hogg, Turner, & Davidson, 1990; McGarty et al., 1992), and political contexts
(Cohen, 2003; Conover & Feldman, 1984; Malka & Lelkes, 2010; Popp & Rudolph, 2011).
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Hogg and Smith (2007, p. 98) claimed that “self-categorisation depersonalises our attitudes
so that they conform to the ingroup prototype, and that this represents genuine attitude
change not superficial behavioural compliance”. Scientific literature in political science
and social psychology abound with publications and theories on attitude change and not
all agree with the claim of genuine attitude change. Taken together, the approaches differ
regarding hypotheses about the underlying mechanism, assumed stability of attitude
change, and the (experimentally manipulated) circumstances that may trigger attitude
change. Other than prototype-based depersonalization, authors have suggested cognitive
dissonance (McKimmie et al., 2003; McKimmie, Terry, & Hogg, 2009) or deliberation
processes (Myers & Mendelberg, 2013) as underlying mechanisms of attitude change.
Dual process theories of persuasion (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993;
Petty, Priester, & Brinol, 2002; Petty & Cacioppo, 2012) assume that “humans are
motivated to hold accurate beliefs and reasonable attitudes, but often are unable or
unwilling to expend the cognitive resources necessary to carefully consider whether new
information should make them change their minds” (Valentino & Nardis, 2013, p 562).
Information will be processed peripherally using simple heuristics when motivation is
low, resulting in temporary attitude change only. When individuals are highly motivated,
they will carefully consider the contents of the information and potential attitude change
will be more stable. Most studies on identity-based attitude shifts have experimentally
manipulated source cues to be either an ingroup or an outgroup member related to
party affiliation or ideological self-placement. Cohen (2003) presented participants with
a welfare policy report that was a) in favor of either a generous or a stringent policy, and
b) allegedly endorsed by an either Democrat or Republican reference group. Participants’
stance on the policy was almost exclusively informed by the fit of their own and the
referents’ political identity. That is, liberal participants supported or opposed either
policy when they were told that Democrats supported or opposed it, and vice versa for
conservatives. However, when no reference group was mentioned, participants based their
attitudes merely on the message content such that liberals preferred the generous and
conservatives preferred the stringent policy. A similar interaction between own identity
and source cue was found for the topics of farm subsidies with conservative/liberal
cues (Malka & Lelkes, 2010), and an economic recovery plan with the source cue being
Bush/Obama (Popp & Rudolph, 2011). Literature from psychology and political science
53
further suggests that by choosing one’s party affiliation or position on an ideological
self-placement scale, the respective social identity becomes salient (Conover & Feldman,
1984; Devine, 2015; Green et al., 2004; Huddy, 2001; Kelly, 1989). In this sense, an
ideological self-placement can lead to a salient social or political identity (Huddy, 2013).
According to SCT, shifts in attitude that follow a change in level of identity are a
consequence of depersonalization. But from where do attitudes shift when a certain
political identity is salient? If attitude change coincides with identity level change, does
this mean that there were different attitudes previously held at the personal level? Most
research within the social identity approach has focused on the influence of different social
identities rather than one’s personal identity (Hitlin, 2003). Do individuals hold distinct
sets of attitudes per level of identity, that is, one personal and one per social category? Or
is the personal attitude set the ’true’ one and any other is just the product of the personal
set and a certain constant? There has been considerable debate regarding the nature
of relation between identity levels. Some authors have argued that personal and social
identities are separate cognitive structures (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991) but most
agree that they are somehow interrelated. There is, however, substantial disagreement
on the relative primacy of identity - which comes first? Proponents of a prepotency of
personal identity argue in favor of a relative primacy of personal over social identity
in Western cultures (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999; Simon, 1993) while others
posit the opposite, a relative primacy of social over personal identity (Brewer, 1991).
Self-categorization theory offers a third perspective where neither takes precedence but
wherein personal identity is socially mediated as “there would be no personal self in
the absence of a higher order ’we’ that provides the context for self-other differentiation
in terms of person-specific attributes” (Onorato & Turner, 2002, p. 165). Turner et al.
(1987, p. 46) further note that personal self-categorizations “do not represent the ’true’
individual self which in some way invests the other levels with their significance” but
rather a self-categorization shaped by interpersonal comparison within a certain category.
Hence, we may assume that political attitudes held at the social level may not only be
informed by one’s personal attitudes but also the other way around. Expanding previous
work on identity-based attitude shifts, the present research aims at quantifying the degree
of entanglement between attitudes towards policy issues held at the personal and social
level.
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One important distinction regarding policy issues needs to be made when assessing the
susceptibility to identity. Following Carmines and Stimson (1980), policy issues can be
categorized as either easy or hard. Easy issues are symbolic, deal with policy ends, have
been on the political agenda for long (Carmines & Stimson, 1980), are familiar (Pollock
et al., 1993), highly salient, and evoke core values (Bailey et al., 2003). Individuals’
stances on these issues may be ’gut responses’, that is, “heuristics, or other short-cuts to
information about politics, may be at the heart of easy issues” (Cizmar, 2011, p. 14).
Hard issues on the other hand are technical, rather unfamiliar, deal with policy means, are
relatively new to the political agenda (Carmines & Stimson, 1980), are unfamiliar (Pollock
et al., 1993), not salient for most people, and “the province of politically knowledgeable,
attentive voters” (Cizmar, 2011, p. 25). Social issues (e.g., same-sex marriage) have often
been assumed to be easy issues, while economic issues (e.g., government spending) were
labeled ’hard’ issues (Bailey et al., 2003; Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Johnston & Wronski,
2015). Hard issues have been theorized to be more abstract and complex than easy
issues (Pollock et al., 1993). While indicating one’s attitude on an easy issue requires
little political attentiveness, individuals need to rely on elite cues or party identification
to make hard issues more readily understandable (Cizmar, 2011). Indeed, economic
or unfamiliar (hard) issues have been found to be more susceptible to elite influence
than social or familiar (easy) issues (Coan, Merolla, Stephenson, & Zechmeister, 2008;
Cohen, 2003; Farrar et al., 2010; Goren, Federico, & Kittilson, 2009; Johnston & Wronski,
2015; Reeskens et al., 2020). Assuming that a salient political identity can serve as a
cue to inform people’s stance on hard issues, we suggest that an attitude shift due to
depersonalization may be more likely to happen for hard issues than for easy ones.
To assess this claim, we conducted two studies where we manipulated participants’
level of identity and assessed their agreement with pro- and counter-attitudinal issues.
Assuming a bi-dimensional ideological model of conservatism and liberalism, we expected
an interaction between the salient level of identity (personal vs. political) and the fit
between one’s own ideology and the respective issue stance. That is, our first hypothesis
assumed liberals to endorse conservative economic attitudes more strongly when their
personal identity was salient compared to when their political identity was salient. And
vice versa, conservatives were expected to endorse liberal attitudes more strongly when
their personal identity was salient. The second hypothesis stated that when their political
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identity was salient, both, liberals and conservatives, would entrench their existing
economic attitudes. We expected no such interaction for social issues. Studies were
conducted in Canada (Study 1) and the United States (Study 2) where the governing
party at the time of data collection was either left-leaning (Canada) or right-leaning
(United States), respectively.
5.2. Study 1
Study 1 tested for differences in identity-based attitude shifts dependent on the nature
of the issue (easy/social vs. hard/economic). Participants were randomly assigned to one
of two conditions where either their personal or political identity salience was manipulated.
They indicated their stance on a total of forty political attitude items of which half were
pro-attitudinal for conservatives, and half were pro-attitudinal for liberals. We expected
participants between identity conditions to differ most on ’hard’ economic issues with
higher levels in the political identity condition.
5.2.1. Method
Participants
A minimum sample size of 270 participants required to detect effects at the .05 level
with a medium effect size (Cohen’s f = .25) and a power of .80 was determined by an
a priori power analysis in G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009). We recruited and paid 317
Canadian citizens for their participation on Amazons Mechanical Turk in early December
2018. 32 participants had to be excluded from the analysis due to failed attention checks
and non-meaningful answering patterns. The final sample comprised N =285 individuals
with a mean age of M = 31.32 (SD=9.78) of whom 45.96% were female. The majority of
participants (54.74%) indicated to be very liberal, liberal or somewhat liberal whereas
22.11% indicated to be very conservative, conservative or somewhat conservative. The
survey was completed with an average time of M = 47.38 (SD = 443.36) minutes.13
13A number of participants had opened the survey but only started filling it in after some time.
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Instruments and Procedure
Our central manipulation was salience of either personal (n = 150) or political identity
(n = 135). We randomly assigned participants to either of the conditions. In the political
identity condition, participants were first asked to indicate their ideological orientation
on a seven-point Likert ideological self-placement scale (1 = very liberal, 2 = liberal, 3 =
somewhat liberal, 4 = middle of the road, 5 = somewhat conservative, 6 = conservative, 7
= very conservative). As a salience manipulation, the label they chose was forwarded to
be included in the following instructions which we adapted from Hogg and Hains (1996):
This section measures your feelings about your political group (participant’s
ideology) as a whole. Take a minute to think about your group. Think about
the things you like and don’t like about your group. Think about what makes
your group special and what makes your group different from other political
groups. When you have formed an impression of your group, proceed.
After one minute had passed, participants were asked to write a short statement
(minimum of 200 characters) about what made them a typical group member of the
ideological label they chose and how that made them feel. Following Haslam, Oakes,
Reynolds, and Turner (1999) they were then asked to list three things that they and other
individuals that indicated the same ideology did relatively well. Next, they completed
a scale measuring several aspects of their political identity before they indicated their
agreement with a total of 40 political attitude items (20 pro-attitudinal liberal and
20 pro-attitudinal conservative items), followed by a measure on the inclusion of their
political group in the self, and a scale that measured aspects of their personal identity.
In the personal identity condition, participants did not indicate their ideological
orientation until after having completed the attitude scales. They started out with a
similar salience assessment to the one described above, except the wording was adapted
to make their personal identity salient:
This section measures your feelings about you as an individual. Take a minute
to think about yourself. Think about the things you like and don’t like about
yourself. Think about what makes you special and what makes you different
from other individuals. When you have formed an impression of yourself,
proceed.
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They were then asked to write a statement on what differentiates them from other indi-
viduals and to indicate three things that they personally thought they were good at, before
filling in the attitudes scale. Finally, they also indicated their ideological orientation, the
degree to which this political group was included in their self, and filled in a scale that mea-
sured aspects of their personal identity (see Table 5.1 for an overview of the study design).
Table 5.1.
Overview Study Design
Political Identity Personal Identity
1 Ideological self-placement –
2 Text production Text production
3 Social identity measure Personal identity measure
4 DV: Political attitudes DV: Political attitudes
5 – Ideological self-placement
6 Inclusion of in-group in self Inclusion of in-group in self
7 In-group identification In-group identification
8 Personal identity measure Social identity measure
Ideological Orientation Ideological orientation was assessed with a standard seven-
point Likert ideological self-placement scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative
and served as information for the salience manipulation described earlier and as predictor
in the subsequent analyses.
Aspects of Political and Personal Identity As further salience manipulation and
in order to assess whether it was successful, participants completed a scale on aspects of
political and personal identity with ten items each (Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk,
1999). For political identity, group self-esteem was measured with four items (ωt = .76),
three items on each self-categorization (ωt = .77), and commitment to the group (ωt = .76).
Regarding personal identity, personal self-esteem (ωt = .82) was measured with seven
items, and personal identification (ωt = .84) with three items. Moreover, inclusion
of the political group in the self was assessed with the graphic measure by Tropp
and Wright (2001) to compare identity involvement between conditions (see Appendix
B.1 for all items). Participants in the political identity condition indicated higher
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levels of self-categorization (M = 4.73, SD = 1.23) than participants in the personal
identity condition (M = 4.31, SD = 1.29, t(281.93) = 2.82, p = .01, d = .33). They
also indicated higher levels of inclusion of the political group in the self in the political
identity condition (M = 4.01, SD = 1.33) than in the personal identity condition
(M = 3.67, SD = 1.46, t(282.97) = 2.06, p = .04, d = .24). Mean levels of all other
identity subscales (group self-esteem, commitment to the group, personal self-esteem,
personal identification) were not significantly different.
Political Attitudes Drawing from previous political attitude scales (Eaves et al., 1999;
Everett, 2013; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), we evaluated 59 topics on
their perceived typicality of either conservative or liberal symbolic ideological content
in several steps. 20 topics resulted of which twelve were on economic issues (defense
spending, gun control, health care, taxation, financial aid for refugees, affirmative action
on housing, jobs, and education, welfare benefits for the unemployed, free market, carbon
footprint, homeless support) and eight tackled social issues (abortion, death penalty,
same-sex marriage, gay rights, immigration, family structures, traditional values, school
prayer). Each issue was rephrased twice, each in a pro-attitudinal wording for liberals
and conservatives, respectively. The topic health care, for instance, was rephrased as
Pro government sponsored health care (liberal) and Against government sponsored health
care (conservative). This procedure was adapted from previous studies that modeled
issue-based ideology on two dimensions (Day et al., 2014; Goren et al., 2009; Johnston
& Wronski, 2015). McDonald’s omega suggested high internal consistency for each of
the scale composites (conservative social issues: ωt = .83, liberal social issues: ωt = .87,
conservative economic issues: ωt = .81, liberal economic issues: ωt = .88). All items and
full documentation can be found in section B.1 of the appendix.
Control Variables We controlled for several additional variables including age, gender




We regressed all four attitude scales (conservative and liberal social issues, conservative
and liberal economic issues) on ideological orientation, level of identity (0 = Personal Iden-
tity), and their interaction while controlling for several demographic variables (see Table
5.2). Ideology significantly predicted both social issue scales. As expected, conservative
social (B = .50, SE = .05, p < .001) and economic issues (B = .38, SE = .04, p < .001)
were positively related, liberal social (B = −.49, SE = .05, p < .001) and economic issues
(B = −.41, SE = .04, p < .001) were negatively related. The interaction between ideology
and political identity was significant for economic issues only.
Table 5.2.
Study 1: Regression Estimates for All Models.
Social (con.) Social (lib.) Economic (con.) Economic (lib.)
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Ideology .50∗∗∗ −.49∗∗∗ .38∗∗∗ −.41∗∗∗
(.05) (.05) (.04) (.04)
Political Identity −.44† .24 −.43† .32
(.26) (.23) (.22) (.22)
Ideology X Political
Identity
.07 −.04 .15∗ −.13∗
(.07) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Age .01∗ −.00 −.00 .00
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Male −.15 .05 .25∗∗ −.21∗
(.11) (.107) (.0) (.01)
Higher education −.25∗ .18† −.06 .05
(.11) (.10) (.09) (.09)
Non-White .47∗∗∗ −.32∗∗ −.03 .17
(.12) (.11) (.10) (.10)
Constant 1.53∗∗∗ 6.44∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 6.64∗∗∗
(.27) (.24) (.23) (.23)
N 279 282 282 282
R2 .489 .501 .494 .508
Adjusted R2 .48 .49 .48 .49
F (7; 271) 37.00∗∗∗ 34.28∗∗∗ 33.28∗∗∗ 35.29∗∗∗
Note: †p<.1;∗p<.05; ∗∗p<.01; ∗∗∗p<.001
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The more conservative a participant stated to be, the stronger were their conservative
economic attitudes in the political identity compared to the personal identity condition
(B = .15, SE = .06, p = .02). And vice versa, the more conservative their ideology,
the stronger their endorsement of liberal economic attitudes in the personal identity




































Figure 5.1.. Study 1: Differences in Attitudes between Conditions per Ideology.
Differences in attitudes between self-identified liberals and conservatives and the
identity conditions were further analyzed by contrasting estimated marginal means
(EMM), as visualized in Figure 5.1. Participants were categorized as either conservatives
(n = 53; those who scored above 4 on the ideological self-placement scale) or liberals
(n = 156; those who scored below 4 on the ideological self-placement scale), thereby
ignoring participants who indicated to be middle of the road when it comes to their
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symbolic ideology. Conservatives in the political identity condition (EMM = 4.05, SE =
.135) expressed significantly higher levels of agreement with conservative economic
issues than conservatives in the personal identity condition (EMM = 3.49, SE =
.14, t(215) = 2.84, p = .01). Conversely, conservatives in the personal identity condition
(EMM = 4.19, SE = .15) expressed significantly higher levels of agreement with liberal
economic issues than conservatives in the political identity condition (EMM = 3.65, SE =
.14, t(215) = −2.63, p = .01). No differences were found for conservatives on social issues
or for liberals on either, economic and social issues (see section B.3 for a detailed item
analysis).
5.2.3. Discussion
In line with the aim of Study 1, we were able to show that the salient level of identity
affected stances on pro- and counter-attitudinal issues differently. We expected liberals
in the personal identity condition to endorse counter-attitudinal economic issues (e.g.,
Less government interference in business and trade) stronger than liberals in the political
identity condition. Vice versa, we hypothesized conservatives in the personal identity
condition to be more in agreement with counter-attitudinal economic issues (e.g., More
government interference in business and trade) than conservatives in the political identity
condition. This hypothesis was found to hold for conservatives only, liberals’ stances
on counter-attitudinal issues were consistent across conditions. Our second hypothesis
stated that both, liberals and conservatives in the political identity condition would
entrench their existing economic attitudes, that is, indicate stronger approval of pro- and
disapproval of counter-attitudinal items. Results lend partial support for this hypothesis,
again with only conservatives being in line with expectations. No significant differences
regarding social issues were expected for either ideological group.
Results suggest that symbolic ideology can indeed inform self-categorization processes.
Moreover, Study 1 provides first evidence that the salient level of identity affects stances
on hard and easy issues differently. Easy issues may be less susceptible to changes in
self-categorization. Attitudes towards them are deeply ingrained, highly salient and
readily available. Taking a stance on more technical, hard issues can be cognitively more
effortful and people might thus rely on ingroup cues that inform their position. However,
assumptions only held for conservative participants. One reason for these substantial
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differences between conservatives and liberals might be rooted in the perceived status
of either group. At the time of data collection in 2018, the Liberal Party held the
absolute majority in the Canadian Parliament with Justin Trudeau as Prime Minister.
Communication scientists have called Trudeau’s political communication strategy similar
to that of Donald Trump in that their messages on social media - while contents-wise
diametrically opposed - are both highly personalized and intend on fostering perceived
approachability (Lalancette & Raynauld, 2019). Thus, having a young, popular ingroup
member in office might reflect positively on self-identified liberals’ self-esteem. Assuming
that holding a minority position in the government somehow reflects on individuals that
self-categorize as conservatives, complying with the ingroup prototype and accentuating
intergroup differences can increase their self-esteem and reduce uncertainty (Kelly, 1990).
5.3. Study 2
In Study 1 we tested whether ideological self-placement increased salience of one’s
political identity and would in turn foster attitude shifts for hard issues. We found
Canadian conservatives to state stronger agreement with counter-attitudinal issues in the
personal compared to the political identity condition, and vice versa for pro-attitudinal
issues. This pattern was not found for liberals. Study 2 intended to replicate these findings
in the United States where in 2018, contrary to Canada, a Republican president, Donald
Trump, was in office and Republicans had just gained majority in the Senate and lost their
majority in the House of Representatives after midterm elections on November 6. The
weeks before and after elections were characterized by political debates between opposing
parties on TV or social media, by individuals putting up lawn signs that support ‘their’
candidate and by constant media coverage of the most recent developments. Furthermore,
engagement between opposing candidates is rarely neutral; “when contesting for political
office, leaders do not only seek to build their own following but also to engage in attacks
to destabilize opponent leaders” (Maskor, Steffens, & Haslam, 2020, p. 1). Translating
this into social identity terms, we suggest that national elections are a ‘natural’ political
identity manipulation. Not only are partisan cues constantly present in the media
and in the public space, party candidates seek to maximize positive distinctiveness by
emphasizing intergroup differences and intragroup similarities. We collected data two
weeks after the midterm elections in 2018 (t1) and recontacted participants four months
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later for a second assessment (t2). We intended to replicate findings from Study 1 and
to investigate whether this ‘natural’ salience manipulation affected attitudes for both
identity levels (personal vs. political) equally. Hence, we expected no identity-based
attitude shifts for either issue domain and ideological group at t1 and similar results as
observed in Study 1 for t2. Assuming that public political identity salience would have
declined four months later, we hypothesized economic issue scales to be uncorrelated in
the personal identity condition and correlated in the political identity condition (third
hypothesis). Given the relative robustness of attitudes on easy issues found in Study 1,




t1 A minimum sample size of 270 participants required to detect effects at the .05 level
with a medium effect size (Cohen’s f = .25) and a power of .80 was determined by an a
priori power analysis in G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009). Two weeks after the midterm
elections in the United States in 2018 we recruited and paid 346 U.S. citizens for their
participation on Amazons Mechanical Turk. 11 participants had to be excluded from
the analysis due to failed attention checks and non-meaningful answering patterns. The
final sample comprised N = 335 individuals with a mean age of M = 37.12 (SD= 12.38)
of whom 49.25% were female. The majority of participants (55.22%) indicated to be
very liberal, liberal or somewhat liberal whereas 25.67% indicated to be very conservative,
conservative or somewhat conservative. The survey was completed with an average time
of M = 14.42 (SD = 8.29) minutes.
t2 Four months later we recontacted all 335 participants recruited at t1 for a second
assessment. 177 participants started the survey and a total of N = 131 finished and
passed attention checks (attrition rate: 60.9%). The mean age of participants at t2
was M = 38.67 (SD = 12.32), and 53.44% were female participants. The majority of
participants (54.96%) indicated to be very liberal, liberal or somewhat liberal whereas
27.48% indicated to be very conservative, conservative or somewhat conservative. The
survey was completed with an average time of M = 13.45 (SD = 6.72) minutes.
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Instruments and Procedure
The procedure was identical to Study 1, the central manipulation was salience of either
personal (n1 = 169, n2 = 63) or political identity (n1 = 166, n2 = 68). We randomly
assigned participants to either of the conditions but kept this assignment constant between
t1 and t2.
Aspects of Political and Personal Identity At t1, participants in the political
identity condition indicated higher levels of self-categorization, commitment to, and
inclusion of the group in their self than participants in the personal identity condition.
In the personal identity condition, personal identification was higher for both points in
time compared to the political identity condition (see Table B.4 in the appendix).
5.3.2. Results
Identity-Based Attitude Shift t1
We regressed all four attitude scales (conservative and liberal social issues, conservative
and liberal economic issues) on ideology, level of identity (0 = Personal Identity), and
their interaction while controlling for several demographic variables (see Table 5.3).
Ideology significantly predicted both social issue scales. As expected, conservative social
(B = .59, SE = .04, p < .001) and economic issues (B = .54, SE = .04, p < .001) were
positively related, liberal social (B = −.59, SE = .04, p < .001) and economic issues
(B = −.57, SE = .04, p < .001) were negatively related. The interaction term between
ideology and identity did not reach significance.
Differences in attitudes between self-identified liberals and conservatives and the
identity conditions were further analyzed by contrasting estimated marginal means of
political attitudes (see Figure B.4). Participants were categorized as either conservatives
(n = 86; those who scored above 4 on the ideological self-placement scale) or liberals (n =
185; those who scored below 4 on the ideological self-placement scale), thereby ignoring
participants who indicated to be middle of the road when it comes to their symbolic
ideology. No differences were found for either liberals on conservatives on any of the issue
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Identity-Based Attitude Shift t2
We regressed all four attitude scales (conservative and liberal social issues, conservative
and liberal economic issues) on ideology, level of identity (0 = Personal Identity), and their
interaction while controlling for several demographic variables (see Table 5.3). Ideology
significantly predicted both social issue scales. As in previous studies, conservative social
(B = .64, p < .001) and economic issues (B = .52, p < .001) were positively related, liberal
social (B = −.67, p < .001) and economic issues (B = −.59, p < .001) were negatively



























































Figure 5.2.. Study 2 t2: Differences in Attitude Scales between Conditions per Ideological
Orientation (Conservative Attitudes in Red, Liberal Attitudes in Blue).
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As for t1 and in Study 1, we contrasted estimated marginal means of political attitudes
between liberals (n = 78) and conservatives (n = 36, see Figure 5.2). Liberals in the
political identity condition (EMM = 6.15, SE = .170) expressed significantly higher
levels of agreement with liberal economic issues than liberals in the personal identity
condition (EMM = 5.64, SE = .15, t(210) = 2.20, p = .03). Similarly, liberals in the
personal identity condition (EMM = 2.16, SE = .14) expressed marginally higher levels
of agreement with conservative economic issues than liberals in the political identity
condition (EMM = 1.76, SE = .16, t(210) = −1.92, p = .06). No differences were found
for liberals on social issues or for conservatives on either, economic and social issues (see
section B.3 for a detailed item analysis).
Changes in Attitude from t1 to t2
In order to test for differences in attitude due to the ‘natural’ political identity salience
during midterm elections compared to a later point in time, we regressed attitude scales
assessed at t2 on the ones assessed at t1 in a path model considering residual covariances
of attitudes per point in time (see Figure 5.3 below and Table B.5 in the appendix for
all results). Similar to what regression results from the preceding section suggested, we
found attitudes to be consistent across scales and identity conditions between points
in time. Residual covariances at t1 were all significant and as expected, that is, issue
scales were positively correlated within (e.g., conservative social and economic issues) and
negatively correlated between the respective ideological stance (e.g., conservative and
liberal social issues) for both identity conditions. At t2, however, we found differences
between identity conditions. Participants’ residual covariances in the personal identity
condition were similar to t1 except for correlations between conservative social issues and
liberal economic issues (z = −1.22, p = .22), and liberal social issues and conservative
economic issues (z = −.99, p = .33). In the political identity condition, only correlations
within a domain were still significantly negative.
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Figure 5.3.. Study 2: Path Model for Attitudes Between Points in Time and per Experi-
mental Condition.
5.3.3. Discussion
In line with expectations, we found no identity-based attitude shifts at t1. Results
suggest that four months later, liberals indicated stronger stances on pro-attitudinal
economic issues when their political identity was salient and stronger stances on counter-
attitudinal economic issues when their personal identity was salient. No such pattern
was found for conservatives or social issues, hence invertedly replicating results from
Study 1. As expected, social attitude scales at t1 and t2 were correlated for both identity
conditions. Contrary to expectations we also found economic attitude scales to be highly
correlated for both conditions between points in time.
Results from Study 2 lend support to our overarching hypothesis of identity-based
attitude shifts on hard issues. However, whereas in Study 1 this pattern was only true for
conservatives, it was observed for liberals only in Study 2. As outlined in Study 1, one of
the reasons for the observed asymmetry might be that the party in power is perceived
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as an outgroup by liberals. Hence, the need for positive distinctiveness by emphasizing
group norms and attitudes.
Both, social and economic issues were strongly correlated over time for both identity
conditions. While this pattern was in line with expectations for social issues, it was
not for economic issues. More specifically, we expected that if participants’ political
identity was salient at t1 independent of our manipulation, then participants’ stances
in the personal identity condition would be informed by group prototypes at t1 only,
resulting in un- or weakly correlated scales between t1 and t2. The fact that residual
covariances were similar for both conditions at t1 might speak to high levels of political
cohesion due to a highly politicized public life at the time. While this remained relatively
unchanged in the personal identity condition at t2, residual covariances in the political
identity condition changed substantially. The identity-based shifts observed for liberals at
t2 might underlie this pattern: while negative correlations within a domain (conservative
vs. liberal social/economic issues) were still significant, correlations between hard and
easy issues were not.
5.4. General Discussion
The results of the present research attest to the importance of identity and the
nature of issues in determining people’s political attitudes. As predicted, pro-attitudinal
issues were entrenched when participants’ political identity was salient. Conversely,
counter-attitudinal issues were more strongly endorsed when their personal identity was
salient. This pattern was only true for ’hard’ economic issues and for the ideological
group whose associated party did not represent a governmental majority (Study 1:
conservatives, Study 2 t2: liberals) at the time of data collection. Moreover, we found
an experimental salience manipulation to be unsuccessful when the public discourse was
shaped by national elections (Study 1 t1). To our knowledge, these studies provide first
experimental evidence of how identity salience affects people’s stances on hard and easy
issues differently. Furthermore, they might present quasi-experimental evidence of how
public politics shape political cohesion on an individual level.
Only recently, Reeskens et al. (2020) published their results from longitudinal studies
showing the relative stability of easy, and relative volatility of hard issues before and
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Their findings are in line with previous research that
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had found easy issues to be relatively stable (Farrar et al., 2010; Wojcieszak & Price,
2010) while hard issues are rather volatile in that individuals are more likely to rely on
ingroup cues to derive their opinion (Coan et al., 2008; Cohen, 2003; Malka & Lelkes,
2010; Popp & Rudolph, 2011). The present research confirms and expands on these
findings by showing that the salience of one’s political identity can trigger an attitude
shift towards an ingroup prototype even without explicit source cues and for hard issues
only. However, we found differences with regard to how well this pattern fit the data.
Firstly, identity-based attitude shifts were only observed for one of the two ideological
groups, either conservatives (Study 1) or liberals (Study 2 t2). Secondly, we found no
such shifts immediately after a national election in the United States. These findings
will be discussed with regard to stability and function of attitude shifts. We argue that
rather than representing genuine, that is, stable attitude change (Hogg & Smith, 2007),
attitude shifts on hard issues can be explained by the psychological functions they serve.
By the time of data collection, Canada’s prime minister and the government majority
were from the Liberal Party, while in the United States, the President and the majority
in the Senate were Republican, hence conservative. Both heads of state, Justin Trudeau
and Donald Trump, have been very active in their social media communication “in order
to circumvent traditional media intermediaries and reach out directly to publics ... in
highly personalized ways” and held a certain celebrity status (Lalancette & Raynauld,
2019, p. 889). The finding of asymmetrical attitude shifts in Study 1 and 2 was not
expected but might be explained by the fact that the respective group that did shift
attitudes when their political identity was salient was not the group of the respective
head of state or government. In terms of social identity theory, the party in office may be
assumed to have a higher status than the party in opposition. However, given the nature
of democracy, this hierarchy can just as easily be reversed with every national election.
Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, and Wilke (1990) found that if one’s group status is likely
to change in the future, people do not dissociate from the group but rather engage in
social competition. This was found to be true for low status groups rather than high
status groups (Ouwerkerk, de Gilder, & de Vries, 2000). If status hierarchy is potentially
unstable or perceived illegitimate, group members are more likely to engage in outgroup
derogatory behavior (Hornsey, Spears, Cremers, & Hogg, 2003). To the extent that a
conservative/liberal self-identification relates to a conservative/liberal party identification
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(Conover & Feldman, 1981; Kossowska & Hiel, 2003), conservatives in Canada might
perceive themselves as temporarily lower status compared to liberals and vice versa for
the United States. A prototype-based depersonalization process of aligning attitudes with
an ingroup would not only increase ingroup entativity and cohesion (Hogg & Smith, 2007),
but also allow for the maintenance of a favorable self-view (Pool, Wood, & Leck, 1998),
an increase in self-esteem (Ellemers et al., 1999), and uncertainty reduction (J. R. Smith,
Hogg, Martin, & Terry, 2007). In summary, this means that the observed pattern of
identity-based attitude shifts could potentially be reversed along with the status hierarchy,
that is, if for instance the Conservative Party would hold the majority in Canada. This
hypothesis, if found to hold, would speak against genuine attitude change as put forward
by Hogg and Smith (2007) but rather for motivated reasoning and temporary functional
attitude shifts. In favor of this impermanence hypothesis, we found attitude shifts to
be significant only until more than four months after national elections (Study 2). No
differences in attitudes towards social and economic issues between identity conditions
were found at t1. Assuming that during national elections, ideological and party cues
were omnipresent and participants’ political identities might have been more salient
than their personal identities independent of our salience manipulation, then anyone’s
opinions at t1 was more prototype-based than at t2. The fact that we did observe shifts
on economic issues for liberals at t2 speaks to the impermanence or salience-dependence
of depersonalized attitudes.
The present research enriches the literature on how social identities can impact
behavior and perception. It introduces an identity-based perspective into the debate
on nonattitudes and the operational-symbolic disconnect (Converse, 1964, 1970; Ellis &
Stimson, 2012). Furthermore, we suggest it bears several implications for public opinion
discourse and political attitude formation. In both, psychology and political science,
research on attitude change has often revolved around mechanisms of persuasion rather
than ‘natural’ attitude change (Bailey et al., 2003; Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997; Mackie,
Worth, & Asuncion, 1990; Mackie, Gastardo-Conaco, & Skelly, 1992). Our findings could
inform political communication in a way that can either improve or undermine democratic
processes of public opinion formation. Making one’s personal level of identity salient
before they vote on a certain issue might prevent attitude polarization. Assuming that
there are common goods worth preserving, for instance the environment, then nudging a
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voter’s attitude towards more environmental protection may be a justified public interest.
However, the same nudging procedure has substantial potential for populist abuse. While
there have been constructive attempts to make hard issues easier (Cobb & Kuklinski,
1997; Pollock et al., 1993), the same mechanism could be used to sway people on hard
issues. By using ‘easy’ imagery on for instance abortion, ‘hard’ attitudes on health care
systems could be influenced (Cizmar, 2011). Making use of identity-based attitude shifts
in attitude formation is a double-edged sword, while powerful and functional, it can also
lay the ground for populist abusive communication.
5.4.1. Limitations and Future Research
Inferences drawn from Study 2 about temporal stability of attitude shifts can only
be preliminary due to a large dropout rate. Furthermore, future studies should test
for interpersonal differences in attitude shifts if assigned the opposite condition at t2
rather than the identical one. One explanatory variable largely neglected in the present
research is that of political sophistication. A series of authors have conceptualized
political sophistication to be a key distinctive factor in attitude stability, especially when
differentiating between easy and hard issues (Carmines & Stimson, 1980; Ellis & Stimson,
2012; Goren, 2004). The possibility of a moderating effect of political sophistication
on identity-based attitude shifts should be considered. Another strand of literature has
investigated the effect of hard issues framed ‘easy’ and vice versa (Cizmar, 2011; Cobb &
Kuklinski, 1997; Pollock et al., 1993). The present research could inform and be informed
by the latter. Moreover, our findings are of course restricted to a North American or
Western population at best. The mechanisms under study here might not hold in more
collectivist countries or in countries were the political landscape can’t be arranged along
a conservative/liberal or left/right dimension.
5.4.2. Conclusion
The current studies aimed at elaborating and quantifying the degree of entanglement
between attitudes towards easy and hard policy issues held at the personal and social
identity level, respectively. We found that individuals endorsed counter-attitudinal issues
stronger when their personal identity was salient. Conversely, stances on pro-attitudinal
issues were entrenched along with a salience of one’s political identity. This was only true
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for hard issues and for individuals whose ’own’ party, that is the party associated with
their own political identification, presented a governmental minority. Putting ’identity’
back in political identification can shed light on attitude shifts and inform political
communication.
74
6. Now More Than Ever! Can Exposure
to Fake News Lead to Polarization?
6.1. Introduction
Following the United States presidential elections in November 2020, Donald Trump
and his supporters repeatedly put forward the false claim of electoral fraud and that he
and not his opponent Joe Biden had won the election (see e.g., Haberman, Rutenberg,
Corasaniti, & Epstein, 2020; Kessler & Rizzo, 2020). When a group of his supporters
violently stormed the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, Donald Trump published
tweets that were interpreted as supporting this attack for which Twitter permanently
suspended his account two days later (BBC, 2021; Ortutay, 2021; Pro Republica, 2021;
Twitter Inc., 2021):
These are the things and events that happen when a sacred landslide election
victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from great patriots
who have been badly & unfairly treated for so long. Go home in love & in
peace. Remember this day forever!
Throughout his presidency, Donald Trump had published statements that were non-
factual on the one hand (see e.g., Applebaum, 2020), and claimed mainstream media
reports that were not in his favor to be fake news on the other hand (Ross & Rivers,
2018). Academic and societal reception of the phenomenon of fake news speaks to its
relevance and timeliness; a Web of Science search for ‘fake news’ resulted in 2229 articles
of which 98.12% (n = 2187) were published after 2016. Moreover, the American Dialect
Society (2018) elected fake news Word of the Year 2017.
Fake news needs to be distinguished from misinformation, false or misleading informa-
tion, and disinformation, misinformation that is spread with deceptive intentions, in that
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fake news is “fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but not
in organizational process or intent” (Lazer et al., 2018, p. 1094). Persily (2017, p. 67)
differentiates four types of fake news: satirical fake news, as published for instance by
The Onion in the United States or the Postillon in Germany, profit-driven fake news that
spread disinformation with the purpose of financial gain, reckless reporting, or political
propaganda, “the deliberate use of misinformation to influence attitudes on an issue or
toward a candidate” (Persily, 2017, p. 68). While fake news is not a new phenomenon
(Posetti & Matthews, 2018), there are several factors that make it a more pressing concern
in the digital age (Ackland & Gwynn, 2021). Throughout the last century, dominant
information distribution technologies such as broadcast and print have been geared to
“journalistic norms of objectivity and balance” (Lazer et al., 2018, p. 1094). Building
up a news outlet and entering the market meant high fixed costs (e.g., wages, utilities,
production cost) before making any revenue. Expecting high levels of credibility and
trustworthiness to result in stable sales figures, news outlets with high fixed costs were
motivated to build a sustainable reputation for themselves (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017).
With an increasing preference for online news consumption, this still holds true for
news producers today that maintained their editorial norms and processes. Providing
information online can come at substantially lower costs of entry for new competitors
rejecting the above-mentioned norms and processes (Ackland & Gwynn, 2021; Lazer et
al., 2018), as “on social media, the fixed costs of entering the market and producing
content are vanishingly small” (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p. 221).
If we assume that consumers always prefer high quality and unbiased news reporting
over the opposite, one might not expect any difficulties resulting from lower quality com-
petitors entering the market. However, an individual’s demand for unbiased information
may be distorted by socio-cognitive biases related to their preexisting attitudes and
their ideological identity. In line with literature on the confirmation bias (Nickerson,
1998) and cognitive consistency (Lavine & Latané, 1996), individuals were found to
prefer attitude-consistent messages in political information search over inconsistent ones
(Knobloch-Westerwick, Johnson, & Westerwick, 2015; Knobloch-Westerwick, Mothes,
& Polavin, 2020; Lodge & Taber, 2005, 2013; Mullainathan & Shleifer, 2005; Taber &
Lodge, 2006; Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009), and outlets were evaluated to be of higher
quality when their reports were in line with an individual’s priors (Gentzkow & Shapiro,
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2006). These biases in information processing might have been the breeding ground for
fake news producers. By mimicking news media content and tailoring their fabricated
content to the expected priors, fake news producers might cater to both, people’s demand
for high quality and their preference for attitude-consistent content. On a supply-side
this can result in a “reduced demand for high-precision, low-bias reporting” (Allcott &
Gentzkow, 2017, p.219) and thus, an increase in fake news prevalence.
Adding fake news producers to the media landscape may come at multiple societal
costs. Even though fake news only make up a small share of the total media output
(Allen, Howland, Mobius, Rothschild, & Watts, 2020; Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2018)
and only very few people actually engage in sharing fake news (Guess, Nagler, & Tucker,
2019; Osmundsen, Bor, Vahlstrup, Bechmann, & Petersen, 2020; Ovide, 2021), they were
found to reach more people and diffuse faster than true news stories (Vosoughi, Roy, &
Aral, 2018). False information about risks associated with vaccinations, for instance, have
lead to a pronounced decrease in vaccine compliance and hence, an increase in diseases
that could have been prevented by vaccines in many countries (Gangarosa et al., 1998;
Hansen & Schmidtblaicher, 2019; Larson, Cooper, Eskola, Katz, & Ratzan, 2011; Poland
& Spier, 2010). Fake news on political topics have been found to spread significantly
faster than fake news on other topics (Vosoughi et al., 2018) and can foster growing
skepticism towards mainstream media (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Barthel, Mitchell, &
Holcomb, 2016; Marwick & Lewis, 2017), undermine the democratic process by erecting
“barriers to educated political decision making” (Persily, 2017, p. 70), or even influence
election outcomes (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Zimmermann & Kohring, 2020).
Having become increasingly aware of these consequences, the European Commission
(2020) has launched the European Digital Media Observatory to detect and fight fake
news, and social media platforms like Twitter (Twitter Inc., 2020), Facebook (Tidy,
2020), and YouTube (Newton, 2020) have started fact-checking and flagging fake news
content. However, evidence on the effectiveness of correcting false information is mixed.
Some have found correction to be rarely fully effective or even counterproductive under
certain circumstances (Lazer et al., 2018; Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017). False
beliefs were often at least partially upheld, even if the correction was acknowledged
(H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012).
Others found that contingent on whether or not a correction challenged a participants’
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ideological world views, belief in false information even increased (Ecker & Ang, 2019;
P. S. Hart & Nisbet, 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Nyhan, Reifler, & Ubel, 2013; Nyhan
& Reifler, 2015; Zhou, 2016). This so called backfire effect, however, occurred almost
exclusively for politically conservative participants and failed to replicate in both, exact
(Haglin, 2017) and modified replications (Wood & Porter, 2019). In fact, the majority
of research suggests that correcting misinformation indeed leads to belief updating in
most cases (see, Swire-Thompson, DeGutis, & Lazer, 2020, for an overview). Assuming
that correction usually leads to successful belief updating, does this mean that flagging
and correcting online fake news can eliminate the threat they pose? The present chapter
aims at evaluating the effect of correction on an individual’s polarization in both, affect
and attitudes.
Political fake news are motivated ideologically in that they seek to promote consistent
topics or candidates and discredit inconsistent ones (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). This
implies an intergroup dynamic where individuals are exposed to opinions of in- or
outgroup members that may accordingly be congruent or incongruent with their own.
From the literature we know that exposure to both, attitude-congruent (Arceneaux &
Johnson, 2013; Kim, 2015; Schmuck, Heiss, & Matthes, 2020) and attitude-incongruent
information (Bail et al., 2018; Schmuck et al., 2020; Sunstein, 2018a, 2018b) can lead
to increasingly polarized attitudes. And while polarization in affect was also found to
increase after exposure to attitude-congruent information, it tended to decrease after
exposure to attitude-incongruent information (Garrett et al., 2014; Wojcieszak & Garrett,
2018). Given the intergroup dynamic of political fake news, learning that a relevant
ingroup disseminated fake news might be perceived as a threat to one’s group identity
as individuals tend to evaluate the groups they identify with positively and “there are
motivational pressures to maintain this state of affairs” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 57).
From multiple studies we know that group identity threat in its interaction with group
identification may eventually lead to an increased ingroup bias (Branscombe & Wann,
1994; Grant, 1993; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997;
Wann & Branscombe, 1990; Verkuyten & Nekuee, 1999), that is, “the tendency to
favor one’s own group, its members, its characteristics, and its products, particularly in
reference to other groups” (American Psychological Association, 2020). Expanding on
these findings and considering that the salience of group categories fosters “perceptual
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accentuation of intra-class similarities and inter-class differences” (Turner et al., 1987,
p. 49), we suggest that learning about ingroup fake news dissemination might exacerbate
the polarizing effect of exposure to ingroup attitudes. Hence, it is the aim of the
present research to examine whether learning about the fake news nature of an ingroup
message can lead to a relative preference of ingroup over outgroup features, in that
individuals become polarized in their evaluations of outgroup relative to ingroup members
(affective polarization) and in their political attitudes (attitude polarization) (Azzimonti
& Fernandes, 2018; Ribeiro et al., 2017; Spohr, 2017). The present research examines
whether learning about the fake news nature of a social media post increases affective
(Study 1) and attitude polarization (Study 2) dependent on the level of identification
with the sender. We randomly presented participants one of four fake news posts found
on https://www.mimikama.at that had actually been shared on social media at some
point prior to data collection. They were then either told right away that the post they
saw was factually incorrect (disclosure) or they were only told so before completing
the survey (no disclosure). Levels of affective and attitude polarization were evaluated
with respect to participants’ level of identification with the perceived sender and their
ideological orientation.
6.2. Study 1
Shanto Iyengar and colleagues (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar & Westwood,
2015; Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra, & Westwood, 2019) coined the term of
affective polarization in an attempt to describe the increasing gap between positive affect
towards their own and negative affect towards the other party for Republicans and
Democrats alike (Haidt & Hetherington, 2012). Linking their theoretical considerations
to insights from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), they
claim affective polarization to be “a natural offshoot of ... partisan group identity”
(Iyengar et al., 2019, p. 130) that is defined by “the tendency of people identifying
as Republicans or Democrats to view opposing partisans negatively and copartisans
positively” (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015, p. 691). Multiple studies have found a trend of
polarized partisan affect in the United States (Druckman & Levendusky, 2019; Iyengar et
al., 2019; S. W. Webster & Abramowitz, 2017) while the evidence for other countries with
multiparty systems is mixed (Boxell et al., 2020; Reiljan, 2020). Rather than analyzing
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long-term effects of exposure to in- or outgroup fake news, this study focused on the
immediate effects of exposure to fake news on affective polarization in a multiparty
system. More specifically, we examined the effect of fake news correction and group
membership on affective polarization. Participants were randomly assigned one of four
fake news stimuli, and one of two disclosure conditions where they either learned about
the social media post being fake news right away (disclosure) or at the end of the survey
(no disclosure). We expected differences in affective polarization dependent on the time
of disclosure and on the participants’ level of identification with the perceived sender
(ingroup vs. outgroup vs. ambiguous). Previous research found an increase in affective
polarization after forced or selective exposure to ingroup online information (Iyengar
et al., 2012; J. K. Lee, Choi, Kim, & Kim, 2014; Stroud, 2010) that was in some cases
attenuated by exposure to outgroup online information (Garrett et al., 2014; Kim, 2015;
Wojcieszak & Garrett, 2018). Hence, when fake news were not corrected, a first hypothesis
expected affective polarization to be stronger for those who perceived the sender to be
an ingroup rather than an outgroup member. However, given a potentially heightened
group identity salience, affective polarization should be lowest whenever participants only
moderately or ambiguously identified with the sender compared to those who clearly
identified the sender as an in- or outgroup member. When participants learned about
the fake news nature of the stimulus early on, a second hypothesis expected that this
might be perceived as a group identity threat that would lead to an increased ingroup
bias (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Grant, 1993; Jetten et al., 1997; Spears et al., 1997;
Wann & Branscombe, 1990; Verkuyten & Nekuee, 1999). Hence, we expected highest
levels of affective polarization when participants perceived the sender to be an ingroup
member compared to an outgroup member and to cases when they ambiguously identified
with the sender. Assuming that group identity threat would motivate ingroup bias more
strongly than mere group identity salience, in a third hypothesis, we hypothesized higher
levels of affective polarization in the disclosure compared to the no disclosure condition
for those who perceived the sender to be an ingroup member. We expected no such
differences when participants’ identification with the perceived sender was ambiguous
or low. Finally, ideological differences in affective polarization between conditions were
assessed in an exploratory manner.
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6.2.1. Method
Procedure
Data collection was conducted via respondi, a German online panel provider, in
December 2019. Participants had to provide information about their age, mother tongue
and ideological orientation on a ten point Likert scale (ranging from 1 = left/liberal to
10 = right/conservative) before starting the survey. Anyone who was either a) younger
than 18, b) did not consider German their mother tongue, or c) indicated an ideological
orientation for which the a priori set quota was already met (40% self-reported liberals,
i.e., indicating a value below 5, 40% self-reported conservatives, i.e., indicating a value
larger than 5, 20% self-reported moderates, indicating a value equal to 5) was screened
out and thanked for their participation. In a 4 (fake news stimulus) x 2 (disclosure
vs. no disclosure) factorial between subjects design, the remaining participants were
randomly presented one of four stimuli and asked to carefully read the Facebook post
presented. After a minimum of 15 seconds of stimulus presentation participants were
asked an attention question regarding the respective stimulus contents and screened out if
their answer was incorrect. In one condition, the information that the stimulus presented
was factually incorrect (i.e., deemed fake news) was disclosed after the attention question,
in the other condition it was disclosed at the very end of the survey. Participants ranked
a list of political groups according to their perceived likelihood of this group being the
sender, and were then asked to report their affect towards and their level of identification
with each of these groups before concluding the survey with demographic questions.
Participants
A minimum sample size of 225 participants required to detect effects at the .05 level
with a medium effect size (Cohen’s f = .25) and an .80 power was determined by an a
priori power analysis in G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009). 1.102 participants started the
survey and after automatic screen-outs due to quota or failed attention checks complete
data was collected from 452 participants. After excluding another 34 cases due to random
answering patterns and 41 cases where too much or too few time had elapsed deviated by
more than minus one or more than plus two standard deviations from the mean of M =
31.8 (SD = 17.62), the final sample consisted of N = 377 participants with a mean age
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of M = 46.42 (SD = 15.21) of which 41.91% (n = 158) were female.14 Mean ideological
orientation was M = 4.76 (SD = 2.10) and the survey was completed with an average
time of M = 20.51 minutes (SD = 140.73).
Materials
Stimuli Four out of eight real-life stimuli were chosen as a result of a pretest conducted
in November 2019 (see section C.1 in the appendix for full documentation). The first
(Hambach forest, Figure C.2c) and the second (Taxes , Figure C.2d) were perceived to
have had a left-wing rather than a right-wing sender, and vice versa for the third (Greta
Thunberg, Figure C.4a) and the fourth (Green Party, Figure C.4b), respectively. Every
participant was randomly assigned one of the four stimuli.
Disclosure The following message was displayed either right after stimulus presentation
(disclosure) or at the end of the survey (no disclosure): “The post you just saw has been
shared in social media multiple times. Various journalists’ research showed that it was
factually incorrect and was therefore labeled fake news by those journalists”. Table C.6
in the appendix displays sample sizes per condition.
Perceived Sender After completing a trial task to familiarize themselves with the
drag and drop procedure, participants were asked to rank a list of groups according to
the perceived likelihood of them being the sender of the Facebook post presented with
rank 1 indicating the highest likelihood. At least five of the following groups had to be
ranked: environmental activists, climate change skeptics, right-wing extremists, left-wing
extremists, politically moderates, CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany), SPD
(Social Democratic Party of Germany), AfD (Alternative for Germany), FDP (Free
Democratic Party), Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens), Die Linke (The
Left), Other (optional string entry).
14Participants who indicated an identical value for every item of at least one scale or an answering
pattern that was logically inconsistent, were excluded. We further excluded all cases where the time
elapsed between first and last click on the affect scale (see 6.2.1) This strict procedure was applied because
taking less than 14 (-1 SD) or more than 67 seconds (+2 SD) to answer might have attenuated the
manipulation effect.
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Affect Participants were asked to indicate how they generally felt towards the groups
listed above on a ten point Likert scale ranging from 1 (= strong negative feelings) to 10
(= strong positive feelings).
Identification On a ten point Likert scale ranging from 1 (= not at all) to 10 (=
completely) participants indicated their level of identification with any of the groups.
Ideological Orientation Participants were asked to place themselves on a ten point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (= very liberal) to 10 (= very conservative) according to
their ideological orientation on a left-right/liberal-conservative spectrum. They were
categorized as either conservatives (n = 211; those who scored above the sample mean)
or liberals (n = 166; those who scored below the sample mean).
Indices
Identification with Perceived Sender As an index for participants’ identification
with the groups they assigned the highest likelihood of being the sender to, identification
scores (IDi) for the groups they assigned rank 1, 2, and 3 to were summed up and divided






Overall, ideological orientation and identification with perceived sender per stimulus
were moderately correlated according to expectations. This pattern held true in both
disclosure conditions (see Table C.5 in the appendix).
Identification with perceived sender was then recoded such that for participants who
identified strongly (i.e., equal to or above one standard deviation) with the perceived
sender relative to their respective overall mean identification, we assumed that the sender
was perceived an ingroup member (n = 113). When identification with the perceived
sender was below or equal to one standard deviation of the individual mean, the sender
was assumed to be an outgroup member (n = 169). In any other case, the level of
identification with the sender was assumed to be ambiguous (n = 95).
Affective Polarization Affective polarization was measured by adapting the two-party
feeling thermometer rating (Iyengar et al., 2012, 2019) to a multi-party environment
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(Boxell et al., 2020; Reiljan, 2020; Wagner, 2020). In a first step, we calculated mean
ingroup affect (āingroup) for all n political groups that had affect ratings greater than the













Equivalently, we calculated mean outgroup affect (āoutgroup) for all m groups with








Therefore, considering n in- and m outgroups, the individual level of affective polar-















We ran a linear mixed effects model using the lme4 package (Bates, Sarkar, Bates, &
Matrix, 2007) including affective polarization as the dependent variable and fixed effects
of identification with perceived sender (0 = ambiguous sender), time of disclosure (0 =
no disclosure), as well as their interaction and a number of control variables (see Table
6.1). Stimuli were included as random effects, thereby allowing for random slopes of the
effect of stimuli on affective polarization. Statistical significance was calculated with
Satterthwaite’s method in the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen,
2017). For the remainder of this article, 95% confidence intervals will be reported in
addition to p-values for any linear mixed effects model as simulations found that p-values
in linear mixed models were somewhat anti-conservative and prone to Type 1 errors
(Luke, 2017). The Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) procedure was applied to control
for Type 1 errors for all planned comparisons. To account for unequal sample sizes per
sub-group (see Table C.7 in the appendix), planned comparisons were computed using
estimated marginal means (EMM).
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Table 6.1.
Study 1: Regression of Affective Polarization on Time of Disclosure and Identification
with Perceived Sender (Fixed Effects), Including a Random Slope for Stimulus.
95% CI
B (SE) LL UL t
Ingroup sender 1.21∗∗∗ .70 1.72 4.65
(.26)
Outgroup sender 1.07∗∗∗ .58 1.57 4.25
(.26)
Disclosure .31 −.26 .89 1.06
(.29)
Ingroup sender X Disclosure −.56 −1.36 .25 −1.36
(.41)
Outgroup sender X Disclosure −.96∗∗ −1.67 −.24 −2.62
(.37)
Age .01 −.01 .02 1.25
(.01)
Male .00 −.29 .30 .01
(.15)
Higher education −.05 −.34 .23 −.37
(.15)






Num. groups: Stimulus 4
Var: Stimulus (Intercept) .00
Var: Residual 1.99
Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. ∗∗∗p < .001; ∗∗p < .01
The data revealed a main effect for each, perceived ingroup (B = 1.21, SE =
.26, t(373) = 4.65, p < .001) and outgroup sender (B = 1.07, SE = .26, t(373) = 4.25, p <
.001) relative to an ambiguous sender. While the main effect of disclosure was not sig-
nificant, an interaction term between disclosure and sender indicated significantly lower
levels of affective polarization when disclosure was early and the sender was perceived
an outgroup member (B = −.955, SE = .37, t(373) = −2.62, p = .01). Comparing
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the full model (AIC = 1338.82) with a model excluding the fixed effects fit the data
significantly better (AIC = 1362.50, χ2(5) = 33.73, p < .001). However, potentially
resulting from near zero random effect variance, the model resulted in singular fit. Hence,
the random slope for stimulus was excluded from further analyses, thereby assuming
affective polarization to be invariant across stimulus conditions.
Averaging over the levels of identification, no differences in affective polarization
were found between no disclosure (EMM = 3.92, SE = .10) and disclosure (EMM =
3.74, SE = .12, t(371) = 1.18, p = .24). Overall, affective polarization was largest when
the sender was perceived an ingroup (EMM = 4.27, SE = .14) rather than an outgroup
member (EMM = 3.91, SE = .11, t(371) = 2.01, p = .05) or when identification was
ambiguous (EMM = 3.31, SE = .146, t(371) = 4.71, p < .001). Differences between the























Figure 6.1.. Study 1: Differences in Affective Polarization between Levels of Identification
with Perceived Sender per Disclosure Condition.
Figure 6.1 visualizes comparisons between the sub-samples. When fake news were
not disclosed, affective polarization was lowest for participants whose identification
was ambiguous (EMM = 3.18, SE = .20) compared to when the sender was per-
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ceived an ingroup (EMM = 4.36, SE = .17, t(371) = 4.55, p < .001) or outgroup
member (EMM = 4.22, SE = .15, t(371) = 4.12, p < .001). The difference be-
tween the latter was found insignificant. In the disclosure condition, affective po-
larization was higher for ingroup senders (EMM = 4.18, SE = .23) compared to
outgroup (EMM = 3.60, SE = .16, t(371) = 2.08, p = .07) or ambiguous identification
(EMM = 3.44, SE = .21, t(371) = 2.35, p = .04). Significant differences between condi-
tions were only found when the sender was perceived an outgroup member with higher
levels in the no disclosure condition (t(371) = 2.85, p = .01, see Table 6.2 for mean levels
and standard deviations).
Table 6.2.
Study 1: Mean Levels of Affective Polarization as a Function of Identification with
Perceived Sender, Time of Disclosure, and Ideological Orientation.
Disclosure late Disclosure early
M SD M SD
Overall
Ingroup 4.36 1.43 4.18 1.78
Ambiguous 3.18 1.34 3.44 1.21
Outgroup 4.22 1.39 3.60 1.43
Liberals
Ingroup 4.55 1.50 4.69 1.52
Ambiguous 3.66 .91 3.60 1.31
Outgroup 4.26 1.26 3.88 1.26
Conservatives
Ingroup 4.14 1.32 3.76 1.90
Ambiguous 2.93 1.47 3.37 1.19
Outgroup 4.19 1.52 3.36 1.53
Exploratory analyses
A multiple regression including ideological orientation as predictor (see Table C.8 in
the appendix) revealed an additional marginally significant main effect for liberals (B =
.781, SE = .43, t = 1.82, p = .07), indicating overall higher levels of affective polarization
for liberals (EMM = 4.11, SE = .12) as compared to conservatives (EMM = 3.63, SE =
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.10, t(365) = −3.03, p = .003). Differences between disclosure conditions were significant
for conservatives when the sender was perceived to be an outgroup member with higher
levels in the no disclosure condition (EMM = 4.19, SE = .209) compared to early
disclosure (EMM = 3.36, SE = .21, t(365) = 2.78, p = .01). When fake news were not
disclosed, affective polarization was lowest for ambiguous sender identification (liberals:
EMM = 3.66, SE = .34, conservatives: EMM = 2.93, SE = .25) compared to when
the sender was perceived an in- (liberals: EMM = 4.55, SE = .22, t(365) = −2.19, p =
.09; conservatives: EMM = 4.14, SE = .24, t(365) = −3.48, p < .001) or outgroup
member (liberals: EMM = 4.26, SE = .22, t(365) = −1.48, p = .21; conservatives:
EMM = 4.19, SE = .21, t(365) = −3.89, p < .001). Statistical significance was obtained
for conservatives only. In the disclosure early condition, liberals’ affective polarization
was highest for ingroup senders (EMM = 4.69, SE = .34) compared to outgroup
(EMM = 3.88, SE = .23, t(365) = 1.96, p = .08) or ambiguous senders (EMM =
3.60, SE = .39, t(365) = −2.088, p = .08), yet the differences were only marginally
significant.
6.2.3. Discussion
In line with our first hypothesis, we found higher levels of affective polarization after
exposure to in- and outgroup stimuli relative to cases were identification with the sender
was moderate or ambiguous. However, levels of affective polarization after exposure to
ingroup stimuli were not significantly different from levels after exposure to outgroup
stimuli, hence, partly contradicting our first hypothesis. In line with our second hypothesis
we find highest levels of affective polarization for participants who perceived the sender
to be an ingroup member when fake news content was disclosed. Comparing affective
polarization between disclosure conditions unexpectedly revealed higher levels in the no
disclosure relative to the disclosure condition when the sender was perceived an outgroup
member. Exploratory analyses showed similar results when accounting for ideological
orientation. Conservatives ambiguously identifying with the sender showed least affective
polarization when they had not learned about the fake news, yet, these differences were
attenuated in the disclosure early condition. Liberals who learned about the fake news
early exhibited higher levels of affective polarization when they perceived the sender to
be an ingroup member relative to an outgroup member or when sender identification was
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ambiguous. These differences, however, were only marginally significant after adjusting
for multiple comparisons. Differences between disclosure conditions were significant for
conservatives perceiving the sender to be an outgroup member only.
Consistent with previous findings, the present data suggests that exposure to ingroup
stimuli on social media can be associated with heightened levels of affective polarization.
However, while affective polarization was slightly lower after exposure to outgroup
compared to ingroup members, the difference did not reach statistical significance. In
their studies, Garrett et al. (2014) and Wojcieszak and Garrett (2018) found an attenuating
effect of exposure to outgroup attitudes on affective polarization in a within-subjects
design. That is, adding outgroup stimuli significantly reduced the polarizing effect of
ingroup stimuli. Our findings suggest that both, in- and outgroup salience can exacerbate
polarization relative to when one does not clearly identify with the sender.
Within the disclosure condition, learning that the stimulus presented was factually
incorrect, that is, fake news, did not affect overall affective polarization. There was a
trend towards greater polarization when the sender was perceived an ingroup member.
Most interestingly, however, the difference between those who moderately or ambiguously
identified with the sender and those who perceived the sender an outgroup member was
no longer significant in the overall sample and for both political groups. Conservatives’
affect towards in- and outgroups was similar, independent of who they perceived the fake
news sender to be. Liberals, however, indicated greater polarization in affect when they
thought the fake news sender was an ingroup member.
Contrary to our expectations, we found no differences between disclosure conditions
when the sender was perceived an ingroup member. Analyzing the differences between
conditions for liberals and conservatives separately revealed different changes in affective
polarization. Conservatives who learned about ingroup fake news dissemination tended
to polarize less in affect than those who did not know the social media post was fake.
Conversely, liberals’ affective polarization was slightly higher when they learned about the
ingroup fake news post. However, the sample sizes required for these differences to reach
89
statistical significance were large.15 Thus, non-significance was unlikely due to a limited
sample size. Differences in conditions regarding outgroup fake news unexpectedly resulted
in significantly lower affective polarization when disclosure was early for the overall
sample and conservatives. Debunking outgroup fake news might have attenuated the
polarizing effect of heightened group identity salience by the stimulus. That is, potentially
feeling morally superior to the outgroup because it was them who disseminated fake news
and not us may have lead to conciliatory rather than derogatory affect ratings.
6.3. Study 2
Study 1 examined the effect of a factually incorrect social media post on participants’
affective polarization in two conditions. Not knowing it was fake news lead to higher
levels of affective polarization for those identifying the sender as an in- or outgroup
member relative to when their identification with the perceived sender was moderate
or ambiguous. When they did learn that the post was factually incorrect, we observed
slightly higher levels for ingroup senders compared to outgroup or ambiguous senders.
Differences between disclosure conditions were found for those perceiving the sender to be
an outgroup member. In this case, participants knowing about the fake news displayed
significantly less polarization in affect than those who did not know.
Study 2 focused on the effect fake news might have on a polarization in attitudes
dependent on the perceived group membership of the sender. Research on selective
exposure, that is, “the use of likeminded media outlets” (Kim, 2015, p. 932), suggests
that exposure to attitude-consistent (ingroup) media can increase attitude polarization
(Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; Slater, 2007; Spohr, 2017). This was found for a variety
of single issue positions in both, correlational (Kim, 2015; Schmuck et al., 2020) and
experimental studies (Levendusky, 2013b). Findings on the effect of exposure to outgroup
media, however, are mixed. Results range from strong polarization for Republicans only
15We conducted post hoc power analyses using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) with power (1 - β) set
at .80 and α = .05, two-tailed, to check whether our non-significant results were due to a lack of statistical
power. On the basis of the respective means and observed effect sizes for the between-groups comparisons
for liberals after ingroup (Cohen’s d = .093) or outgroup exposure (Cohen’s d = .302), we estimated
that sample sizes would have to increase up to 1440, and 137, respectively, in order for group differences
to reach statistical significance at the .05 level. For conservatives after ingroup (Cohen’s d = .232) or
outgroup exposure (Cohen’s d = .544), sample sizes of 230 and 43 would be necessary. Sample sizes for
between-groups comparison of conservatives after outgroup exposure were met (no disclosure: n = 46,
disclosure: n = 45). For all other comparisons, it is unlikely that our non-significant findings can be
attributed to a limited sample size.
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(Bail et al., 2018), or for those favoring Muslim immigration (Schmuck et al., 2020), to
studies where polarization after exposure to outgroup media only occurred for those with
strong prior attitudes (Levendusky, 2013b). Assuming that exposure to in- or outgroup
media can result in a heightened group identity salience (Levendusky, 2013a) and hence
lead to an increased ingroup bias (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992), we suggest that
individuals may generally polarize in their attitudes. That is, other than testing the
effect of in- or outgroup fake news content on a single attitude, the present research
investigates attitude polarization in several domains. Identical to Study 1, we expected
those identifying strongly (ingroup) or very little (outgroup) with the perceived sender to
polarize more in attitudes compared to those who identified moderately or ambiguously
after exposure to fake news without disclosure. Given the mixed evidence on the effect of
ideological orientation on attitude polarization after exposure to in- or outgroup media,
this effect was investigated in an exploratory manner.
In a meta-analysis comprising 30 studies, Walter, Cohen, Holbert, and Morag (2020)
analyzed the effect that correcting fake news on a certain topic had on the attitudes
regarding this topic. They concluded that pro-attitudinal correction (i.e., debunking the
opposing ideology) was more likely to result in updated beliefs than counter-attitudinal
correction (i.e., debunking one’s own ideology). Linking this to results from Study 1 and
findings on the effect of group threat, we hypothesized that disclosing fake news would
result in higher levels of attitude polarization for those identifying strongly (ingroup)
with the sender relative to those identifying little (outgroup) or ambiguously. We
expected those levels to be higher compared to the no disclosure condition for those
identifying strongly (ingroup sender) and lower for those identifying little (outgroup).
When accounting for ideological orientation, Walter et al. (2020) found no differences in
the overall effect of correction between liberals and conservatives. However, the difference
in belief-updating between pro- and counter-attitudinal correction was only significant
for conservatives. Thus, we conducted exploratory analyses comparing the change in
affective polarization between disclosure conditions among liberals and conservatives




The procedure was identical to Study 1 except for the dependent variable for which,
after stimulus presentation and information about the factual incorrectness of the stimulus
in one condition, participants indicated their agreement with 37 policy statements.
Participants
A minimum sample size of 225 participants required to detect effects at the .05 level
with a medium effect size (Cohen’s f = .25) and an .80 power was determined by an a
priori power analysis in G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009). 1137 participants started the
survey and after automatic screen-outs due to quota or failed attention checks complete
data was collected from 467 participants. After applying exclusion criteria identical to
Study 1, three cases were excluded due to random answering patterns and another 32
because too much (+2 SD) or too few (-2 SD) had elapsed when indicating their political
attitudes. The final sample consisted of N = 432 with a mean age of 45.09 (SD = 15.52)
of which 44.68% (n = 193) identified as women. Mean ideological orientation was
M = 4.87 (SD = 2.22) and the survey was completed with an average time of M = 21.08
minutes (SD = 112.36). Sample size per stimulus condition is displayed in Table C.9 in
the appendix.
Materials
Political Attitudes The Federal Agency for Civic Education in Germany issues a so
called Wahl-O-Mat for every national or regional election where citizens can indicate
their stance (agree, neutral, disagree) on a number of policy issues. All political parties
that can be voted for in the respective election are asked prior to publication for their
position on each of the respective items. Upon completion citizens’ and parties’ answers
are matched to indicate the percentage of overlap in their answers. For this study, we
used the items used in the 2018 national election Wahl-O-Mat (Federal Agency for Civic
Education, 2017). All except for one of the 38 items broached political issues that were
still relevant at the time of data collection. Deviating from the original version we asked
participants to indicate their agreement with an item on a ten point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (= fully disagree) to 7 (= fully agree). An exploratory graph analysis (Golino
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& Epskamp, 2017; Golino et al., 2020) to estimate the dimensional structure of the
Wahl-O-Mat attitude scale suggested five dimensions (see Table C.3). This dimensional
structure was validated in a confirmatory factor analysis and provided acceptable fit
(χ2(454) = 1438.30, p < .001, CFI = .82, RMSEA = .07, 95% RMSEA CI [.07; .08], NFI
= .76, NNFI = .81, SRMR = .09, see chapter C.2 in the appendix for full documentation).
The first factor tackled economic issues (nine items, ωt = .70), factor 2 democracy and
globalization (eight items, ωt = .72), factor 3 environmental issues (six items, ωt = .70),
factor 4 domestic and immigration policies (six items, ωt = .78), and factor 5 contained
neoliberal issues (three items, ωt = .48). Items that had negative network loadings
were recoded such that higher levels on factor 1 through 3 indicated a more left-leaning
position, while higher levels on factor 4 indicated a more right-leaning position. Factor
5 was uncorrelated with ideological orientation (see Table C.10 in the appendix for all
intercorrelations).
Indices
Identification with Perceived Sender Identification with perceived sender was
calculated identical to Study 1. Higher levels indicate higher identification with the
perceived sender. Overall, ideological orientation and identification with perceived sender
per stimulus were moderately correlated according to expectations. This pattern only
held true in the disclosure late condition. When participants had learned about the
fake news content right away, ideological orientation and identification with perceived
sender were only correlated in one condition (see Table C.11 in the appendix for all
intercorrelations).
Attitude Polarization per Dimension Following prior work (Kim, 2015; J. K. Lee
et al., 2014; Wojcieszak & Rojas, 2011), attitude polarization was conceptualized as the
absolute deviation from the scale midpoint. The measure was created by folding each
item, with the answer 4 recoded to 0, 1 and 7 recoded as 3, 2 and 6 recoded as 2, 3 and 5
recoded as 1. Folded items were aggregated and divided by the respective number of items
per dimension (Factor 1: M = 1.81, SD = .65; Factor 2: M = 1.95, SD = .64; Factor
3: M = 1.80, SD = .70; Factor 4: M = 1.86, SD = .71; Factor 5: M = 2.06, SD = .82;
range = 0-3; higher values indicate greater polarization). Attitude polarization as
measured by factor 1 through 3 were negatively correlated with ideological orientation,
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suggesting stronger overall polarization for left-leaning participants on these factors.
Attitude polarization for factor 4 was positively correlated, suggesting stronger overall
polarization for right-leaning participants while attitude polarization for factor 5 was
found uncorrelated with ideological orientation (see Table C.10 in the appendix for all
intercorrelations).
6.3.2. Results
Intercorrelations of Study Variables
In the disclosure late condition, attitude polarization as measured by factors 1 through
3 was negatively correlated with ideological orientation suggesting stronger overall po-
larization for left-leaning participants on these factors. While polarization as measured
by factor 4 was positively correlated with ideological orientation suggesting stronger
overall polarization for right-leaning participants, polarization for factor 5 was found
uncorrelated with ideological orientation. When disclosure was early, only polarization as
measured by factor 2 and factor 4 was correlated with ideological orientation (see Table
C.12 in the appendix for all intercorrelations).
Effect of Disclosure and Identification on Attitude Polarization
We ran five separate linear mixed effects models using the lme4 package (Bates et
al., 2007) including attitude polarization per dimension as the dependent variable and
fixed effects of identification with perceived sender (0 = ambiguous sender), time of
disclosure (0 = no disclosure), as well as their interaction and a number of control
variables (see Table 6.4). Stimuli were included as random effects, thereby allowing for
random slopes of the effect of stimuli on affective polarization. Statistical significance was
calculated with Satterthwaite’s method in the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al., 2017).
Results, whenever significant, will be presented per factor. Comparing the full model
with a model excluding the fixed effects fit the data significantly better for all factors
except factor 3 (Factor 1: AIC = 815.60, χ2(5) = 18.98, p = .002; Factor 2: AIC =
815.23, χ2(5) = 22.37, p < .001; Factor 3: AIC = 920.84, χ2(5) = 7.28, p = .20, Factor 4:
AIC = 904.24, χ2(5) = 16.71, p = .01; Factor 5: AIC = 1020.70, χ2(5) = 14.22, p = .01).
Random effect variance was nearly zero for all models. Hence, the random slope for
stimulus was excluded from post-hoc analyses, thereby assuming affective polarization to
94
Chapter 6. Now More Than Ever! Can Exposure to Fake News Lead to Polarization?
be invariant across stimulus conditions. The Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) procedure
was applied to control for type I errors for all planned comparisons. To account for unequal
sample sizes per sub-group (see Table C.13 in the appendix), planned comparisons were
computed using estimated marginal means. All estimated marginal means of attitude
polarization per factor as a function of identification with perceived sender and time of
disclosure are displayed in Table 6.3.
Factor 1: Economic Issues The data revealed a main effect for perceived outgroup
sender (B = .20, SE = .09, t = 2.14, p = .03, 95% CI [.02; .39]) relative to an ambiguous
sender. Neither time of disclosure nor the interaction term was found significant. Overall,
attitudes were most polarized when the sender was perceived an outgroup rather than
an ingroup member (t(426) = −3.969, p < .001) or when identification was ambiguous
(t(426) = −3.53, p < .001). In both disclosure conditions, attitude polarization was most
pronounced when the sender was perceived an outgroup member relative to an ingroup
member (no disclosure: t(426) = −2.49, p = .04; disclosure: t(426) = −3.01, p = .02) or a
sender with ambiguous identification (no disclosure: t(426) = −2.28, p = .05; disclosure:
t(426) = −2.70, p = .03). No significant differences between disclosure conditions were
found.
Factor 2: Democracy and Globalization We found a main effect for perceived
outgroup sender (B = .19, SE = .09, t = 2.04, p = .04, 95% CI[.01; .38]) relative to
an ambiguous sender. Neither time of disclosure nor the interaction term was found
significant. Overall, attitudes were most polarized when the sender was perceived an
outgroup rather than an ingroup member (t(426) = −3.93, p < .001) or when identification
was ambiguous (t(426) = −3.91, p < .001). In both disclosure conditions, attitude
polarization was most pronounced when the sender was perceived an outgroup member
relative to an ingroup member (no disclosure: t(426) = −2.24, p = .07; disclosure:
t(426) = −3.28, p = .01) or a sender with ambiguous identification (no disclosure:
t(426) = −2.16, p = .07; disclosure: t(426) = −3.35, p = .01). However, differences in
the no disclosure condition were only marginally significant. Attitude polarization for
participants perceiving the sender an outgroup member was higher in the disclosure
compared to the no disclosure condition but the difference was not statistically significant
(t(426) = −1.28, p = .36). Post hoc power analyses revealed that given the small effect
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size (Cohen’s d = .21) a sample size of n = 289 per group would be necessary for the
difference to be significant at the 5% level (one-tailed) with an 80% chance. Thus,
we cannot rule out that there might have been a small effect of disclosure on attitude
polarization.
Factor 3: Environmental Issues Neither main nor interaction effects were signifi-
cant for factor 3 as dependent variable. Planned comparisons also did not indicate any
significant differences between identification levels, times of disclosure, or their interaction.
Table 6.3.
Study 2: Estimated Marginal Means and Standard Errors of Attitude Polarization per
Factor as a Function of Identification with Perceived Sender, and Time of Disclosure.
Overall Ambiguous Ingroup Outgroup
EMM SE EMM SE EMM SE EMM SE
Factor 1
Overall 1.81 .03 1.70 .06 1.65 .06 1.96 .05
No disclosure 1.76 .04 1.70 .08 1.66 .08 1.92 .06
Disclosure 1.78 .05 1.71 .09 1.64 .10 2.00 .06
Factor 2
Overall 1.95 .03 1.82 .06 1.80 .06 2.10 .04
No disclosure 1.90 .04 1.84 .08 1.81 .08 2.05 .06
Disclosure 1.92 .05 1.81 .08 1.79 .09 2.16 .06
Factor 3
Overall 1.80 .03 1.71 .06 1.76 .07 1.88 .05
No disclosure 1.80 .05 1.74 .09 1.82 .09 1.83 .07
Disclosure 1.77 .05 1.68 .09 1.70 .11 1.93 .07
Factor 4
Overall 1.86 .03 1.80 .06 1.65 .07 2.00 .05
No disclosure 1.83 .05 1.74 .08 1.73 .09 2.03 .07
Disclosure 1.80 .05 1.87 .09 1.56 .01 1.97 .07
Factor 5
Overall 2.06 .04 2.00 .07 1.81 .08 2.22 .06
No disclosure 1.99 .06 1.98 .10 1.80 .11 2.19 .08
Disclosure 2.03 .06 2.03 .11 1.83 .12 2.24 .08
Note. EMM = Estimated marginal means.
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Factor 4: Domestic and Immigration Policies We found a main effect for per-
ceived outgroup sender (B = .27, SE = .11, t = 2.53, p = .01, 95% CI [.06; .47]) relative
to an ambiguous sender. Neither time of disclosure nor the interaction term was found
significant. Overall, attitudes were most polarized when the sender was perceived an
outgroup rather than an ingroup member (t(426) = −4.19p < .001) or when identifica-
tion was ambiguous (t(426) = −2.49, p = .02). Affective polarization was highest after
exposure to outgroup relative to ingroup fake news in both disclosure conditions (no
disclosure: t(426) = −2.63, p = .06; disclosure: t(426) = −3.28, p = .01) and relative to
an ambiguous sender in the no disclosure condition (t(426) = −2.62, p = .03). Attitude
polarization for participants perceiving the sender an ingroup member was lower in the
disclosure compared to the no disclosure condition but the difference was not statistically
significant (t(426) = 1.17, p = .43). Post hoc power analyses revealed that given the small
effect size (Cohen’s d = .22) a sample size of n = 249 per group would be necessary for
the difference to be significant at the 5% level (one-tailed) with an 80% chance. Thus,
we cannot rule out that there might have been a small effect of disclosure on attitude
polarization.
Factor 5: Neoliberal Issues Neither main nor interaction effects were significant for
factor 5 as dependent variable. Overall, attitudes were most polarized when the sender
was perceived an outgroup rather than an ingroup member (t(426) = −4.10p < .001) or
when identification was ambiguous (t(426) = −2.31, p = .03). When accounting for time
of disclosure, attitude polarization for perceived outgroup members was still higher than
for ingroup members independent of whether participants had learned about the fake news
early on (t(426) = −2.86, p = .02) or at the end of the study (t(426) = −2.94, p = .02).
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Effect of Disclosure and Identification on Attitude Polarization by
Ideological Orientation
All estimated marginal means of attitude polarization per factor as a function of
disclosure condition, level of identification, and ideological orientation can be found in
Table C.14 in the appendix.
Factor 1: Economic Issues We found overall higher levels of attitude polarization on
economic issues for liberals (EMM = 1.86, SE = .05) than for conservatives (EMM =
1.70, SE = .04, t(420) = −2.43, p = .02). In both disclosure conditions, conservatives’
attitude polarization was most pronounced when the sender was perceived an outgroup
member (no disclosure: EMM = 1.90, SE = .08; disclosure: EMM = 2.01, SE = .09)
relative to an ingroup member (no disclosure: EMM = 1.51, SE = .12, t(420) =
−2.75, p = .07; disclosure: EMM = 1.41, SE = .14, t(420) = −3.60p = .01). No
significant differences between disclosure conditions were found.
Factor 2: Democracy and Globalization Overall, levels of attitude polarization
on topics related to democracy and globalization were higher for liberals (EMM =
2.09, SE = .049) than for conservatives (EMM = 1.77, SE = .04, t(420) = −5.07, p <
.001). Conservatives’ attitude polarization was most pronounced when the sender was
perceived an outgroup member (no disclosure: EMM = 2.02, SE = .08; disclosure:
EMM = 2.02, SE = .08) relative to an ingroup member (no disclosure: EMM =
1.50, SE = .11, t(420) = −3.83, p = .002; disclosure: EMM = 1.57, SE = .14, t(420) =
−2.84, p = .04) in both disclosure conditions, and higher compared to an ambiguous sender
when fake news weren’t disclosed (EMM = 1.71, SE = .09, t(420) = −2.69, p = .04).
Attitude polarization for liberals perceiving the sender an outgroup member was higher
in the disclosure compared to the no disclosure condition but the difference was not
statistically significant (t(420) = −1.66, p = .10). Post hoc power analyses revealed that
given the small effect size (Cohen’s d = .41) a sample size of n = 76 per group would be
necessary for the difference to be significant at the 5% level (one-tailed) with an 80%
chance. Thus, we cannot rule out that there might be a small effect of disclosure on
attitude polarization for liberals perceiving the sender to be an outgroup member.
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Factor 3: Environmental Issues Attitude polarization on environmental issue was
larger for liberals (EMM = 1.90, SE = .06) than for conservatives (EMM = 1.67, SE =
.05, t(420) = −3.12, p = .002). Comparisons between disclosure conditions were insignifi-
cant. However, post hoc power analyses revealed that the non-significant difference for
liberals perceiving the sender either an in- (t(420) = .95, p = .50, Cohen’s d = .41) or an
outgroup member (t(420) = −1.42, p = .33, Cohen’s d = .30) might have failed to reach
statistical significance due to low sample size. A sample size of n = 141 and n = 139 per
group, respectively, would have been necessary to reach the 5% level (one-tailed) with an
80% chance.
Factor 4: Domestic and Immigration Policies Conservatives showed overall higher
levels of attitude polarization regarding domestic and immigration policies (EMM =
1.89, SE = .05) compared to liberals (EMM = 1.71, SE = .06, t(420))2.45, p = .02).
Accounting for level of identification or disclosure did not reveal any significant differences.
Yet, post hoc power analyses revealed that the non-significant difference for liberals
perceiving the sender either an ingroup member (t(420) = .99, p = .70, Cohen’s d = .28)
might have failed to reach statistical significance due to low sample size. A sample size
of n = 164 per group would have been necessary to reach the 5% level (one-tailed) with
an 80% chance.
Factor 5: Neoliberal Issues Neither differences in overall attitude polarization on
neoliberal issues between conservatives and liberals, nor when accounting for level of
identification or disclosure, were found significant.
6.3.3. Discussion
Building on results from Study 1, our first hypothesis assumed that exposure to in-
and outgroup fake news would result in higher attitude polarization relative to ambiguous
identifiers, even if they were not informed about the fake news nature of the stimulus.
Results suggested highest affective polarization after exposure to outgroup compared
to ingroup fake news (factor 1, 2, 4, 5) or to fake news with an ambiguous sender
identification (factor 1, 2, 4). When disclosing fake news, the second hypothesis expected
highest levels for perceived ingroup senders. However, we found an almost identical
pattern compared to the no disclosure condition. Contrary to expectations, attitude
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polarization was lower after exposure to ingroup fake news (factor 4), and higher after
exposure to outgroup fake news (factor 2) when non-factuality was disclosed relative
to when it was not. None of these differences reached statistical significance, but post
hoc analyses suggested that this could have been reached by increasing the number of
participants.
Being exposed to a social media post sent by an outgroup member resulted in more
polarized attitudes on a range of topics (economic issues, democracy and globalization,
domestic and immigration policies, neoliberal issues) relative to social media posts by
other senders. That is, a potentially heightened group identity salience by an outgroup
cue might have affected overall attitudes differently than one by an ingroup cue. While the
latter may also increase group identity salience, the need to accentuate group boundaries
by stating extreme attitudes might have been stronger with an explicit reference to an
outgroup present. This was also the case when participants knew the post was factually
incorrect. While no significant differences in attitude polarization between disclosure
conditions emerged, there was a trend towards more polarization for outgroup posts
related to democracy and globalization for those who knew it was factually incorrect
compared to those who did not know. On the other hand, we found a noteworthy trend
of lower attitude polarization on domestic and immigration policies when ingroup fake
news were debunked compared to when they were not.
Comparing attitude polarization with regard to ideological orientation, we found
overall higher levels in liberals for all domains where high levels indicated a more left-
leaning position (economic issues, democracy and globalization, environmental issues)
and higher levels in conservatives for domestic and immigration policies. Conservatives’
attitude polarization after exposure to outgroup fake news was higher than after exposure
to ingroup fake news (factor 1, 2) or to fake news with an ambiguous sender (factor 2).
We found no such differences for liberals. Our results suggest a non-significant trend of
lower polarization after ingroup fake news exposure (factor 3, 4) and higher polarization
after outgroup fake news exposure (factor 2, 3) for liberals who were aware of the fake
news content relative to those who were not. Again, post hoc analyses suggested that
non-significance was likely due to a low sample size. Given that liberals were more
likely to have high scores on factor 2 and 3, and low scores on factor 4, the observed
differences between disclosure conditions make sense. A liberal identifying highly with
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the perceived sender must have most likely seen a pro-environmental (Hambach Forest) or
a pro-immigration (Taxes) Facebook post. Learning that this ingroup post was actually
fake news, they reacted by displaying lower polarization on environmental issues, as well
as domestic and immigration policies compared to those who did not know it was fake.
On the other hand, liberals identifying little with the perceived sender must have most
likely seen an anti-environment (Greta Thunberg) or an anti-democratic/homophobic
(Green Party) Facebook post. Here, learning that this outgroup post was actually fake
news, they reacted by displaying stronger polarization on environmental issues, as well
as items on democracy and globalization compared to those who did not know it was
fake. Hence, for liberals, ingroup deviant behavior decreased ingroup bias while outgroup
deviant behavior increased it.
6.4. General Discussion
Along with the COVID-19 pandemic that keeps the world in suspense, we are faced
with what has been called an infodemic - a surge of false or misleading information
about the virus, vaccines, and national policies associated therewith (World Health
Organization, 2020a, 2020b). Fake news downplaying the mortality of the virus or the
effectiveness of face masks are just two examples out of many that have been exploited
in the interest of mostly right-wing political parties (see for instance, McGreal, 2020;
Reichart, 2020). As a result of an algorithmic placement of users in like-minded clusters
based on their online activity, so called filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011, p. 10), citizens are
exposed to increasingly homogeneous information, a development that can contribute to
the spread of fake news and a further polarization of opinion networks at the same time
(Törnberg, 2018). The question we posed was whether and under which circumstances
encountering political fake news on social media could lead to a polarization in affect and
attitudes. Can correcting fake news increase or decrease polarization? And does it matter
whether the alleged sender is perceived an ingroup rather than an outgroup member?
In two separate studies we assessed the impact of fake news posts on an individual’s
affective (Study 1) and attitude polarization (Study 2) and whether this impact was
dependent on how strongly they identified with the perceived sender.
The present results suggest that exposure to in-and outgroup fake news may impact
affective polarization differently than attitude polarization. Not knowing the post they saw
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was fake news, participants in Study 1 displayed ingroup favoritism similarly when they
thought that either an in- or an outgroup member disseminated the post. Participants
in Study 2 showed increased ingroup favoritism by stating more extreme attitudes only
when they thought that the social media post was sent by an outgroup member. We
assumed that seeing a social media post from either an in- or an outgroup member would
lead to increased group identity salience and an ingroup bias for both. This was only true
in Study 1. One reason for this unexpected result could be that stating stronger positive
or negative feelings towards the in- and outgroup may be easier or less consequential
than stating more extreme attitudes towards real-life policies. If one identifies the sender
as an outgroup member, then one’s own group membership might be more salient in
contrast to this outgroup and thereby increase the need to accentuate group boundaries
more strongly. Another explanation may be that ingroup bias in Study 1 was specific and
directed while Study 2 measured an un-directed spill-over to general political attitudes.
The tendencies observed in the no disclosure condition were even more pronounced
when participants learned that the social media post they saw was fake news. Affective
polarization was now largest for those perceiving the sender to be an ingroup member
while attitudes on four out of five dimensions were most polarized for perceived outgroup
senders. Comparing polarization between disclosure conditions also resulted in different
patterns for affect and attitudes, respectively. Those who had learned about the outgroup
fake news polarized significantly less in affect than those who had not learned about it.
We found a reversed, yet insignificant pattern for some attitude dimensions in Study 2:
more polarization for those to whom the outgroup fake news information was disclosed
compared to those to whom it was not disclosed. Polarization for those having perceived
the sender an ingroup member was rather similar between studies. The results suggest a
non-significant trend towards lower polarization in affect and some attitude dimensions
for those who had learned about the fake news. Hence, contrary to our expectations,
correcting fake news may not lead to more polarization in affect or attitude if identification
with the sender is high. Learning, however, that an outgroup member posted fake news
may lead to less affective ingroup bias on the one hand, but to a tendency towards more
extreme attitudes on the other.
Taking the results at face value, we could summarize the present studies on an
optimistic note, saying that correcting ingroup fake news does not increase polarization
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and correcting outgroup fake news even decreases polarization in affect. Does this mean
that correcting fake news is beneficial in the best and harmless in the worst case? Certainly,
summarizing what the present results imply for the impact of fake news correction does
not come without caveats. That is, we cannot disentangle whether polarization in any
condition was caused by exposure to the stimulus, by correction of fake news or whether
it was present anyway for those identifying highly with a political group. For now, we
can only make assumptions about the underlying processes. However, the finding that
correction of ingroup fake news decreased affective polarization, is noteworthy. Social
identity theorists have found lower ingroup bias or even an outgroup bias when ingroup
status was high rather than low (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Dutton, 1976;
Mullen et al., 1992). Learning that the outgroup disseminated fake news might result in
the perception of a superior status and subsequently less ingroup bias or favoritism. On
the other hand, those studies also document higher ingroup bias for low status groups.
We do not find that those learning that their own group had disseminated fake news
showed greater ingroup bias. If anything, there was a tendency towards less ingroup
bias as well. Moreover, the non-significant tendency for stronger attitude polarization
after learning about outgroup fake news conflicts with this rationale. Nevertheless, while
acknowledging certain reservations, we believe that our findings can contribute to a
growing body of insights investigating the consequences of exposure to and the correction
of fake news.
6.4.1. Limitations and Future Research
We aimed at assessing the impact of correction by comparing degrees of polarization
between those who were merely exposed to the post without knowing it was fake
news to those who were told it was. However, the provocative nature of the stimuli
presented suggests that they were not only meant for ingroup members to read but also
as a positioning statement against any opposing, allegedly outgroup, opinions. Hence,
disentangling polarization induced by mere exposure from polarization induced by group
threat as a result of correction, was not possible. Future studies should include a measure
of perceived threat to test for a potential mediating effect.
The present studies aimed at testing immediate effects of exposure to fake news rather
than long-term consequences. Yet, testing differences in affect and attitudes within the
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same study or between two points in time rather than between disclosure conditions only
could shed light on how those polarization types interact and whether they persist over
time.
Another limitation of our studies is the fact that we asked every participant to indicate
their ideological orientation at the beginning of the survey. We did this in the interest of
quotas, that is, a balanced sample. However, this might have made everyone’s political
identity salient even before viewing the stimulus. The stimuli used here were real-life
fake news posts from Facebook. We did not control whether participants had either seen
the stimulus before or whether they even deemed it believable. Future studies should
collect more data on the stimulus features in order to control for unsystematic biases
due to prior knowledge or incredibility of the stimulus itself. Moreover, any impact of
ideological orientation reported here can only be preliminary as some sub-groups did not
have enough statistical power.
6.4.2. Conclusion
The present work takes on a social identity perspective on how online fake news impact
an individual’s affect and attitudes. It finds exposure to in- and outgroup fake news to
be associated with high affective polarization while higher levels in attitude polarization
were found after exposure to outgroup fake news. Informing participants about the
fake news nature of the post attenuated affective polarization for those perceiving the
sender to be an outgroup member only. It is the first empirical work to investigate the
impact of exposure of in- and outgroup fake news on attitude and affective polarization
separately. Although some results may be but preliminary, it offers valuable insight into




7. Measuring Political Ideology - A
Systematic Review
7.1. Introduction
Political ideologies are foundational to a broad range of social science fields such
as political science, behavioral economics, social and political psychology – but also to
medical-related sciences, marketing, and sociology. Political ideologies help individuals
to navigate and interpret the complex socio-political world by offering an organization of
values, justifying social arrangements, and explaining power relations. But despite its
almost ubiquitous prevalence, scholarly debate rages on ideology’s elemental, underlying
and foundational aspects. Can people be considered as ideologues (Azevedo, Jost,
Rothmund, & Sterling, 2019; Conover & Feldman, 1984; Converse, 1964; Goren, 2001,
2012; Zaller, 1992), which psychological processes help structure individuals’ political
beliefs (Duckitt, 2001; Feldman, 1988; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Jost et al., 2003b; Tomkins,
1963)? How can ideological mental representations be empirically evaluated (Carmines
et al., 2012a; Ellis & Stimson, 2009; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Fuchs & Klingemann,
1990; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; von Collani & Grumm, 2009), and is mass public
ideologically polarized (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Lelkes,
2016)? Social and political psychology research mainly focused on identifying individual
antecedents of ideological proclivities, that is, for instance how political ideology relates
to moral foundations (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt et al., 2009; Weber & Federico, 2013),
motivated social cognition (Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost et al., 2003b), personality traits
(Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010; Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson, 2010;
McClosky, 1958), genetic predispositions (Funk et al., 2013), genotypic differences (Settle,
Dawes, Christakis, & Fowler, 2010), or differences in neural activity (Jost & Amodio, 2012),
to name only a few. To shed some light onto these questions, social scientists resorted
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to interviews and subsequent analyses of responses to political questions, in mostly two
approaches. On one hand, political scientists typically made use of a selected number of
political attitudes questions present in national election studies and cross-national surveys.
On the other hand, some streams of inquiry, more predominant in social psychology
and related fields, tended to opt for fashioning and employing their own surveys and
inventories aiming to tap into the same ideological beliefs. Thus, studying the interplay
between political ideology and the individual, scholars used diverse and wide-ranging
approaches. Yet, few grappled meaningfully with either theory or measurement of ideology.
In this chapter, we explore the diverse approaches to conceptualizing and investigating
political ideology systematically by giving special focus to theory, measurement, and
their intersection.
Unlike temperature or height, politico-psychological phenomena are mostly latent
in that they are not directly observable. Covariance in manifest, that is, observable
indications of one’s ideological orientation on either symbolic or operational ideology
scales are assumed to have a common underlying cause. Here, a certain latent political
ideology. To interpret scores on ideological instruments as indicative of the degree to
which a person adheres to an ideology, these instruments need to be valid indicators of the
underlying latent construct. Hence, their measurement needs systematic psychometric
development and validation. This process of construct validation is the method by which
evidence is provided that the scores actually reflect the target construct. A lack thereof
severely hinders the ability to make any inference about the phenomenon under study
and thereby might affect the verity of reported findings as well as their replicability
(Flake, Pek, & Hehman, 2017; Flake & Fried, 2020; Hussey & Hughes, 2020). It also
increases the likelihood of jingle-jangle fallacies (Kelley, 1927; Thorndike, 1916; Weidman,
Steckler, & Tracy, 2017), that is, either assuming different sets of items would measure
convergent constructs when those are actually distinct (jingle fallacy), or vice versa,
assuming different sets of items would measure distinct constructs when they’re actually
convergent (jangle fallacy).
With the recent surge in interest in politico-psychological research, instruments
intending to gauge one’s location on the ideological space abound in the literature.
For instance, Jost et al. (2003b) included almost thirty different scales assumed to
measure political conservatism in their meta-analysis. Producing multiple instruments
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for the same construct may be simply convenient for researchers, or a consequence of the
tendency to develop one’s own theories instead of building on existing theories. Mischel
(2005, 2008) dubbed this phenomenon the toothbrush problem, humorously suggesting
that psychologists “treat other people’s theories like used toothbrushes, and therefore
[...] stray away from them as much as possible. The objective is to develop one’s own
toothbrush - shiny and new” (Mischel, 2005, as cited by Vartanian, 2014, p. 15). This
analogy might also apply to measurement as reviews on studies from social and personality
psychology (Flake et al., 2017), health education and behavior (Barry, Chaney, Piazza-
Gardner, & Chavarria, 2014), and emotion research (Weidman et al., 2017) suggest.
Those reviews found that between 44% and 88% of included papers reported using ad hoc
measures. More often than not did those scales (both, well-established and ad hoc) fail
to report validation evidence. Further research on the prevalence of validation evidence
in psychological research suggests that scales for which little validity evidence had been
published were more likely to fail those validity metrics (Hussey & Hughes, 2020; Shaw,
Cloos, Luong, Elbaz, & Flake, 2020). The authors assumed that the pattern of failing
to report validation evidence may not just have been a case of underreporting, that is,
measures may be valid but their validity is not reported. They argue it may rather
represent “an abundance of invalid measures hiding in plain sight (i.e., hidden invalidity)”
(Hussey & Hughes, 2020, p. 176). These findings are particularly alarming given that “the
verity of results about a psychological construct hinges on the validity of its measurement”
(Flake et al., 2017, p. 370), implying a serious threat for the confidence researchers may
have in their findings.
In a recently published article, Flake and Fried (2020) build on these claims and put
forward the concept of questionable measurement practices (QMP). The authors transfer
the concept of questionable research practices (see, John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012)
to the measurement of psychological constructs, that is “any approach that researchers
take to create a number to represent a variable under study” (Flake & Fried, 2020,
p. 458). QMPs are defined as “decisions researchers make that raise doubts about
the validity of the measures used in a study, and ultimately the validity of the final
conclusion” (p. 458). According to Flake and Fried (2020), examples of QMPs include:
lack of definition for the construct; failure to describe the measure or administrative
procedure; not reporting justification for measure selection or existing validity evidence;
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undisclosed response coding, transformation, items, calculation of score, and conducted
(psychometric) analyses; undeclared modifications before or after data collection without
justification; use of measures on-the-fly deprived of validity evidence (i.e., all of above)
and without reasoning for existing measures. QMPs cover a broad range of issues,
“including lack of transparency, ignorance, negligence, and misrepresentation”, and need
to be taken seriously as failing to disclose measurement specifics can pose a threat to
both, replicability and all aspects of validity (Flake & Fried, 2020, p. 458–459).
Given the plethora of ideological instruments, we assume this might likely also apply
to the measurement of political ideology. While it may be standard practice to assume
ideological inventories can be used interchangeably, it is unlikely that they are all equally
valid indicators of ideological content. This untested assumption, if shown not to hold, may
pose a threat to the validity and replicability of findings, thus hindering the accumulation
of knowledge. The main goal of the present review is to provide a systematic assessment
of political ideology measurement in order to map the extent to which QMPs are present
in the literature. In addition, we aim to explore how this might affect replicability as well
as three aspects of the overall validity of a conclusion: external, statistical-conclusion,
and construct validity (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Replicability would be
threatened if a researcher unaffiliated with the original study were not able to repeat
this study, given the information provided in the original study. External validity would
be compromised by an overly population-specific measure that precludes generalizability
or if the information to assess the latter is missing. Statistical-conclusion validity can be
threatened if “undisclosed measurement flexibility generates multiple comparisons in a
statistical test, which can bias the test’s results” (Flake & Fried, 2020, p. 459). And lastly,
failing to report information on how latent constructs relate to their operationalization
threatens construct validity (Shadish et al., 2002, p. 72). We will focus on published
work from psychology and political science, and evaluate potential differences between
the fields. As outlined in chapter 2, there are different conceptions of political ideology.
Given that some of the most popular works on the topic focused on conservatism (e.g.
Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Jost et al., 2003b; Wilson & Patterson, 1968), we will restrict our
analysis on the construct of operational political conservatism. To assess measurement
practices and the degree to which QMPs are present, we conducted a non-exhaustive
systematic literature review comprising a final sample of 207 empirical articles.
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7.2. Method
Sampling and Data Sources
In line with guidelines for making research syntheses more transparent and easier to
replicate (Atkinson, Koenka, Sanchez, Moshontz, & Cooper, 2015), we followed J. Webster
and Watson’s (2002) recommendations for systematic literature studies. The authors
argue for the use of both forward and backward snowballing search (i.e., from the reference
lists and citations of selected relevant literature) as the main and appropriate method
for literature search procedures. Jalali and Wohlin (2012) compared this technique to
more traditional approaches via keywords in reference databases (e.g., Kitchenham &
Charters, 2007) and found no major differences between the findings of either analysis.
The present approach ensures that the resulting dataset paints an accurate description
and development of ideology as a construct, as well as of the myriad of approaches,
methodologies, and analyses leveraged in its history.
With this goal in mind, seven papers were selected as the starting set from leading
journals in areas using ideological instruments. Our criteria for identifying papers with
ideological scales were not only based on journal impact (Mdn = 2.56, SD = .96)16
and citations (Mdn = 107, SD = 309.37)17 but also relative to their representation in
terms of both theoretical and methodological characteristics (e.g., dimensionality, field,
sample type and size). The selected ideological instruments were also balanced with
respect to unidimensional vs. multidimensional conceptualizations of ideology, they had
been published in psychological, communication and political science disciplines, cut
across academia and industry, utilized varying degrees of psychometric methods, and
figured both representative, adult and large samples, as well as convenient, small, student
samples.
In specific, the first instrument was the classic Conservatism Scale by Wilson and
Patterson (1968) which is the most cited conservatism scale according to Google Scholar
(N = 745). The second and third were the refined and validated successors of the Con-
16No impact factor could be retrieved for the British Journal of Social and Clinical psychology as it
was split in two separate journal (British Journal of Social psychology and British Journal of Clinical
psychology) in 1981. Thus, we averaged the 2018 impact factor of the latter two for our purposes. Impact
factors for Personality and Individual Differences, Psychological Reports and Cognition & Emotion were
from 2017, from 2018 for Social Psychological and Personality Science, and from 2019 for Political
psychology and PLOS One.
17Number of citations was retrieved from Google Scholar on July 20, 2020.
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servatism Scale, Social Conservatism (Henningham, 1996) and Economic Conservatism
(Henningham, 1997). The fourth ensues from a nonpartisan, independent, American think
tank, the Pew Research Center (2012) which developed the Core Issues in American
Politics (also used in Zell & Bernstein, 2014). The fifth selected scale, Core Domains of
Social and Economic Conservatism was developed by political scientists and its indices
were present in several waves of the reputable American National Election Studies (ANES;
Feldman & Johnston, 2014). The sixth instrument, Political Issue Statements (Inbar,
Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009) and the seventh, Social and Economic Conservatism Scale
(Everett, 2013) both stem from psychological science while adopting widely contrasting
conceptual and methodological approaches.
Inclusion Criteria and Coding of Articles
For this review, we included empirical studies where at least one operational measure
of conservatism was used. Studies that used only either symbolic ideology (i.e. ideological
self-placement), a measure of Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) or Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO) as proxy, were excluded from further analysis. A total of N = 394
initially identified articles were reviewed of which n = 85 were either meta-analyses,
reviews or did not measure political ideology. 48 articles had to be excluded because
they were not or only partially accessible online. A total of n = 47 studies used ideo-
logical self-placement, or an RWA or SDO measure (n = 7) for the operationalization
of Conservatism only (see Figure 7.1 for an overview). The final sample of N = 207
articles was coded by two independent junior coders and checked for correctness by a
senior coder.18 Any inconsistent or ambiguous case was discussed with a second senior
coder before making a final decision, resulting in a single accurate data set for analysis.
Both junior coders held an undergraduate degree in social sciences and had received
both, formal training in measurement, research practices, and statistics as part of their
education, as well as a specific training on the coding of this project by the senior coders.
Senior coders held postgraduate degrees in psychology at the time of coding with formal
training and practical experience in measurement, research practices, and statistics. For
each of the 207 articles examined we coded meta-information (year of publication, name
of author(s), scientific discipline, publication outlet), sample specifics (national origin of
18All articles included in the review are marked with an asterisk in the reference section.
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sample, type of sample, sample size), study specifics (number of studies within article,
number of relevant measures within article), measurement specifics (name of relevant
measure, novelty of measures, number of items for each measure, type of scale, lower and
upper limit of scale, scoring of items, and whether or not all items or example items were
provided), and information on construct validation (presence of validation evidence for
measures used, use of factor analytical methods, type and technique of factor analysis,
rotation and extraction method used in factor analysis).
Articles identified N = 394
Articles measuring
Conservatism n = 309
Articles accessible n = 261
Articles including opera-
tional measure n = 214
Final N = 207
No Conservatism mea-
sure present n = 85
Symbolic ideology only n = 47
Not accessible n = 48
Conservatism by RWA
or SDO only n = 7
Figure 7.1.. Flowchart of Sampling Process
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7.3. Results
Findings of the present review will be presented along the five coding categories of
meta-information, sample specifics, study specifics, measurement specifics, and validation
evidence. The last section presents a case study of the most frequently coded scale.
Meta-Information
The earliest of the articles included was published in 1929, the latest in 2020 with more
than half of the articles published after 2003. 60.39% were from psychology (including
social psychology, political psychology, and educational psychology), 26.57% from political
science, and 13.04% from other disciplines (e.g. economics, sociology, or genetics). The
three most frequently coded publication outlets in psychology were Personality and
Individual Differences (n = 18), The Journal of Social Psychology (n = 14), and Political
Psychology (n = 11). In political science, the most frequently coded outlet was the
American Journal of Political Science (n = 7), followed by the Journal of Politics (n = 6),
and The Forum (n = 5, see Figure D.1 and D.2 in the appendix for all frequencies).
Sample Specifics
Sample size was reported in n = 175, that is, 84.54% of all cases (n = 122,
98.39% in psychology, n = 30, 54.55% in political science). Overall median sam-
ple size was 502 (SD = 15806.67, range : 1 − 163814 subjects), 452.5 in psychol-
ogy (SD = 18564.41, range : 30 − 163814 subjects), and 1126 in political science
(SD = 3550.31, range : 1− 13201 subjects). Samples consisted mostly of adults (n = 99,
49.01%, of which n = 36, 17.82% were panel data) and students (n = 55, 27.23%). In
Psychology, samples were equally made up of adults (n = 45, 36.89%, of which n = 4,
3.28% were panel data) and students (n = 45, 36.89%), while in political science mostly
adult samples (n = 39, 75%, of which n = 25, 48.08% were panel data) and almost no
student samples (n = 2, 3.85%) were coded.A total of 76 different countries were coded
out of which about half (n = 37, 48.68%) were non-OECD countries.19 In relative terms,
OECD countries were largely over-represented. 80.96% (n = 370) of all studies were
conducted with samples from OECD countries with 28.01% (n = 128) from the United
19Countries were compared with regard to their membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). Member states of the OECD are high-income countries with a high
Human Development Index (see https://stats.oecd.org/).
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States alone (see Table D.1 in the appendix for an overview of the ten most frequently
coded countries).
Study and Measurement Specifics
We coded an average of 1.3 studies (SD = .9, range : 1− 8 studies) and 1.66 relevant
measures (SD = 1.42, range : 1− 11 measures) per article. An average of 37.14 items
(SD = 43.93, range : 1− 400 items) across scales within a single article and M = 23.97
items (SD = 32.15, range : 399 items) within scales across articles was documented.
A total of 222 distinct operational ideology measures were coded out of which 60
were not named and nine (4.06%) were coded more than once throughout all articles.
Across articles and scales we coded a total of n = 303 measurement instances. The most
prevalent scale was the Wilson and Patterson Conservatism Scale (WP C-Scale, Wilson
& Patterson, 1968) with a total of n = 49 measurement instances (16.17%) of which
seven were modified, shortened or adapted versions (see Section 7.3 below for a detailed
case study). Second most frequently were De Witte’s (1990) Cultural (2.97%, n = 9) and
Economic Conservatism scales (2.31%, n = 7). For the majority of all articles (75.36%,
n = 156) authors reported the scale type used for scoring (e.g. Likert scale) but only in
54.59% (n = 113) did they also report lower and upper limits of the scale. Exact scoring
techniques were reported in 52.17% (n = 108) of all cases out of which 63.89% (n = 69)
used mean scores and 33.33% (n = 36) used sum scores. All items used in the study were
documented in 58.45% (n = 121) of the articles. Example items were provided in 36.05%
(n = 31) of the cases where full item reporting was not present (see Table 7.1 for a more
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Out of all scales, 61.26% were novel measures that had no reference to previous use
(n = 136, Mdn = 1, SD = .91, range: 1-7 measures). For these novel measures, 77.94%
(n = 106) reported the type of scale they had used, 56.62% (n = 77) also documented
lower and upper limits of their scales, and 52.21% (n = 71) reported the scoring technique.
All items of novel scales were provided in 75% (n = 102) of all cases, while example items
were provided for 38.23% (n = 13) of novel scales that did not report all items.
Validation Evidence
Whenever authors used scales that had previously been reported elsewhere, the major-
ity did not report factorial validation evidence (83.1%, n = 59). Articles where we coded
at least one novel measure reported factorial validation evidence for those measures about
half of the time (47.79%, n = 65). Of those, 67.69% (n = 44) reported the technique,
another 58.46% (n = 38) reported rotation method, and 26.15% (n = 18) reported the
extraction method. In summary, factorial evidence with full reporting was present in
18.46% (n = 12) of the cases where novel measures were implemented (see Table 7.2 for
a more detailed break-down between scientific disciplines).
Table 7.2.







n % n % n %
Validation evidence reported 37 53.62 21 42.86 7 38.89
Technique reporteda 24 64.86 14 66.67 6 85.71
Rotation method reporteda 26 70.27 7 33.33 5 71.43
Extraction method reporteda 12 32.43 4 19.05 1 14.29
Full reportinga 9 24.32 2 9.52 1 14.29
Note. a Percentages were calculated for the respective number of cases when validation evidence
for a novel measure was reported.
Case Study: Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale
The original Wilson and Patterson (1968) Conservatim Scale presented 50 items, half
of them assumed to be agreed to by participants high in conservatism. Each agreement
(Yes) with a conservative statement and disagreement (No) with a non-conservative item
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was assigned a value of 2. A value of 0 was assigned for answers of the opposite pattern
(i.e. disagreement with conservative statements and agreement with non-conservative
statements). If uncertain (? ) a value of 1 was given. The authors aggregated all values
(sum score) resulting in a possible range of scores from 0 to 100. Ranging from 1968 to
2017, the majority of the 49 mentions coded in this review were from Psychology (n = 35,
71.43%), only 12.25% were from Political Science (n = 6). Table 7.3 provides an overview
of the coded measurement specifics.
Table 7.3.








n % n % n %
Number of items reported 29 82.86 6 100.00 7 87.50
Scale type reported 27 77.14 5 83.33 4 50.00
Scoring technique reported 23 65.71 3 50.00 5 62.50
Mean scorea 10 43.48 0 0.00 4 80.00
Sum scorea 13 56.52 2 66.67 1 20.00
Validation evidence reportedb 7 58.33 0 0.00 1 20.00
Scale use as suggested by the authorsc 4 11.43 0 0.00 0 0.00
Note. aPercentages were calculated for the respective number of cases when scoring techniques were
reported. bPercentages were calculated for the respective number of cases when the number of items was
not 50 (n = 12 in Psychology, n = 4 in Political Science, and n = 5 for Other). cThat is, whenever authors
reported using 50 items and a sum scoring of the Yes/No/? scale.
The original version with 50 items was used about half of the time (n = 21, 42.86%)
and mostly in Psychology (n = 17, 48.57%). Item count ranged from 13 to 67 items
and was validated in 38.1% (n = 8) of all cases whenever item count was not 50. Scale
and scoring type as suggested by the original authors was coded in 40.82% (n = 20) and
32.65% (n = 16) of all cases, respectively. Overall, we coded four cases (8.16%) where
the original number of items, scale type, and scoring technique were used (see Figure 7.2
on the following page).
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The present review aimed at providing a historical assessment of political ideology
measurement with a special focus on replicability and validity. Using a forward and
backward snowballing search strategy, we identified 394 articles of which 207 met all
inclusion criteria. We extracted information along five broad categories that will also
structure the following discussion. We highlight key findings per category, provide
recommendations for improving the current practice and give a concluding assessment of
the findings regarding implications for replicability and validity.
Meta-Information
More than half of the coded articles had been published after 2003. Comparing this to
publications on the topic of ‘political ideology’ available in the Web of Science database,
our sample even underrepresents studies published from 2003 to 2020. 85.51% of the
articles found under the keyword ‘political ideology’ in any scientific discipline listed on
Web of Science were published after 2003.20 Within this database search, Personality
and Individual Differences was the second most frequently listed journal, The Journal of
Social Psychology was on rank 17, while Political Psychology was the most prominent
outlet. For political science, the American Journal of Political Science ranked eighth,
the Journal of Politics ranked fourth, while The Forum was not among the top ten
journals. While our sample does deviate from the actual publication statistics, we suggest
it represents a sufficiently representative sample in terms of years of publication and
publication outlet. Interestingly, Political Psychology was the most frequent journal for
both disciplines on Web of Science. This might speak to an increasing interdisciplinary
interest in the topic of political ideology and is all the more reason to consider differences
in measurement practice between fields.
Sample Specifics
Sample sizes were reported in almost all cases for psychology but only in about half of
the articles from political science. Standard deviations and the range in sample size were
large for both fields. This variance might have been driven by studies using panel data or
20Numbers retrieved from https://apps.webofknowledge.com/ on December 17, 2020. We searched
for publications on the topic of ‘political ideology’ between 1929 and 2020.
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instances where large scale data (e.g. Dimock, Kiley, Keeter, & Doherty, 2014; Graham
et al., 2011; Kubin & Brandt, 2020) or Twitter data (Kteily, Rocklage, McClanahan,
& Ho, 2019) was analyzed. Using panel data such as the American National Election
Survey seems to be more common in political science than in psychology.
While we sampled studies conducted in 76 different countries, a large majority of
the samples were from OECD countries with more than a quarter from the United
States alone. These findings are in line with previous critical assessments of sampling
practices in psychology that found 68% of all subjects to be from the United States, and
another 27% from the English-speaking countries21 and Europe (Arnett, 2008). That
is, countries that made up 12% of the population at the time, and whose population
is as critics put it “a truly unusual group” (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010b,
p. 61) or even among “the most psychologically unusual people on Earth” (Henrich,
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010a, p. 29) were largely over-represented in our dataset. The
discussion about asymmetric sampling from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich,
and Democratic countries (WEIRD, Henrich et al., 2010b) has put into question the
generalizability of findings with regard to “the rest of the world’s population, the other
95%” (Arnett, 2008, p. 602). Findings that model an individual’s political ideology with
regard to any other psychological or behavioral outcome can hence only be accurate
for WEIRD countries. Not only does this bear implications for social sciences and the
self-set mission to identify universal principles underlying human behavior, it may also
have societal consequences (Henrich et al., 2010a). Policy-makers relying on WEIRD
research to inform global politics need to be aware of the very special subsample that
studies have been conducted with. Henrich et al. (2010a, p. 29) suggest that “recognizing
the full extent of human diversity does not mean giving up on the quest to understand
human nature” but rather that it would paint a more just and accurate picture of it.
Study and Measurement Specifics
We found that across our sample of 207 articles, 222 distinct scales had been used,
of which about a quarter were not given a name. Out of the nine scales that had
been used more than once, the most prominent scales were the Wilson and Patterson
Conservatism Scale (Wilson & Patterson, 1968), and De Witte’s (1990) Cultural and
21English-speaking countries are the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
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Economic Conservatism scales making up about twenty percent of all measurement
instances. For sixty percent of all measures no reference to a previously used and
validated scale was provided. For both, novel and non-novel scales, scale type was
reported in most cases while lower and upper limit of the scale and scoring technique
were only reported half of the time. Exact item wording was more often reported for
novel than for established scales. With nominally more scales than articles of which only
few were used repeatedly and the majority was constructed on the fly, it seems that
there has been little consistency across and within fields throughout the last century.
However, we suggest that different explanations underlie the heterogeneity in psychology
and political science, respectively. More than half of the novel measures in political
science were composite scales constructed from panel data variables that were referenced
in the majority of articles. Compared to single cross-section data, panel data comes
with the advantages of more accurate inference of model parameters, greater capacity
for capturing the complexity of human behavior, and a simplification of computational
and statistical inference (Hsiao, 2007, p. 3–5). There is usually little change regarding
the variables assessed over the years, providing a convenient sample of longitudinal data.
However, this also means that analyses can only be conducted with the variables at hand
leading to a plethora of unnamed scales. In psychology, more than half of the scales were
novel, whereas most of them, unlike in political science, were named. This potentially
speaks to the toothbrush problem in that psychological researchers exhibit a tendency
to provide novel conceptual work instead of building on and replicating previous work
(Mischel, 2005, 2008). To speak metaphorically; while psychologists would rather develop
their own toothbrush each and give it a distinct name, political scientists feel comfortable
drawing from the same pool of readily available toothbrushes but wouldn’t bother naming
them.
Validation Evidence
Validation evidence can be provided in two ways. Either authors reference to previous
work where the scale in question had been validated, thereby assuming that this validation
evidence extends to their study or they provide the evidence themselves (Flake et al.,
2017). For the present sample we found that whenever scales were novel or had no
reference to previous studies, less than half of the authors reported factorial validation
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evidence. Out of those, full reporting of factor analytical specifics (technique, rotation,
and extraction method) was provided in less than twenty percent. To the extent that the
scales coded for this review intend to measure one underlying latent construct across
multiple studies or even multiple latent constructs within one study, construct validation is
of paramount importance. Just like it is imperative for researchers studying temperature
to make sure their instrument measures temperature and not humidity or air pressure,
we need to make sure that our scales actually measure what we think they do (Flake et
al., 2017, p. 374). Surely, the full process of scale construction and validation is lengthy
and complex. Yet, shying away from it eventually leaves us with questionable conclusions.
Measuring political ideology heterogeneously in the absence of systematically developed
scales creates the untested and potentially misleading assumption that those measures
capture the same latent construct when we do not know that they do. Hence, we can not
rule out succumbing to jingle fallacies (Thorndike, 1904). These different scales could
have differential relationships to other constructs, leading to the erroneous conclusion
that the same ideology does not relate consistently to external correlates. However,
several scales composed of different items may also be highly correlated with each other
and therefore lead to similar empirical effects in different studies (Weidman et al., 2017).
This could be investigated empirically by comparing convergent and predictive validity of
multiple ideology measures in one study. So far, however, we cannot assume that different
scales actually capture identical latent constructs. Like Flake et al. (2017, p. 374), we
suggest that “researchers consider their studies as part of a broader literature which
encompasses substantive theory including what is known about how to best measure the
constructs central to that theory”. This way, well-established and validated scales can be
confidently implemented (if used as intended) and conclusions can be relied on.
Case Study: Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale
When evaluating the most frequently coded Wilson and Patterson (1968) Conservatism
Scale more closely, we found substantial variance with regard to how it had been
implemented. The original version of the Conservatism Scale as developed and validated
by Wilson and Patterson (1968) was used in four cases out of a total 49. The other
45 versions varied with regard to item count, scale type and scoring technique. Barely
any of the variations were validated. Hence, even when focusing on a single scale only,
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we cannot confidently assume results to be comparable between those studies. While
it might be potentially adequate to update the Conservatism Scale as its items have
been created over forty years ago, this should be done within a full process of construct
validation. If not only the latent construct allegedly underlying all the sampled articles,
but even studies allegedly using the same scale can not be assumed to be equivalent,
then psychological and political science as fields should start being more conscientious
about their decisions.
Summary
The present review provides an overview of how the fields of psychology and political
science have been measuring political conservatism in the last century. We found several
asymmetries and inconsistencies whose impact on replicability and validity we will discuss
hereinafter. Our data suggest a potential threat to replicability of the fields’ findings
given the incomplete reporting of measurement specifics in general, and especially for
novel, not previously validated scales. Incomplete reporting of measurement specifics can
also threaten statistical conclusion validity as undisclosed measurement flexibility can
potentially allow for questionable research practices such as different scoring techniques
that can lead to different outcomes (Flake & Fried, 2020). Given the large asymmetry
when it comes to representativeness of samples in favor of WEIRD countries, or, more
specifically, in favor of the United States, we propose that external validity may be
threatened as well. Either authors need to be clear about the restricted scope their
findings may apply to, or sampling needs to be extended to other, non-WEIRD countries.
Finally, the lack of reported validation evidence for novel scales leaves us with the
assumption that construct validity within the measurement of political conservatism is
also threatened.
7.4.1. Limitations and Future Research
Given that the inclusion criteria of this review were such that only work on operational
political conservatism was included, we can only assume that our results would generalize
to other constructs like for instance operational political liberalism, or libertarianism.
The representativeness in itself might be compromised by the selection technique of
forward and backward snowballing as chosen articles were by definition interlinked to a
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certain degree. Future research could draw random samples from a body of literature
obtained from keyword searches to ensure a less internally coherent sample.
We had taken on a relatively conservative approach with regard to coding. That
is, we took information as published but never contacted the authors for additional
information on for instance validation evidence or item wording. Hence, our conclusions
might be overly pessimistic vis-à-vis the true state of the world. We also disregarded
the actual content of the scales, information necessary to actually evaluate construct
validity. In order to assess the degree to which scales on operational political conservatism
measure the same underlying latent construct, future research endeavors could focus on
a systematic assessment of scale content on the one hand, and measurement invariance
on the other hand.
We believe that as a field, we need an institutional effort towards a standardized
measure of ideology or a set of standardized measures which are continuously updated
and whose psychometric properties are known. For instance, we should have a measure
whose dimensionality is known and tested across high-quality surveys. We should have a
measure that is invariant across major population groups, and ideally, invariant in time.
Another path forward would be to qualify findings based on ideological topics, rather
than scales, and try to generalize to ideology if findings work on a variety of both social
and economic issue positions. Yet another approach is to have theory-based measures.
That is, to focus on theoretical clarity and possibly try to limit the scope of ideology
to a theory-justified range of issues as a mean to placate the conceptual chaos we are
currently in.
7.4.2. Conclusion
Given previous works from different fields on similar questions (Flake et al., 2017;
Flake & Fried, 2020; Hussey & Hughes, 2020; Shaw et al., 2020; Weidman et al., 2017),
we conclude that our findings might not apply to research on political ideology only. We
suggest that the threats to replicability and validity outlined above could be mitigated
by considering four suggestions. Firstly, by making a full report of measurement specifics
mandatory whenever authors deviate from a scale for which this information is available.
Secondly, by embedding one’s own research within a larger body of literature to the extent
that well-established and validated scales are used to answer new questions. Thirdly, by
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providing factorial validation whenever there is a need for a new scale and reporting all
factor analytical specifics necessary. And finally, by making an effort to expand sampling
beyond our own WEIRD scope.
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8. General Discussion
“There is little technical basis for telling
whether a given experiment is an eco-
logical normal, ... or whether it is more
like a bearded lady at the fringes of real-
ity, or perhaps like a mere homunculus
of the laboratory out in the blank.”
Egon Brunswik, 1955, p. 204
This dissertation investigated the impact of different context factors such as domain,
identity, and measurement on political ideology and its psychological underpinnings. It
was the overarching aim to disentangle psychological processes from variance due to
context by taking on an ecological perspective along the lines of Brunswik (1955, 1956).
By representative sampling of experimental stimuli, the present work aimed at expanding
our knowledge about whether and how individuals’ political ideology relates to their
underlying psychological make-up. In four self-contained chapters, I tested the domain-
specificity of need for cognitive closure (Chapter 4), investigated the impact of identity and
group membership on political attitudes (Chapter 5) and political polarization (Chapter
6), and conducted a systematic review of political ideology measurements (Chapter 7).
To conclude this dissertation, I will discuss findings from the present four chapters and
eight studies with regard to the opening quote. Has the effort of representative sampling
brought us closer to finding the ecological normal, that is, the underlying psychological
process? Can we rule out the possibility of bearded ladies at the fringes of reality or
laboratory homunculi? And if not, have we at least come closer to identifying them?
Following this introduction, I will provide a summary of the present research and highlight
main findings. After integrating implications and the contribution of said findings I
will discuss this work’s limitations, outline future research avenues and finish with an
overarching conclusion.
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8.1. Main Findings, Implications & Contribution
In the first project of this dissertation, I tested the overarching hypothesis of domain-
specificity of need for cognitive closure. I hypothesized that need for cognitive closure,
rather than as a function of political ideology alone (see for instance, Jost et al., 2003b),
would result from an interaction of domain and political ideology. More specifically, I
assumed ideological symmetries in need for cognitive closure when the domain addressed
was taken into account. In a total of three studies, participants filled in either a domain-
general or a domain-specific version of one of three operationalizations of need for cognitive
closure; discomfort with ambiguity (Study 1 and 2), closed-mindedness (Study 2), or
dogmatism (Study 3). Political domains used in these studies were sampled with regard
to relevant political discussions in the country of participants’ origin at the time of data
collection. Across all three studies, I consistently found higher need for cognitive closure
in liberals relative to conservatives when an environmental domain (environment in Study
1, climate change in Study 2 and 3) was addressed. Vice versa, conservatives displayed
higher need for cognitive closure within two out of three operationalizations (discomfort
with ambiguity and dogmatism) than liberals when a religious domain was addressed.
When personal relevance of the domain was accounted for, differences in domain-specific
discomfort with ambiguity (Study 2) and dogmatism (Study 3) were no longer significant,
suggesting it may underlie domain-specificity of need for cognitive closure. Inconsistent
with previous work (e.g., Jost et al., 2003b; Kossowska & Hiel, 2003), I did not find higher
levels of domain-general discomfort with ambiguity or closed-mindedness for conservatives.
Only for domain-general dogmatism did they display significantly higher levels than
liberals (Jost, 2017).
In line with previous work (Brandt et al., 2014; Conway et al., 2016, 2018; Elad-
Strenger et al., 2020; Fiagbenu et al., 2019; Proch et al., 2019), the present studies lend
further support to the notion of an ideology symmetry hypothesis. That is, while different
beliefs and values may lead liberals and conservatives to assign personal relevance to
different topics, respectively (Feldman, 2013; Graham et al., 2013), the motivation to
defend their convictions seems to be similar for both. While the present results cannot
explain the underlying mechanism beyond the notion that personal relevance might play
a role, representative stimulus sampling regarding both, domain and latent construct,
did help us disentangle content from psychological processes (Kessler et al., 2015). This
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work is among the first to account for the complexity of cognition in political contexts by
modeling several issue domains and operationalizations of need for cognitive closure. The
results emphasize the necessity of representative sampling for the study of underlying
psychological processes.
In a second project, I examined the degree of entanglement between political attitudes
and the salient level of identity dependent on one’s political orientation. I built on
previous work that found shifts in attitudes when a certain level of identity (personal
vs. political) was induced (i.e., identity-based attitude shifts, Cohen, 2003; Conover
& Feldman, 1984; Malka & Lelkes, 2010; Popp & Rudolph, 2011) and introduced the
notion of easy and hard issues (Carmines & Stimson, 1980; Pollock et al., 1993). Social
issues have often been assumed to be easy, that is, they are familiar, highly salient, and
individuals often rely on heuristics when indicating their agreement with such. Economic
issues have been labeled hard as they can be more abstract and complex than easy issues.
In two studies, one in Canada, one in the United States, I assigned participants randomly
to one of two conditions where either their personal or political identity salience was
manipulated. Participants indicated their stance on a total of forty political attitude
items half of which were pro-attitudinal for conservatives, and half were pro-attitudinal
for liberals. I expected an interaction between the salient level of identity (personal vs.
political) and the fit between one’s own ideological orientation and the respective issue
stance. That is, I assumed liberals to endorse conservative economic attitudes more
strongly when their personal identity was salient compared to when their political identity
was salient. And vice versa, conservatives were expected to endorse liberal attitudes
more strongly when their personal identity was salient. Secondly, I hypothesized that
when their political identity was salient, both, liberals and conservatives, would entrench
their existing economic attitudes. We expected no such interaction for social issues. In
line with hypotheses, individuals indeed endorsed counter-attitudinal issues stronger
when their personal identity was salient, and pro-attitudinal issues more strongly when
their political identity was salient. This was only found for economic (hard) issues and
for individuals whose ‘own’ party (i.e., the party associated with their own political
orientation) was not in government.
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These results attest to the importance of identity and the nature of issues in deter-
mining people’s political attitudes. They enrich the literature on how social identities
can impact behavior and perception by introducing an identity-based perspective into
the debate on nonattitudes and the operational-symbolic disconnect (Converse, 1964,
1970; Ellis & Stimson, 2012). Moreover, the natural manipulation of different ideological
orientations of the governing party in each of the samples provided further support for
the the need of an ecological perspective. Not only do we need to consider a variation
of experimental stimuli, we also need to take into account societal variables such as the
party in power and potentially heightened political identity due to national elections. To
my knowledge, these studies provide first experimental evidence of how identity salience
affects people’s stances on hard and easy issues differently. Furthermore, they might
present quasi-experimental evidence of how public politics shape political cohesion on an
individual level.
The third project investigated the effect of exposure to in- or out-group fake news on
political polarization. I empirically tested the hypothesis put forward by theorists and
in simulations (Azzimonti & Fernandes, 2018; Ribeiro et al., 2017; Tucker et al., 2018)
that exposure to online fake news can exacerbate polarization in affect and attitudes of
the electorate. I presented participants with real-life fake news and orthogonally crossed
correction (disclosure vs. no disclosure) and group membership of the sender (in-group
vs. out-group vs. ambiguous). In doing so, the impact of exposure to online fake news
on affective (Study 1) and attitude polarization (Study 2) was compared as a function
of whether or not participants knew the social media post was factually incorrect and
their identification with the perceived sender. The question I posed was whether and
under which circumstances encountering political fake news on social media could lead
to a polarization in affect and attitudes. Would correcting fake news increase or decrease
polarization? And would it matter whether the alleged sender was perceived an ingroup
rather than an outgroup member? In two separate studies I assessed the impact of
fake news posts on an individual’s affective (Study 1) and attitude polarization (Study
2) and whether this impact was dependent on how strongly they identified with the
perceived sender. Exposure to in- and out-group fake news were associated with high
affective polarization (Study 1) while higher levels in attitude polarization were found
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after exposure to out-group fake news (Study 2). Informing participants about the fake
news nature of the post attenuated affective polarization for those perceiving the sender
to be an out-group member only (Study 2).
The present results suggest that exposure to in-and outgroup fake news may impact
affective polarization differently than attitude polarization. It is the first empirical work
to investigate the impact of exposure of in- and outgroup fake news on attitude and
affective polarization separately and hence, contributes to a growing body of insights
investigating the consequences of exposure to and the correction of fake news. In line
with suggestions for instance from Wells and Windschitl (1999), this work modeled
different stimuli as random factors to control for variance due to stimulus variation. As
no differences in polarization were found between stimuli, I was able to generalize across
stimuli while still allowing for a more representative experimental design.
The fourth and final project entails a non-exhaustive systematic review of nearly
400 scientific articles that include a measure of ideology. Reviewing studies from the
1930s up to 2019, we sampled across a wide range of social sciences’ subfields. A total of
394 selected articles were identified, 309 articles measured ideology in some form, and
from those which were accessible, 207 articles used an operational measure of ideology.
Overall, we cataloged more than 200 unique ideological measures, of which only but
a third had been developed and validated beforehand. And from these, only a small
minority provided information on statistical technique, extraction and rotation method,
which are needed for replication. About 50% of all ideological instruments lacked a
single mention of validation evidence. Indeed, the majority of the scales were on-the-fly
measures or a combination of items used in previous studies. Furthermore, the data
suggests that replicability might be restricted due to incomplete reporting of the items
used, and substantial variance in scoring and scale type (even within seemingly identical
scales).
Taken together, these circumstances might hinder the ability to build on each other’s
work and thus likely pose a serious threat to the comparability and generalizability
of findings. The results call upon empirical researchers to acknowledge the need for
thorough reporting and construct validation in the interest of cumulative science and
valid inferences. It is the first systematic review to map social scientific practices in
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the measurement of political ideology and should be considered the prelude of future
empirical work putting the discussed validity threats to test. It also provides a new
perspective onto representative sampling, as it puts into question whether the plethora
of ideological instruments represents the environment about which a researcher wishes
to make inferences. While this may well be the case, the lack of construct validation
precludes us from coming to such conclusions.
8.2. Limitations and Future Directions
Several limitations, open questions and ambiguous results in this dissertation lay out
the path for future research endeavors and will be outlined below.
Not only is there substantial variance in psychology and political science regarding
the measurement of operational conservatism (see Chapter 7), there are also several
conceptualizations of political ideology of which I only considered one in this dissertation;
a one-dimensional spectrum of conservatism and liberalism. Chapter 4, 5, and 6 only used
a symbolic liberal-conservative self-placement scale as predictor variable and factored
in neither operational conservatism or liberalism, nor other political ideologies such as
libertarianism or socialism. While this choice was made intentionally in order to build on
existing literature that predominantly modeled liberalism and conservatism as political
ideologies, future research should widen the scope as to capture a more fine-grained
picture. Furthermore, having both, symbolic and operational measures within one study
would account for and shed light onto how the operational-symbolic disconnect (Converse,
1964; Ellis & Stimson, 2012) relates to psychological processes.
In Chapter 4, domain-specific scales were compared to an allegedly domain-general
scale. However, from previous work we know that scales or stimuli can hardly be ‘neutral’
inasmuch as individuals resort to an accessible salient context when evaluating the scales
or stimuli (Fiagbenu et al., 2019, 2020; Schmitt et al., 2003). Hence, the domain-specificity
or domain-generality of a stimulus should always be considered as a random factor in
experimental designs. While this was indeed considered for fake news stimuli in Chapter
6, this design lacked control stimuli in the sense of true news (as opposed to fake news).
Furthermore, the stimuli used in this chapter were on purpose ideologically slanted.
Subsequent studies should also consider more moderate stimuli and could, for instance,
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include a fact-checker tool and orthogonally cross verity of news (true vs. fake) and
disclosure (disclosure vs. no disclosure) on both, slanted and non-slanted stimuli.
The present work aimed at sampling representative stimuli for the experimental designs
in order to increase ecological validity. However, as Brunswik (Brunswik, 1955, 1956)
suggested, a single individual should also be exposed to multiple representatively sampled
stimuli in order to map intraindividual differences when facing different context variations.
This was not the case in any of the present studies. In the interest of orthogonal salience
manipulation, participants were only exposed to one domain (Chapter 4), one identity
salience manipulation (Chapter 5), one fake news stimulus, and one dependent variable
(Chapter 6). The present findings need to be replicated in either within-subjects or
longitudinal designs where participants would be exposed to multiple stimuli at one or
several points in time.
In order to disentangle context variation from the underlying psychological mechanism,
a number of explanatory variables should be considered in future studies. In Chapter
4 and 5, strength of ideological identificiation, perceived group status, and political
sophistication could explain part of the observed variance in addition to personal relevance.
Moreover, perceived threat, identity salience, and several stimulus features should have
been accounted for in Chapter 6.
Construct validation can be conceptualized in three phases: substantive, structural, and
external validation (Benson, 1998; Clark & Watson, 2016; Flake et al., 2017; Loevinger,
1957; Strauss & Smith, 2009). For the systematic review conducted in Chapter 7 only
structural validity evidence was considered. The claims put forward in this chapter
need to be substantiated by systematic assessment of scale content, their convergent,
discriminant, and predictive validity, as well as measurement invariance. Furthermore,
representativeness of sampled studies needs to be accounted for by either random or
more systematic sampling.
Finally, all participants in this dissertation were sampled from either Germany, Canada,
or the United States. All of which are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and
Democratic (WEIRD, Henrich et al., 2010b) countries, and hence, any inferences made
and conclusions drawn are limited to such countries. Future research should consider




The overarching goal of this dissertation was to evaluate the stability of political atti-
tudes and their psychological underpinnings in the face of situational and methodological
variance. In summary, the four lines of research highlight the necessity of representative
sampling and context sensitivity when assessing the psychological foundations of political
attitudes. Returning to Hannah Arendt’s understanding of political thought as impartial
and representative, this thesis substantiates my initial suggestion that impartial public
opinion may be a desired rather than an actual state. In line with theories on political
socialization (Eckstein, 2019) and the stimulus sampling paradigm (Brunswik, 1955,
1956), the three experimental chapters in this dissertation (Chapter 4, 5, and 6) illustrate
how the interrelation between ideological orientation, political attitudes, and certain
psychological motives heavily depends on and varies along with the context provided. In
taking on a meta-perspective, Chapter 7 systematically reviewed and mapped practices
in the measurement of political ideology. Results suggest substantial heterogeneity in
ideological instruments and a non-negligible lack of construct validation therein. Hence,
not only do we need to account for ecological variance by stimulus sampling, we also
need to consider our choice of instrument as an additional source of variance.
In four chapters, this thesis paints a comprehensive, multi-perspective picture of the
need to consider contextual factors of various origins. This need becomes even clearer if
one takes into account that political ideology by definition develops in shared, that is,
social contexts. Acknowledging contextual and methodological variance in the study of










Domain-General and Domain-Specific Discomfort with Ambiguity.
Domain-general
1 I don’t like situations that are uncertain.
2 I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason why an event occurred in my life.
3 When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset.
4 In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong.
5 I like to know what people are thinking all the time.
6 I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many different things.
7 It’s annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind.
8 I feel uncomfortable when someone’s meaning or intention is unclear to me.
9 I’d rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty.
Domain-specific (religion/environment)
1 I don’t like to feel uncertain about religious (environmental) issues.
2 I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason for my religious (environmental)
beliefs.
3 When I am confused about a religious (environmental) issue, I feel very upset..
4 In most conflicts on religious (environmental) topics, I can easily see which side is right
and which is wrong.
5 With respect to religious (environmental) topics, I like to know what people are thinking
all the time.
6 I dislike it when a person’s statement on religious (environmental) issues could mean many
different things.
7 It’s annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind on religious
(environmental) topics.
8 I feel uncomfortable when someone’s meaning or intention on religious (environmental)
topics is unclear to me.
9 I’d rather know bad news when it comes to my religious (environmental) convictions than




Domain-General and Domain-Specific Closed-Mindedness.
Domain-general
1 Even after I’ve made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a
different opinion. (r)
2 I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.
3 I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes.
4 When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could be right.
(r)
5 When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as
possible. (r)
6 I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from my own. (r)
7 I always see many possible solutions to problems I face. (r )
8 I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view.
Domain-specific (religion/climate change)
1 Even after I’ve made up my mind about religion (climate change), I am always eager to
consider a different opinion. (r )
2 I dislike questions on religion (climate change) which could be answered in many different
ways.
3 I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes about
religion (climate change).
4 When considering most conflicts on religion (climate change), I can usually see how both
sides could be right. (r )
5 When thinking about religion (climate change), I consider as many different opinions on
the issue as possible. (r )
6 I prefer interacting with people whose opinions on religion (climate change) are very
different from my own. (r)
7 I always see many possible solutions to problems related to religion (climate change). (r )
8 I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view on religion
(climate change).
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Dogmatism
Table A.3.
Domain-General and Domain-Specific Dogmatism.
Domain-general
1 Anyone who is honestly and truly seeking the truth will end up believing what I believe.
2 There are so many things we have not discovered yet, nobody should be absolutely certain his beliefs are
right. (r)
3 The things I believe in are so completely true, I could never doubt them.
4 I have never discovered a system of beliefs that explains everything to my satisfaction. (r)
5 It is best to be open to all possibilities, and ready to reevaluate all your beliefs. (r)
6 My opinions are right, and will stand the test of time.
7 Flexibility is a real virtue in thinking, since you may well be wrong. (r )
8 My opinions and beliefs fit together perfectly to make a crystal-clear ”picture” of things.
9 There are no discoveries or facts that could possibly make me change my mind about the things that
matter most in life.
10 I am a long way from reaching a final conclusion about the central issues in life. (r)
11 The person who is absolutely certain they have the truth will probably never find it. (r )
12 I am absolutely certain that my ideas about the fundamental issues in life are correct.
13 The people who disagree with me may well turn out to be right. (r)
14 I am so sure I am right about the important things in life, there is no evidence that could convince me
otherwise.
15 If you are ”open-minded” about the most important things in life, you will probably reach the wrong
conclusions.
16 Twenty years from now, some of my opinions about the important things in life will probably have
changed. (r)
17 “Flexibility in thinking” is another name for being “wishy-washy”.
18 No one knows all the essential truths about the central issues in life. (r)
19 Someday I will probably realize my present ideas about the BIG issues are wrong. (r)
20 People who disagree with me are just plain wrong, and often evil as well.
Domain-specific (religion/climate change/abortion/gun ownership/same-sex marriage)
1 Anyone who is honestly and truly seeking the truth about [...] will end up believing what I believe.
2 When it comes to [...], there are so many things we have not discovered yet, nobody should be absolutely
certain his beliefs are right. (r)
3 The things I believe in regarding [...] are so completely true, I could never doubt them.
4 When it comes to [...], I have never discovered a system of beliefs that explains everything to my satis-
faction. (r)
5 It is best to be open to all possibilities, and ready to reevaluate all your beliefs concerning [...]. (r)
6 My opinions on [...] are right, and will stand the test of time.
7 Flexibility is a real virtue in thinking, since you may well be wrong about [...]. (r )
8 My opinions and beliefs fit together perfectly to make a crystal-clear ”picture” of [...].
9 There are no discoveries or facts that could possibly make me change my mind about [...].
10 I am a long way from reaching a final conclusion about the central issues regarding [...]. (r)
11 The person who is absolutely certain they have the truth about [...] will probably never find it. (r)
12 I am absolutely certain that my ideas about the fundamental issues in [...] are correct.
13 The people who disagree with me on [...] may well turn out to be right. (r)
14 I am so sure I am right about the important things in life like [...], there is no evidence that could convince
me otherwise.
15 If you are ”open-minded” about [...], you will probably reach the wrong conclusions.
16 Twenty years from now, some of my opinions about [...] will probably have changed. (r)
17 “Flexibility in thinking” regarding [...] is another name for being “wishy-washy”.
18 No one knows all the essential truths about [...]. (r)
19 Someday I will probably realize my present ideas about [...] are wrong. (r)
20 People who disagree with me on [...] are just plain wrong, and often evil as well.
Note. (r) indicates reverse-coded items. [...] represents a placeholder where the respective topic (reli-




Study 1: Sample Size per Domain and Ideological Orientation.
Control Religion Environment Sum
Conservative 53 63 57 174
Liberal 65 94 101 260
Sum 118 157 158 433
Table A.5.
Study 2: Sample Size per Domain and Ideological Orientation.
Control Religion Climate Change Sum
Conservative 15 15 20 50
Liberal 36 26 32 94
Sum 51 41 52 144
Table A.6.
Study 3: Sample Size per Domain and Ideological Orientation.
Control Religion Climate Abortion Gun Same-Sex Sum
Conservative 27 29 20 26 26 26 154
Liberal 50 52 51 49 50 46 298
Sum 97 81 71 75 76 72 452
Note.Climate = Climate Change; Gun = Gun Ownership; Same-Sex = Same-Sex Marriage
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Table A.7.
Study 3: Contrasts of Estimated Marginal Means of Dogmatism between Domains per
Ideological Orientation.
Contrast Estimate SE t p
Conservatives
Religion – Climate Change .66 .32 2.06 .40
– Abortion −.45 .33 −1.37 1.00
– Gun Ownership −.15 .33 −.45 1.00
– Same-Sex Marriage −1.64 .33 −.93 1.00
Climate Change – Abortion −1.11 .30 −3.73 .00
– Gun Ownership −.81 .30 −2.72 .07
– Same-Sex −.96 .30 −3.24 .01
Abortion – Gun Ownership .30 .31 .98 1.00
– Same-Sex .14 .31 .47 1.00
Same-Sex Marriage – Gun Ownership −.16 .31 −.51 1.00
Liberals
Religion – Climate Change −1.17 .22 −5.37 <.001
– Abortion −.92 .22 −4.18 <.001
– Gun Ownership −.98 .22 −4.46 <.001
– Same-Sex Marriage −1.64 .22 −7.31 <.001
Climate Change – Abortion .24 .22 1.12 1.00
– Gun Ownership .19 .22 .87 1.00
– Same-Sex −.47 .22 −2.12 .35
Abortion – Gun Ownership −.06 .22 −.26 1.00
– Same-Sex −.72 .23 −3.17 .02
Same-Sex Marriage – Gun Ownership −.66 .23 −2.93 .04
Note. Bonferroni method was used to correct p values for multiple testing.
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B.1. Scales
Aspects of Political and Personal Identity
Table B.1.
Aspects of Political and Personal Identity.
Political Identity
Group self-esteem
1 I think my group has little to be proud of. (r)
2 I feel good about my group.
3 I have little respect for my group. (r)
4 I would rather not tell that I belong to this group. (r)
Self-categorization
5 I identify with other members of my group.
6 I am like other members of my group.
7 My group is an important reflection of who I am.
Commitment to the group
8 I would like to continue working with my group.
9 I dislike being a member of my group. (r)
10 I would rather belong to the other group. (r)
Personal Identity
Personal self-esteem
1 I have got what it takes.
2 I think I have sufficient qualities.
3 I generally feel like a failure. (r )
4 I can do most things just as well as others.
5 I have nothing to be proud of. (r )
6 I feel good about myself.
7 I am generally satisfied about myself.
Personal identification
8 I see myself as someone with individual characteristics.
9 I am different from other people.
10 I feel like a unique person.
Note. (r) indicates reverse-coded items.
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Inclusion of the In-Group in Self
Which of the following circles best represents your own level of identification with this
group? (S = Self, G = Group)
Figure B.1.. Inclusion of the Political Group in the Self.
Political Attitudes
Topic Selection We intended to create a set of items that comprises current topics
which are perceived as either conservative or liberal. In a first step, we evaluated well
established scales that have, however, been created more than 20 years ago (Eaves et al.,
1999; Pratto et al., 1994; Wilson & Patterson, 1968). After excluding items that were
outdated or not indicative of either ideology, we added topics from a more recent scale
that were not yet represented (Everett, 2013), and rephrased every topic twice, once in a
conservative and once in a liberal pro-attitudinal sense. This set of items was reassessed
and after excluding duplicates and non-indicative items, 20 topics or 40 items remained.
Step 1 We asked N = 101 participants to evaluate a list of 59 topics on whether they
thought the respective topic was definitely conservative, somewhat conservative, definitely
liberal, somewhat liberal, or whether they were undecided on how to categorize the topic
(see Table B.2 for all items). Item 1 through 28 were taken from Eaves et al. (1999) and
Wilson and Patterson (1968), item 29 through 58 from Pratto et al. (1994). After compar-
ing these items with the most prominent issues on https://www.isidewith.com/polls
at the time of the study (November 2018), we included another item on fracking, a topic
that was popular but had not been captured by the aforementioned scales.
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Table B.2.
Frequency Table of Evaluations in Step 1.
Item Def. con.e Def. lib. Swt. con. Swt. lib. Und.
1 Death penalty 61 3 26 3 8
2 Astrology 2 15 2 10 72
3 X-rated movies 2 23 3 17 56
4 Modern art 1 33 3 28 36
5 Women’s liberation 1 78 2 17 3
6 Foreign aid 7 33 13 35 13
7 Federal housing 3 59 7 29 3
8 Democrats 1 71 2 26 1
9 Military drill 59 3 24 3 12
10 Military draft 48 2 27 3 21
11 Abortion 10 61 5 16 9
12 Property tax 25 13 15 18 30
13 Gay rights 1 85 1 13 1
14 Liberals 0 96 0 4 1
15 Immigration 8 38 10 23 22
16 Capitalism 62 1 21 3 14
17 Segregation 47 3 23 8 20
18 Moral majority 38 13 14 12 24
19 Pacifism 6 46 6 21 22
20 Censorship 43 8 23 7 20
21 Nuclear power 24 10 25 10 32
22 Living together 5 6 23 23 44
23 Republicans 89 2 9 1 0
24 Divorce 7 13 11 20 50
25 School prayer 80 2 15 3 1
26 Unions 13 47 9 24 8
27 Socialism 5 61 6 17 12
28 Busing 3 17 6 29 46
29 Death penalty for drug kingpins 58 4 26 4 9
30 Prisoner’s rights 3 60 2 30 6
31 Longer prison sentences 75 0 18 5 3
32 Gay or lesbian marriage 1 87 1 11 1
33 Gay and lesbian rights 3 88 1 6 3
34 Guaranteed job security after mater-
nity leave
3 70 4 19 5
Continued on next page
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Item Def. con.e Def. lib. Swt. con. Swt. lib. Und.
35 Stiffer penalties for wife beating 10 33 10 25 23
36 Equal pay for women 2 67 2 22 8
37 More women judges 2 66 1 25 7
38 Government sponsored health care 0 83 3 14 1
39 Better support for the homeless 2 68 4 23 4
40 More support for early education 4 49 3 35 10
41 Free school lunches 5 62 3 26 5
42 Low income housing 2 63 4 26 6
43 Arresting the homeless 54 3 23 2 19
44 Guaranteed jobs for all 2 72 9 14 4
45 Reduced benefits for the unemployed 65 4 26 2 4
46 Greater aid to poor kids 4 68 3 23 3
47 Increased taxation of the rich 2 78 5 15 1
48 Racial quotes 21 14 17 14 35
49 Affirmative action 2 72 3 22 2
50 School busing 6 25 5 19 46
51 Civil rights 6 59 5 21 10
52 Helping minorities get a better edu-
cation
2 67 3 23 6
53 Government helping minorities get
better housing
3 72 5 16 5
54 Government has no business helping
any particular ethnic group in the job
market
71 3 15 6 6
55 Decreased defense spending 8 55 7 27 4
56 Going to war 57 5 22 3 14
57 Government-mandated recycling pro-
grams
2 65 3 29 2
58 More government involvement on
clean air and water
4 72 5 19 1
59 Fracking 56 3 21 1 20
Note. Def. con. = definitely conservative; Def. lib. = definitely liberal; Swt. con. = somewhat conservative;
Swt. lib. = somewhat liberal; Und. = Undecided. Items excluded in Step 2 are printed in italics.
Step 2 In a second step, we reviewed the results (see Table B.2, excluded items are
printed in italics) and excluded items a) where a large share of the sample was undecided
on (e.g., astrology, divorce, X-rated movies), b) where the topic was represented more
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than once (e.g., gay rights, gay and lesbian rights), c) that did not contain policy issues
(e.g., liberals, modern art), and d) that described ideologies themselves (e.g., capitalism,
pacifism). Comparing the remaining 25 items with a more recently developed scale
(Everett, 2013), we added the following topics that were not yet represented in our set of
topics: traditional marriage, limited government, business, gun ownership, patriotism,
traditional values. Furthermore, items that tackled environmental topics (21, 57, 58, 59)
were rephrased to a more up-to-date version regarding government-mandated programs
to decrease the American carbon footprint. Topics that we assumed to comprise several
aspects (immigration, traditional marriage) were split in two new topics each (immigration
and federal aid for refugees; alternative and traditional family structures).
Each of the remaining 34 topics was rephrased so as to represent a liberal or con-
servative stance. The topic health care, for instance, was rephrased as Pro government
sponsored health care (liberal) and Against government sponsored health care (conserva-
tive). The 68 resulting items were evaluated by a sample of N = 127 U.S. American
participants as to whether they though the topic was definitely conservative, somewhat
conservative, definitely liberal, somewhat liberal, both, neither or whether they were
undecided.
Table B.3.
Frequency Table of Evaluations in Step 2.
Item Both Def. con. Def. lib. Neither Swt. con. Swt. lib. Und.
1 Pro-choice 1 9 98 6 2 9 2
2 Pro-life 4 88 17 1 9 4 4
3 Government should help mi-
norities get better housing
3 2 88 1 3 26 4
4 Government should not help
minorities get better hous-
ing
3 70 8 12 26 3 5
5 Government should help mi-
norities get a better educa-
tion
10 4 73 1 7 29 3
6 Government should not help
minorities get a better edu-
cation
2 55 5 22 30 8 5
Continued on next page
147
Table B.3 – Continued from previous page
Item Both Def. con. Def. lib. Neither Swt. con. Swt. lib. Und.
7 Government should help par-
ticular ethnic groups in the
job market
2 2 81 5 3 29 5
8 Government has no business
helping any particular eth-
nic group in the job market
3 70 4 14 26 3 7
9 Pro federal housing 6 2 79 2 6 26 6
10 Against federal housing 1 68 3 12 27 7 9
11 Greater aid to poor kids 22 3 71 4 5 18 4
12 Less aid to poor kids 1 52 3 34 29 5 3
13 Better support for the home-
less
15 4 73 6 5 23 1
14 Less support for the home-
less
4 60 3 21 32 1 6
15 Increased benefits for the un-
employed
4 3 72 4 3 38 3
16 Reduced benefits for the un-
employed
1 60 4 14 35 8 5
17 Pro censorship 5 42 17 30 12 7 14





14 2 82 4 5 14 6
20 Disapprove of government-
mandated programs to de-
crease the American carbon
footprint
3 66 6 9 26 9 8
21 Longer prison sentences 6 64 3 12 31 4 7
22 Shorter prison sentences 4 1 63 16 3 32 8
23 Strengthen prisoner’s rights 6 4 70 14 3 24 6
24 Weaken prisoner’s rights 3 53 5 23 33 6 4
25 Legalize same-sex marriage 4 77 2 8 27 4 5
26 Disapprove of same-sex mar-
riage
4 1 71 8 7 31 5
27 Pro death penalty 10 2 93 0 1 21 0
28 Against death penalty 2 84 2 13 21 3 2
29 Support alternative familiy
structures
11 1 96 2 1 15 1
30 Disapprove of alternative
family structures
1 88 3 11 21 1 2
31 Support gay rights 4 1 85 4 7 22 4
32 Disapprove of gay rights 1 74 5 12 28 2 5
Continued on next page
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Table B.3 – Continued from previous page
Item Both Def. con. Def. lib. Neither Swt. con. Swt. lib. Und.
33 Pro government sponsored
health care
2 4 100 3 3 13 2
34 Against government spon-
sored health care
2 89 2 5 21 4 4
35 More government interfer-
ence
4 10 61 10 8 24 10
36 Less government interfer-
ence
5 77 10 7 19 3 6
37 More government interfer-
ence in business and trade
1 11 59 12 9 24 11
38 Less government interfer-
ence in business and trade
2 76 9 7 22 5 6
39 Pro gun control laws 5 21 85 1 4 11 0
40 Against gun control laws 2 87 17 2 9 6 4
41 Make immigration to the US
easier
1 1 99 3 1 20 2
42 Make immigration to the US
more difficult
2 98 2 2 19 3 1
43 Federal aid for refugees 4 1 88 3 2 24 5
44 No federal aid for refugees 2 79 6 8 25 4 3
45 Increased defense spending 4 86 4 5 20 6 2
46 Decreased defense spending 2 7 66 9 5 34 4
47 Pro patriotism 40 62 3 8 9 0 5
48 Against patriotism 2 3 26 80 1 10 5
49 Establish school prayer 0 83 5 11 15 6 7
50 Abolish school prayer 3 3 77 10 3 22 9
51 Support a desegregation of
neighborhoods
23 5 51 18 11 12 7
52 Disapprove of a desegrega-
tion of neighborhoods
10 30 9 36 19 9 14
53 Increased taxation of the
rich
1 5 95 5 6 13 2
54 Decreased taxation of the
rich
3 79 10 8 18 6 3
55 Support traditional values 6 98 2 2 17 2 0
56 Disapprove of traditional
values
1 4 51 39 2 23 7
57 Support traditional family
structures
10 91 4 1 18 3 0
58 Disapprove of traditional
family structures
1 5 40 60 1 18 2
59 Pro unions 10 15 60 5 6 18 13
60 Against unions 3 58 11 14 23 5 13
Continued on next page
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Table B.3 – Continued from previous page
Item Both Def. con. Def. lib. Neither Swt. con. Swt. lib. Und.
61 Pro women’s liberation 18 1 77 4 1 23 3
62 Against women’s liberation 2 49 2 52 17 3 2
63 Support for guaranteed
job security after maternity
leave
22 5 58 5 4 29 4
64 Opposition to guaranteed
job security after maternity
leave
3 43 6 38 25 6 6
65 More women judges 25 3 57 11 3 23 5
66 Fewer women judges 0 36 3 55 28 1 4
67 Support equal pay for
women
46 2 54 7 2 15 1
68 Disapprove of equal pay for
women
1 41 2 56 18 3 6
Note. Def. con. = definitely conservative; Def. lib. = definitely liberal; Swt. con. = somewhat conservative;
Swt. lib. = somewhat liberal; Und. = Undecided. Items excluded in Step 3 are printed in italics.
Step 3 Finally, we excluded items that were a) not associated with an either liberal
or conservative stance (i.e., that participants associated with both, neither, or that they
were undecided on) for more than 20% of the sample (e.g., support/disapprove of equal
pay for women), and b) were semantically similar to other items (e.g., more government
interference, more government interference in business and trade). We decided to keep
some items (e.g., less support for the homeless) even though they did not meet the
20% criterion when their counterpart (e.g., better support for the homeless) did meet
it. Applying this rationale left us with a total of 40 items, 20 per ideological stance (see
Table B.3, excluded items are printed in italics).
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B.2. Additional Tables
Table B.4.
Study 2: Mean Level Comparison Between Personal and Political Identity Indicator
Variables.
t1 t2
Political Personal t Political Personal t
Group
Self-esteem 5.91 5.72 1.58 6.019 5.79 1.19
Self-categorization 5.20 4.76 3.25∗∗ 5.28 4.94 1.55
Commitment 6.16 5.89 2.22∗ 6.25 6.02 1.41
Personal
Self-esteem 5.39 5.61 −1.57 5.57 5.68 −.50
Identification 5.33 5.61 −2.55∗ 5.27 5.705 −2.15∗
Inclusion in self 4.07 3.72 2.30∗ 4.21 3.70 1.99∗
n 166 169 67 70
Note. †p<.1;∗p<.5; ∗∗p<.01; ∗∗∗p<.001.
B.3. Additional Analyses
Study 1: Detailed Item Analysis
For a more finegrained picture, we analyzed items individually (see Figure B.2 for a
visualization). While we found liberals to differ on virtually no issue between identity
conditions, conservatives’ attitudes varied on most economic but also some social issues.
The interaction of ISP and identity level did not have a significant effect on the aggregate
social issue scales. However, we found conservatives to indicate stronger conservative
stances when their political identity was salient regarding same sex-marriage (personal:
EMM = 2.53, SE = .271, t(430) = 1.255, p < .001, political: EMM = 3.79, SE = .258)
and gay rights (personal: EMM = 2.33, SE = .240, t(430) = 1.030, p = .002 , political:
EMM = 3.36, SE = .228) compared to when it was not. Similarly, they held more liberal
attitudes regarding same-sex marriage (personal: EMM = 5.13, SE = .271, political:
EMM = 4.15, SE = .258, t(430) = −.982, p = .009), gay rights (personal: EMM =
5.40, SE = .240, political: EMM = 4.61, SE = .228, t(430) = −.794, p = .017), and
family structures (personal: EMM = 4.83, SE = .263, political: EMM = 4.12, SE =
.250, t(430) = −.712, p = .05) when their personal identity was salient compared to when






































































































































































































Appendix B. Supplementary Materials Chapter 5
Study 2: Detailed Item Analysis t1
Conservatives indicated stronger conservative stances in the political compared to the
personal identity condition regarding gay rights (personal: EMM = 3.30, SE = .229,
political: EMM = 4.02, SE = .229, t(534) = 2.222, p = .027), gun control (personal:
EMM = 4.16, SE = .255, political: EMM = 4.93, SE = .255, t(534) = 2.127, p = .034),
benefits for the unemployed (personal: EMM = 3.14, SE = .222, political: EMM =
4.12, SE = .222, t(534) = 3.110, p = .002), affirmative action with regard to education
(personal: EMM = 3.65, SE = .235, political: EMM = 4.40, SE = .235, t(534) =
2.238, p = .026), and homeless support (personal: EMM = 2.42, SE = .190, political:
EMM = 3.42, SE = .190, t(534) = 3.714, p < .001). Contrary to expectations, they also
indicated stronger liberal stances on some items in the political compared to the personal
condition, namely on aid for refugees (personal: EMM = 3.09, SE = .231, political:
EMM = 3.95, SE = .231, t(534) = 2.637, p = .009), and traditional values (personal:
EMM = 1.70, SE = .229, political: EMM = 2.56, SE = .229, t(534) = 2.659, p = .008).
Liberals indicated marginally stronger liberal stances regarding death penalty (personal:
EMM = 4.91, SE = .198, political: EMM = 4.42, SE = .197, t(534) = 1.768, p = .078)
and marginally stronger conservative stances on school prayer (personal: EMM =























































































































































































































Figure B.4.. Study 2 t1: Differences in Attitude Scales between Conditions per Ideological
Orientation (Conservative Attitudes in Red, Liberal Attitudes in Blue).
Study 2: Detailed Item Analysis t2
Conservatives indicated stronger conservative stances in the political compared to the
personal identity condition regarding same-sex marriage (personal: EMM = 3.33, SE =
.383, political: EMM = 4.67, SE = .355, t(232) = 2.552, p = .011), gay rights (personal:
EMM = 3.00, SE = .343, political: EMM = 4.05, SE = .317, t(232) = 2.244, p = .026),
and governmental action to reduce America’s carbon footprint (personal: EMM =
2.94, SE = .325, political: EMM = 4.71, SE = .301, t(232) = 3.993, p < .001). Conserva-
tives’ liberal stances were stronger in the personal than in the political identity condition on
same-sex marriage (personal: EMM = 4.72, SE = .383, political: EMM = 3.33, SE =
.355, t(232) = −2.658, p = .008), gay rights (personal: EMM = 5.00, SE = .343, politi-
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cal: EMM = 3.29, SE = .317, t(232) = −3.672, p < .001), family structures (personal:
EMM = 4.56, SE = .402, political: EMM = 3.05, SE = ..373, t(232) = −3.207, p =
.002), and governmental action to reduce America’s carbon footprint (personal: EMM =
4.89, SE = .325, political: EMM = 3.29, SE = .301, t(232) = −3.617, p < .001). Con-
trary to expectations, they also indicated stronger liberal stances on some items in
the political compared to the personal condition, namely on immigration (personal:
EMM = 1.89, SE = .412, political: EMM = 3.00, SE = .381, t(232) = 1.979, p = .049),
and affirmative action for housing (personal: EMM = 2.83, SE = .409, political:
EMM = 4.33, SE = .378, t(232) = 2.692, p = .008). Liberals indicated stronger
liberal stances in the political compared to the personal identity condition regard-
ing affirmative action on education (personal: EMM = 6.27, SE = .245, political:
EMM = 5.43, SE = .267, t(232) = 2.201, p = .029), and stronger conservative stances
in the personal identity condition (personal: EMM = 2.48, SE = .257, political:
EMM = 1.70, SE = .281, t(232) = −2.034, p = .043) on the same topic.
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Study 2: Structural Equation Modeling
Table B.5.
Study 2: Structural Equation Model for Both Identity Conditions.
Personal Identity Political Identity
Estimate SE z p Estimate SE z p
Regression Slopes
Social (con.) t2
Social (con.) t1 0.61 0.13 4.83 .00 0.53 0.12 4.60 .00
Social (lib.) t1 -0.36 0.13 -2.80 .01 -0.46 0.12 -3.73 .00
Economic (con.) t1 0.15 0.15 0.96 .34 -0.07 0.14 -0.45 .65
Economic (lib.) t1 0.05 0.15 0.33 .74 -0.01 0.15 -0.08 .94
Social (lib.) t2
Social (con.) t1 -0.41 0.09 -4.51 .00 -0.20 0.11 -1.75 .08
Social (lib.) t1 0.60 0.09 6.58 .00 0.69 0.12 5.86 .00
Economic (con.) t1 0.08 0.11 0.72 .47 0.04 0.14 0.25 .79
Economic (lib.) t1 0.07 0.10 0.65 .52 0.12 0.15 0.81 .42
Econ (con.) t2
Social (con.) t1 0.10 0.12 0.85 .40 0.09 0.11 0.79 .43
Social (lib.) t1 0.17 0.12 1.38 .17 0.19 0.12 1.65 .10
Economic (con.) t1 0.60 0.15 4.09 .00 0.58 0.14 4.24 .00
Economic (lib.) t1 -0.39 0.14 -2.80 .01 -0.46 0.14 -3.27 .00
Econ (lib.) t2
Social (con.) t1 -0.14 0.11 -1.31 .19 0.25 0.12 2.13 .03
Social (lib.) t1 -0.14 0.11 -1.32 .19 0.18 0.12 1.43 .15
Economic (con.) t1 -0.32 0.13 -2.39 .02 -0.52 0.15 -3.58 .00
Economic (lib.) t1 0.70 0.13 5.56 .00 0.56 0.15 3.71 .00
Residual Covariances
Social (con.) t1 - Social (lib.) t1 -1.69 0.29 -5.84 .00 -2.05 0.35 -5.82 .00
Social (con.) t1 - Economic (con.) t1 1.22 0.25 4.93 .00 1.45 0.29 5.09 .00
Social (con.) t1 - Economic (lib.) t1 -1.24 0.26 -4.84 .00 -1.50 0.29 -5.08 .00
Social (lib.) t1 - Economic (con.) t1 -1.13 0.24 -4.77 .00 -1.46 0.29 -5.04 .00
Social (lib.) t1 - Economic (lib.) t1 1.20 0.25 4.84 .00 1.62 0.31 5.28 .000
Economic (con.) t1 - Economic (lib.) t1 -1.60 0.27 -5.90 .00 -1.74 0.30 -5.87 .00
Social (con.) t2 - Social (lib.) t2 -0.11 0.03 -4.02 .00 -0.11 0.03 -3.85 .00
Social (con.) t2 - Economic (con.) t2 0.11 0.03 3.20 .00 -0.00 0.02 -0.14 .89
Social (con.) t2 - Economic (lib.) t2 -0.04 0.03 -1.22 .22 -0.05 0.03 -1.81 .07
Social (lib.) t2 - Economic (con.) t2 -0.02 0.02 -0.99 .33 0.00 0.02 0.06 .95
Social (lib.) t2 - Economic (lib.) t2 0.05 0.02 2.44 .02 0.01 0.03 0.56 .58
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C.1. Pretest Stimuli
Method
Participants 136 German participants were recruited online in November 2019 and
complete data was collected for N = 112 participants with a mean age of M = 24.45
(SD = 6.59) of which 76.79% (n = 86) were female. Mean ideological orientation was
M = 2.72 (SD = 1.22) and the survey was completed with an average time of M = 10.53
minutes (SD = 8.22).
Instruments and Procedure In a between-subjects design, participants were ran-
domly assigned one of eight real-life social media posts that were factually incorrect
(retrieved from https://www.mimikama.at) and were asked to carefully read the post
presented. After passing an attention question regarding the respective stimulus contents,
participants indicated the amount of dissonant discomfort, positive and negative affect
they experienced after reading the post and were then asked to rate a list of political
groups according to their perceived likelihood of this group being the sender. They
reported how strongly they identified with each of these groups, how credible they found
the stimulus and to what extent they found it likely that this stimulus had actually
been shared on social media. The survey was completed with a number of demographic
questions.
Stimuli Eight real-life social media posts were retrieved from https://www.mimikama
.at, four of which (Figure C.1) were presumably targeted at left-wing rather than right-
wing individuals, and vice versa for another four (Figure C.3). Participants each saw one
stimulus for a minimum of 15 seconds.
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Figure C.1.. Left-Wing Stimuli
(a) Stimulus 1: Honorary chairman (b) Stimulus 2: Birthplace Hitler
(c) Stimulus 3*: Hambach Forest (d) Stimulus 4*: Taxes
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Figure C.3.. Right-Wing Stimuli
(a) Stimulus 5*: Greta Thunberg (b) Stimulus 6*: Green Party Parliament
(c) Stimulus 7: Green Party Migration (d) Stimulus 8: Christmas Bonus Refugees
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Affect Participants indicated how strongly they experienced dissonance/psychological
discomfort by rating the extent to which they felt uncomfortable, uneasy, and bothered
(Elliot & Devine, 1994) on a scale from 1 (= not at all) to 7 (completely). They were
further asked to state the extent to which they experienced negative (afraid, ashamed,
hostile, nervous, upset) and positive affect (active, inspired, attentive, determined, alert)
(adapted from Röcke & Grühn, 2003; Watson & Clark, 1999) using the same scale.
Sender Participants were asked to indicate how likely (0 = very unlikely to 100 =
very likely) they thought one of the following groups to be the sender of the post they had
just seen: environmental activists, climate change skeptics, refugees, Antifa, Nazis, right-
wing extremists, left-wing extremists, politically moderates, CDU (Christian Democratic
Union of Germany), SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany), AfD (Alternative for
Germany), FDP (Free Democratic Party), Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The
Greens), Die Linke (The Left), Other (optional string entry).
Identification On a scale ranging from 0 (= not at all) to 100 (= completely)
participants indicated their level of identification with all of the above-mentioned political
groups.
Credibility and Sharing-Likelihood of Stimuli On a scale from 0 (very incred-
ible) to 100 (very credible) participants indicated how credible they found the stimulus.
They were furthermore asked how likely they thought it was that the presented stimulus
had actually been shared on social media (0 = very unlikely to 100 = very likely).
Results
Mean affect ratings per stimulus are presented in Table C.1, mean perceived likelihood
of certain political groups being the sender in Table C.2. Figure C.5 and C.6 display
credibility and dissemination likelihood ratings, respectively.
Stimuli - Leftist Sender Stimulus 1 (Hambach Forest) made participants feel un-
comfortable (M = 3.92, SD = 2.04), upset (M = 4.20, SD = 2.12), and attentive (M =
4.20, SD = 1.71). Participants perceived environmental activists (M = 87.64, SD =
162
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Table C.1.
Mean Affect Ratings Per Stimulus.
Affect 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
uncomfortable 3.92 3.47 4.93 5.00 4.36 3.36 3.25 2.82
uneasy 3.56 2.93 4.33 3.92 4.00 3.00 3.17 3.09
bothered 3.24 3.20 4.73 3.92 3.09 3.91 2.50 2.18
upset 4.20 4.47 5.47 6.08 4.45 4.18 4.25 3.45
hostile 3.20 2.93 4.47 4.00 2.82 3.09 3.67 2.18
alert 3.76 3.40 4.20 4.17 4.73 4.27 3.50 3.36
ashamed 3.12 2.87 5.27 5.33 3.36 3.55 3.75 4.18
inspired 3.44 2.87 3.47 3.92 4.00 3.64 3.75 3.36
nervous 3.36 2.40 3.13 3.42 3.27 3.09 2.17 2.36
determined 3.44 3.00 3.53 2.83 3.91 2.91 3.42 3.00
attentive 4.20 4.53 4.67 4.67 5.55 5.09 4.00 4.09
afraid 3.00 2.33 3.27 3.83 2.64 1.45 1.75 1.73
active 3.12 2.27 3.60 3.17 3.91 3.45 3.08 3.36
Note. 1 = Hambach Forest, 2 = Taxes, 3 = Birthplace Hitler, 4 = Honorary Chairman,
5 = Green Party Migration, 6 = Green Party Parliament, 7 = Greta Thunberg, 8 = Christmas
Bonus Refugees. Highest mean scores per stimulus are printed in bold font.
19.30), the Green (M = 75.24, SD = 19.08) or the Left party (M = 57.48, SD = 25.86)
to be the most likeliest senders. Credibility was higher for stimulus 1 (M = 48.96, SD =
20.01) compared to stimulus 4 (M = 29.92, SD = 24.15t(63) = 2.527, p = .014), no
differences in dissemination likelihood were found.
Stimulus 2 (Taxes) made participants feel uncomfortable (M = 3.47, SD = 2.13), upset
(M = 4.47, SD = 2.26), and attentive (M = 4.53, SD = 1.64). Participants perceived the
Left party (M = 80.13, SD = 17.10), left-wing extremists (M = 75.47, SD = 19.09), or
Antifa (M = 69.21, SD = 28.73) to be the most likeliest senders. Credibility was higher
for stimulus 2 (M = 56.87, SD = 23.19) compared to stimulus 3 (M = 41.40, SD =
19.74t(63) = 1.974, p = .053) and 4 (t(63) = 3.243, p = .002) and perceived slightly
more likely to be shared (M = 85.27, SD = 12.135) than stimulus 3 (M = 70.4, SD =
31.04, t(63) = 1.844, p = .070).
Stimulus 3 (Birthplace Hitler) made participants feel uncomfortable (M = 4.93SD =
1.75), upset (M = 5.47, SD = 1.96), and ashamed (M = 5.27, SD = 1.75). Participants
perceived the AfD (M = 78.80, SD = 19.89), Nazis (M = 77.53, SD = 16.26), or
right-wing extremists (M = 76.93, SD = 18.05) to be the most likeliest senders.
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Stimulus 4 (Honorary Chairman) made participants feel uncomfortable (M = 5.00SD =
1.60), upset (M = 6.08, SD = 1.00), and ashamed (M = 5.33, SD = 2.19). Participants
perceived the AfD (M = 78.58, SD = 29.67), right-wing extremists (M = 75.25, SD =
29.05), or Nazis (M = 70.33, SD = 36.00) to be the most likeliest senders.
Table C.2.
Mean Likelihood of Political Group Being the Sender per Stimulus.
Sender 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Environmental activists 87.64 57.00 19.13 11.09 40.73 16.00 33.58 21.46
Climate change skeptics 16.16 11.13 51.07 44.82 37.00 79.73 55.75 26.91
Refugees 17.88 36.20 9.93 7.82 37.82 17.20 20.27 21.64
Antifa 46.30 69.21 43.00 42.86 48.10 25.22 32.20 16.60
Nazis 11.84 6.67 77.53 70.33 22.27 76.90 41.17 70.91
Right-wing extremists 13.48 6.40 76.93 75.25 25.55 77.82 49.75 70.00
Left-wing extremists 54.80 75.47 25.36 31.92 61.10 16.80 35.00 23.91
Moderates 36.16 32.62 33.23 29.22 30.67 38.75 47.00 47.00
CDU 18.04 28.33 28.33 25.25 33.10 48.00 46.75 49.18
SPD 37.36 40.73 29.93 16.75 38.18 31.64 36.92 39.91
AfD 17.56 7.80 78.80 78.58 27.64 84.36 61.67 76.64
FDP 17.52 27.93 31.60 23.67 25.91 40.50 45.33 42.82
Green Party 75.24 65.47 19.13 13.00 56.64 2.55 20.00 25.91
The Left 57.48 80.13 23.13 40.08 53.00 23.50 35.33 25.00
Note. 1 = Hambach Forest, 2 = Taxes, 3 = Birthplace Hitler, 4 = Honorary Chairman,
5 = Green Party Migration, 6 = Green Party Parliament, 7 = Greta Thunberg, 8 = Christmas
Bonus Refugees. Highest mean scores per stimulus are printed in bold font.
Stimuli - Rightist Sender Stimulus 5 (Green Party Migration) made participants
feel upset (M = 4.45, SD = 1.63), alert (M = 4.73, SD = 1.74), and attentive (M =
5.55, SD = 1.13). Participants perceived left-wing extremists (M = 61.09, SD = 36.32),
the Green (M = 56.64, SD = 33.97), or the Left party M = 53.00, SD = 33.52) to be
the most likeliest senders.
Stimulus 6 (Green Party Parliament) made participants feel upset (M = 4.18, SD =
2.09), alert (M = 4.27, SD = 1.01), and attentive (M = 5.09, SD = .70). Participants
perceived the AfD (M = 84.36, SD = 6.80), climate change skeptics (M = 79.73, SD =
15.81), or right-wing extremists M = 77.82, SD = 13.91) to be the most likeliest senders.
Stimulus 7 (Greta Thunberg) made participants feel upset (M = 4.25, SD = 2.49),
ashamed (M = 3.75, SD = 2.18), inspired (M = 3.75, SD = 1.71), and attentive
(M = 4.00, SD = 1.71). Participants perceived the AfD (M = 61.67, SD = 29.62),
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Figure C.5.. Credibility of Stimuli.
climate change skeptics (M = 55.75, SD = 38.81), or right-wing extremists M =
49.75, SD = 32.35) to be the most likeliest senders.
Stimulus 8 (Christmas Bonus Refugees) made participants feel upset (M = 3.45, SD =
2.16), ashamed (M = 4.18, SD = 2.52), and attentive (M = 4.09, SD = 1.45). Par-
ticipants perceived the AfD (M = 76.64, SD = 27.63), right-wing extremists (M =
70.00, SD = 24.85), or Nazis M = 70.91, SD = 30.25) to be the most likeliest senders.
No significant differences in credibility or dissemination likelihood between stimuli were
found. Overall, left-wing stimuli were perceived more credible (M = 45.63, SD = 22.83)
than right-wing stimuli (M = 28.69, SD = 23.31, t(93.192) = 3.801, p < .001) while no
differences in dissemination likelihood between left-wing (M = 76.39, SD = 22.18) and
right-wing stimuli (M = 80.98, SD = 20.54, t(99.311) = −1.122, p = .264) was found.
Discussion
Out of the four stimuli (stimulus 1, 2, 3, and 4) that were sent by left-wing rather
than right-wing individuals, only two (stimulus 1 and 2) were perceived as such, that
is, sent by a left-wing political group (environmental activists, the Green party, the




















































































Figure C.6.. Dissemination Likelihood of Stimuli.
than stimulus 3 and 4, and in one case more likely to be shared. All stimuli elicited
psychological discomfort and upset. While stimulus 1 and 2 also made participants feel
attentive, stimulus 3 and 4 elicited shame.
All except one (stimulus 5) right-wing stimuli were perceived to have been sent out
by rightist political groups (AfD, climate change skeptics, right-wing extremists, Nazis).
Participants felt negative affect (upset, alertness, shame) and attentiveness after exposure
to any of the right-wing stimuli, while stimulus 7 also felt inspiring to some. Overall,
credibility was lower for right-wing than for left-wing stimuli, yet, stimulus 6 and 7 had
absolute highest mean ratings within the group of right-wing stimuli.
Stimulus 1, 2, 6, and 7 were chosen to be implemented in the study design as they
were the most credible within their group and were each perceived to have been sent out
by a sender with the intended ideological orientation.
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C.2. Construct Validation of Political Attitudes Scale
The Wahl-O-Mat (Federal Agency for Civic Education, 2017) attitude scales used for
this study have, to the best of our knowledge, not been structurally validated, nor have
their number of dimensions been assessed systematically. Alongside recent developments
in psychometrics focusing on network models, so called Markov Random Fields (Lauritzen,
1996), Golino and Epskamp (2017) introduced exploratory graph analyses (EGA) as an
alternative way of estimating the dimensional structure of psychological data. They
could elaborately show that EGA performed equally well or even outperformed more
traditional approaches in a number of simulation studies.
We applied EGA to the political attitude scales using the EGAnet package (Golino &
Christensen, 2019). In a recursive process items were analyzed one by one using Gaussian
graphical LASSO (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) with extended Bayesian
information criterion in order to select the optimal regularization parameter. A Walktrap
algorithm was used for node similarity-based community detection. Similar to Golino and
Demetriou (2017, p. 58) we applied two rules to assess dimensionality with EGA. Firstly,
whenever a dimension was represented by a single item only, this item was deleted and
the analysis was repeated. Secondly, we estimated node strength, that is, the between-
and within-community strength of each item for each community, which can be seen as a
rough equivalent to factor loading (Christensen, Golino, & Silvia, 2020). Whenever node
strength was < |.1| for all dimensions, the item was also deleted and EGA was re-run.
The final model was then submitted to confirmatory factor analysis using a weighted
least square mean and variance adjusted (WLSMV) estimator in lavaan (Rosseel, 2012).
Model fit was verified by evaluating the comparative fit index (CFI, Bentler, 1990), the
root mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), the normed fit index (NFI), the
nonnormed fit index (NNFI, Bentler, 1990), and the standardized root mean square
residual (SRMR) for each of the models. Good model fit is indicated by CFI > .95 (Hu &
Bentler, 1999), RMSEA < .08 (Browne & Cudeck, 1992), NFI and NNFI > .90 (Bentler
& Bonett, 1980), and SRMR < .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis
In a first step, EGA identified seven factors all represented by more than one item
(see Figure C.7). Five items had a node strength < |.1| and were excluded (a6, a14,
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a17, a24, a34). The second EGA suggested a five-dimensional structure with only one
item with a node strength < |.1| (a35). The third EGA identified four factors with
no single item-dimensions or node strengths < |.1| (see Table C.3 for an overview of
the dimensional structure per model). None of the models provided good fit (Model
1: χ2(608) = 1992.912, p < .001, CFI = .774, RMSEA = .073, NFI = .706, NNFI =
.752, SRMR = .089; Model 2: χ2(454) = 1557.597, p < .001, CFI = .800, RMSEA =
.075, NFI = .741, NNFI = .782, SRMR = .092; Model 3: χ2(428) = 1649.961, p <
.001, CFI = .773, RMSEA = .081, NFI = .718, NNFI = .754, SRMR = .098, see
Figure C.8, C.9 and C.10 for visualizations of all CFA structures). However, the second
model had the highest CFI, NFI, and NNFI with an RMSEA still < .08. Hence, we
chose to proceed with the five-dimensional factor structure as suggested in Model 2
(see Table C.4). Two items (a9 and a22) had a node strength below < |.1| while
loading considerably higher on other factors (factor 4 and 5, respectively). Regarding
content, these items also provided a better fit with the factors they had higher node
strength with. This solution provided a better fit than Model 2 and was hence used for
analyses in Study 2 (χ2(454) = 1438.3, p < .001, CFI = .822, RMSEA = .071, NFI =
.761, NNFI = .805, SRMR = .089, see Figure C.11). Factor 1 tackled economic issues,
factor 2 democracy and globalization, factor 3 environmental issues, factor 4 domestic
and immigration policies, and factor 5 contained neoliberal issues.
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(c) Model 3 (31 items)
Figure C.7.. Study 2: Exploratory Graph Analysis Using gLASSO and a Walktrap
Algorithm for Three Different Models.
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Study 1: Correlation of Identification with Perceived Sender and Ideological Orientation
per Stimulus and Time of Disclosure.
Hambach Forest Taxes Green Party Greta Thunberg
Overall −.488∗∗∗ −.471∗∗∗ .444∗∗ .359∗∗∗
Disclosure late −.464∗∗∗ −.463∗∗∗ .472∗∗∗ .291∗
Disclosure early −.523∗∗ −.484∗∗ .401∗ .440∗∗
Note. ∗∗∗p < .001; ∗∗p < .01; ∗p < .05.
Table C.6.








No disclosure 60 46 48 58 212
Disclosure 41 43 38 43 165
Sum 101 89 86 101 377
176
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Table C.7.
Study 1: Sample Size per Disclosure Condition, Identification with Sender, and Ideological
Orientation.
Conservative Liberal Sum
No disclosure Ambiguous 33 17 50
Sender ingroup 34 41 75
Sender outgroup 46 41 87
Sum 113 99 212
Disclosure Ambiguous 32 13 45
Sender ingroup 21 17 38
Sender outgroup 45 37 82
Sum 98 67 165
Sum Ambiguous 65 30 95
Sender ingroup 55 58 113
Sender outgroup 91 78 169
Sum 211 166 377
177
Table C.8.
Study 1: Multiple Regression Predicting Affective Polarization From Time of Disclosure,
Identification with Perceived Sender, Ideological Orientation, and their Interaction.
95% CI
B (SE) LL UL t
In-group sender 1.25∗∗∗ .56 1.95 3.55
(.35)
Out-group sender 1.30∗∗∗ .65 1.95 3.95
(.33)
Disclosure .50 −.20 1.21 1.40
(.36)
Liberal .78† −.06 1.63 1.82
(.43)
In-group sender X Disclosure −.92† −1.97 .14 −1.71
(.54)
Out-group sender X Disclosure −1.34∗∗ −2.26 −.42 −2.86
(.47)
In-group sender X Liberal −.37 −1.44 .70 −.68
(.54)
Out-group sender X Liberal −.69 −1.73 .35 −1.31
(.53)
Disclosure early X Liberal −.51 −1.76 .74 −.81
(.64)
In-group sender X Disclosure X Liberal .97 −.72 2.66 1.13
(.86)
Out-group sender X Disclosure X Liberal .93 −.60 2.46 1.20
(.78)
Age .01 −.00 .02 1.37
(.01)
Male .06 −.25 .36 .38
(.16)
Higher education .01 −.29 .31 1.18
(.15)





F (15, 357) 3.34∗∗∗
Note: †p<.1; ∗∗p<.01; ∗∗∗p<.001
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Table C.9.
Study 2: Sample Size per Disclosure Condition and Stimulus.
Hambach forest Taxes Greens parliament Greta Thunberg
Overall 94 103 117 118
No disclosure 48 56 63 60
Disclosure 46 47 54 58
Table C.10.
Study 2: Intercorrelations of Indices.




F3 −.43∗∗∗ .41∗∗∗ .39∗∗∗
F4 .44∗∗∗ −.12∗ −.22∗∗∗ −.25∗∗∗
F5 .02 .19∗∗∗ −.07 −.03 .28∗∗∗
AP F1 −.11∗ .32∗∗∗ .03 .03 .11∗ .26∗∗∗
AP F2 −.22∗∗∗ .25∗∗∗ .31∗∗∗ .17∗∗∗ .01 .25∗∗∗ .68∗∗∗
AP F3 −.12∗ .26∗∗∗ .11∗ .25∗∗∗ .03 .21∗∗∗ .66∗∗∗ .64∗∗∗
AP F4 .18∗∗∗ .12∗ −.08 −.07 .46∗∗∗ .24∗∗∗ .63∗∗∗ .52∗∗∗ .53∗∗∗
AP F5 .05 .15∗∗ −.05 −.08 .26∗∗∗ .67∗∗∗ .57∗∗∗ .49∗∗∗ .45∗∗∗ .49∗∗∗
Note. ∗∗∗p < .001; ∗∗p < .01; ∗p < .05. IO = Ideological orientation, higher values indicate a more
right-wing/conservative orientation; F = Factor; AP = Attitude polarization.
Table C.11.
Study 2: Correlation of Identification with Perceived Sender and Ideological Orientation
per Stimulus and Time of Disclosure.
Hambach Forest Taxes Green Party Greta Thunberg
Overall −.476∗∗∗ −.392∗∗∗ .293∗∗ .240∗∗
No disclosure −.481∗∗∗ −.574∗∗∗ .403∗∗∗ .279∗
Disclosure −.468∗∗ −.119 .104 .156
Note. ∗∗∗p < .001; ∗∗p < .01; ∗p < .05.
179
Table C.12.
Study 2: Intercorrelations of Indices Per Time of Disclosure.
IO F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 AP F1 AP F2 AP F3 AP F4 AP F5
IO −.37∗∗∗ −.43∗∗∗ −.46∗∗∗ .51∗∗∗ −.01 −.04 −.20∗∗ −.07 .20∗∗ .07
F1 −.35∗∗∗ .06 .41∗∗∗ −.18∗ .18∗ .38∗∗∗ .25∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗ .14∗ .17∗
F2 −.42∗∗∗ .07 .43∗∗∗ −.30∗∗∗ −.11 .03 .30∗∗∗ .09 −.07 −.11
F3 −.40∗∗∗ .41∗∗∗ .35∗∗∗ −.28∗∗∗ .01 −.02 .09 .19∗∗ −.09 −.13
F4 .37∗∗∗ −.06 −.14∗ −.22∗∗∗ .28∗∗∗ .06 −.04 −.03 .43∗∗∗ .26∗∗∗
F5 .05 .19∗∗ −.03 −.06 .29∗∗∗ .22∗∗ .21∗∗ .21∗∗ .23∗∗∗ .66∗∗∗
AP F1 −.16∗ .26∗∗∗ .03 .07 .16∗ .29∗∗∗ .65∗∗∗ .63∗∗∗ .59∗∗∗ .54∗∗∗
AP F2 −.24∗∗∗ .24∗∗∗ .32∗∗∗ .24∗∗∗ .07 .28∗∗∗ .69∗∗∗ .60∗∗∗ .48∗∗∗ .43∗∗∗
AP F3 −.17∗∗ .24∗∗∗ .13 .30∗∗∗ .09 .22∗∗∗ .69∗∗∗ .67∗∗∗ .48∗∗∗ .41∗∗∗
AP F4 .16∗ .11 −.09 −.05 .48∗∗∗ .25∗∗∗ .67∗∗∗ .54∗∗∗ .57∗∗∗ .43∗∗∗
AP F5 .04 .12 −.01 −.04 .28∗∗∗ .67∗∗∗ .58∗∗∗ .55∗∗∗ .48∗∗∗ .54∗∗∗
Note. ∗∗∗p < .001; ∗∗p < .01; ∗p < .05. Intercorrelations for participants in the disclosure early condition
(n = 205) are presented above the diagonal, and intercorrelations for participants in the disclosure
late condition (n = 227) are presented below the diagonal. IO = Ideological orientation, higher values indicate
a more right-wing/conservative orientation; F = Factor; AP = Attitude polarization.
Table C.13.
Study 2: Sample Size per Disclosure Condition, Identification with Sender, and Ideological
Orientation.
Conservative Liberal Sum
No disclosure Ambiguous 48 21 69
Sender ingroup 29 29 58
Sender outgroup 62 38 100
Sum 139 88 227
Disclosure Ambiguous 42 15 57
Sender ingroup 20 24 44
Sender outgroup 53 51 104
Sum 115 90 205
Sum Ambiguous 90 36 126
Sender ingroup 49 53 102
Sender outgroup 115 89 204
Sum 254 178 432
180





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































D. Supplementary Materials Chapter 7
D.1. Additional Tables
Table D.1.
Ten Most Frequently Coded National Origin of Samples.
Rank Country n %
1 USA 128 28.01
2 England 23 5.03
3 Australia 19 4.16
4 Sweden 17 3.72
5 Belgium 13 2.84
6 Wales 12 2.63
7 Germany 11 2.41
8 Scotland 10 2.19
9 Netherlands 9 1.97
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